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In the dissertation “Enabling Pain, Enabling Insight: Opening up Possibilities for Chronic
Pain in Disability Rhetoric and Rhetoric and Composition,” Hilary Selznick argues that pain is
rhetorical, accessible, and communicable to those without the lived experience of chronic pain.
Additionally, she argues for the necessity of considering chronic pain as a disability and not
merely as a symptom of a disability. In order to make these arguments possible, Selznick crafts a
political-relational-rhetorical methodology that challenges restrictive models of disability and
theoretical and commonplace assumptions that pain is resistant to language. Specifically,
Selznick’s methodology, which combines disability scholar and activist Alison Kafer’s politicalrelational model of disability with research in disability and feminist rhetorics, makes visible the
socio-political, cultural, economic, and material realties of living with chronic pain and the
generative power of rhetoric to transform commonplace understandings of disability. In so doing,
this dissertation reveals disability as positive difference. In this way, Selznick’s dissertation not
only disrupts and intervenes in problematic rhetorics of chronic pain, but also introduces
alternative and productive rhetorics of pain that account for pain as a necessary and privileged
position. By doing this work, this dissertation provides a presence for chronic pain and persons
with chronic pain in disability rhetoric, rhetoric and composition, disability studies, feminist

rhetorics, and medical rhetorics, while also forging critical alliances between these diverse yet
intersecting fields.
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PROLOGUE
“Do you think it’s true, that pain destroys language?” asked the self-identified patient
advocate in the second row. She was poised and assured. She looked about my age. When I
didn’t answer right away (I was sure I was looking at her blankly, although my mind was
running a 50-yard dash trying to pull up a reference), she continued, “That’s what trauma
theorists say, Elaine Scarry. . . .” After swallowing back a “who?” and my initial response of
“that’s ridiculous,” I thought back to a class I took on trauma and the Holocaust and remembered
something about how during traumatic events, survivors don’t actually experience what happens,
that it is not until they tell their story to another, that it is witnessed, that it becomes lived.
It was my second time presenting at an academic conference and my first time doing so
at the Conference of the Society for Disability Studies (SDS), so I had not yet learned from my
advisor to say, “I need to take some time and think about that, thank you,” nod, and then write
down the question in my notebook. Instead I found myself replying, what I thought at the time
was, at best, naïve: “I don’t know. But I think we should at least try.”
And yet, not knowing the answer to that question became a pivotal moment, a moment
that inspired this dissertation, a moment that brought me back to my own experiences with
chronic pain (not that I actually ever leave them), but this time to seek a different answer. I think
of the many times over the years that I tried to explain to my husband and wondered if he was
“getting” the twisted ache in my belly, the spasms that split across my abdomen, the reason why
I dropped to the floor with my arms around my belly. I would repeat over and over again how it
felt, using as many descriptive words as possible, just in case he didn’t “get it,” because if he did,
couldn’t he make it go away? And I think back to those days, months, a year with my mother and
father—back in their house, back in the little room upstairs, instead of being away at graduate
1

school, looking up at their faces, knowing that they would never really understand as I tried to
sleep with my legs up against the wall (to take the pressure off my back), and instead only saw
their youngest daughter in tears and in pain and felt the helplessness of it all.
And I remember being in the sixth rheumatologist’s office, he telling me that there are no
trigger points on the feet and gesturing to a map—the outline of a woman’s body—indicating the
18 fibromyalgia trigger points, even though I was having trouble walking and the bottom of my
feet were sore and raw and numb. The same doctor who a year later wouldn’t give me a handicap
placard (but had no problem giving my husband one for the same condition) because technically
I could walk the 200 feet to my destination from my car. But then I think about the place where I
met my husband, the Mayo Clinic’s Pain Center, and how maybe we wouldn’t be celebrating our
10th wedding anniversary if we didn’t, in some way, share each other’s pain.
***
After the Q&A, I followed other SDS conference attendees to the Indian restaurant a few
blocks away from the hotel. I was grateful to be invited, so I didn’t ask them to slow down, wait,
or help me carry my bag (made heavy with the computer inside). Instead I remained silent and
found myself lagging behind the rest of the group while I worried about how much the Indian
food would hurt my stomach. Then I took notice of the wheelchairs and canes, the long boot that
lengthened one foot to meet the other, and I knew that this time I was not alone, and that in this
group I was the one who looked “abnormal.”
At the restaurant, we made quite a commotion, seven unapologetic women needing what
others might call special accommodations, what we called our equal right to occupy public
space. When the shuffling was over, the woman beside me told me she was at my talk and that a
friend of hers at the conference was doing similar work (the two of us, I later realized, were the
2

only presenters at the four-day conference addressing pain and disability). She gave me her
contact information, and then, as I moved my fork around pretending to eat my saffron rice, I
told her how hard it was to keep and make friends with chronic pain.
“That’s because you need crip friends,” came a voice from the middle of the table. I
turned around to see the speaker gazing in my direction, realizing she was blind. “Yes, that’s
right,” the woman I had been talking to called back and then added: “Hey, we can be your crip
friends.” I immediately heard myself say, “Yes, please.”
I was reminded of a presentation earlier in the conference in which Simi Linton
discussed her memoir, My Bodily Politic, and her upcoming film “An Invitation to Dance,”
which was followed by a Q&A. She spoke about the giving up of one life for another, such an
interesting way, I thought, of describing the transition from abled to disabled. One was not more
valuable or whole than the other, she had said in response to a question. She then spoke about her
activism in the DS movement and how claiming a disability made her a part of what she
described as a loving and supportive community. As I gazed around that table, at the strangers I
just met a half a mile ago, I wondered: Perhaps I had just been let in.

3

CHAPTER I
CHRONIC PAIN, DISABILITY, AND RHETORIC
Pain is not only an inevitable component of human existence but also thoroughly entangled with
our experiences of love, joy, humor, and intimacy.
—Susannah Mintz, Hurt and Pain
The central argument of this dissertation is that pain is rhetorical. As such, pain is
accessible, communicable, and representable to those without the lived experience of chronic
pain. However, before continuing, let me be careful to note that by making this claim I am not
attempting to suggest that pain is easily understandable or that it can ever be fully realized by
another (as is true of all human experience). Instead I am offering a beginning, a space to listen
to pain, a possibility for engagement with pain that moves beyond suffering and tragedy and
unknowability. This beginning is made possible only by exploring and opening up opportunities
to witness and access alternative rhetorics of chronic pain that move beyond linear, print-based,
sole-authored, alphabetic text. In order to do this work, this dissertation will first challenge
theoretical and commonplace assumptions that pain is resistant to language1 and lacks
rhetoricity,2 while also disrupting other such problematic rhetorics of chronic pain. Next, this
dissertation will intervene in these problematic discourses by offering up a productive and
1

Scholarship on pain, in particular Elaine Scarry’s 1985 landmark work The Body in Pain: The
Unmaking and Making of the World, argues that pain destroys language and is uncommunicable.
2
The term rhetoricity coined by Lewiecki-Wilson (“Rethinking Rhetoric”) and Prendergast (“On
the Rhetorics of Mental Disability”) refers to those who are perceived by dominant society as
having rhetorical agency. Lewiecki-Wilson and Prendergast counter the commonplace belief that
persons with mental illness lack rhetoricity because they are presumed “not to be competent, nor
understandable, nor valuable nor whole” (Prendergast 26) and cannot communicate. Prendergast
further explains that “to lack rhetoricity is to lack all basic freedom and rights, including the
freedom to express ourselves and the right to be listened to” (26-27). Similarly, I use the term
rhetoricity in relation to persons with chronic pain to refer to how this population has been
oppressed and silenced by the assumption that pain is an uncommunicable personal tragedy.
4

generative alternative rhetoric of chronic pain that honors the lived experiences of persons with
chronic pain. In addition, this alternative rhetoric of chronic pain will account for pain as a
necessary and privileged position that opens up experiences for interdependence, access, and
identification, which are key principles of disability studies and feminist rhetorical
methodologies guiding this dissertation.3
Before continuing, I wish to identify the two definitions of rhetoric that I will use
throughout this dissertation to differentiate between problematic rhetorics of chronic pain and the
generative alternative rhetoric of chronic pain I will be presenting. The former (problematic
rhetorics of chronic pain) defines rhetoric as the persuasive use of language, wherein language
induces audiences to accept certain versions of reality, which can thus be interpreted, contested
and revised, while the latter (alternative rhetoric of chronic pain) defines rhetoric as the study of
how embodiment produces knowledge, identity, and ways of being-in-the-world.4 Making this
distinction is fundamental to the arguments of this dissertation. Of course, these two definitions
also inform each other since how we live in the world is influenced by language about the world.
In addition, I wish to make clear that for the intents and purposes of this dissertation, the pain I
refer to throughout this project is physical pain and not mental pain. I realize that by making this
distinction I am in danger of endorsing the mind/body Cartesian split that in most instances I
believe is an artificial construction and detrimental to theories of embodiment in the very fields I
claim an investment in. However, there are several reasons, including the lack of scholarship on
physical pain in relation to mental pain in disability studies, the limited scope of this dissertation,

3

For further discussion of the methodology used in this dissertation please see chapter 2:
“Theorizing a Political-Relational-Rhetorical Methodology.”
4
I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Julie Jung who assisted me in crafting these definitions of
rhetoric.
5

and the tendency for medical professionals to dismiss chronic physical pain as all “in one’s
head,” that makes this distinction necessary, even if, at times, fraught.
The exigency of this project emerges from the relative absence of chronic pain and
persons with chronic pain in rhetoric and composition, medical rhetorics, disability studies,
feminist rhetorics, and in particular disability rhetoric,5 despite the growing national and
worldwide population of this marginalized and stigmatized group. Chronic pain differs from
acute pain. Unlike acute pain, which is temporary, chronic pain lasts for more than three months
and has no discernible cause. Also unlike acute pain, such as pain resulting from touching a hot
stove, dental pain, or broken bones, chronic pain does not indicate that the body is in danger and
in need of immediate medical attention. Common chronic pain conditions and syndromes include
chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, interstitial cystitis, complex regional pain syndrome,
neuropathy, rheumatoid arthritis, and migraines. The absence of discussion of these syndromes
from scholarship and activism reveals that chronic pain as a disability (and not merely a symptom
of a disability) has yet to be considered in disability studies, by disability activists, the medical
profession, and government agencies such as the Social Security Administration. The failure to
account for chronic pain as a disability results in further alienation of persons with chronic pain,
the potential loss of benefits and resources that can come with a recognized disability status, and
the perpetuation of problematic rhetoric that casts the chronic pain figure as suspect, lazy,
difficult to manage, and drug-seeking. Furthermore, as long as silence surrounds pain it will be

5

Disability rhetoric is a subfield of rhetoric and composition. Disability rhetoric scholars (see,
for example, Brueggemann; Dolmage; Dunn; Kerschbaum; Lewiecki-Wilson; Price; Vidali)
adopt or integrate disability studies research, perspectives, and theory into their rhetoric
scholarship. They argue that naming, cultural practices, institutions (both educational and
medical), media representations of persons with disabilities, and hegemonic abelism contribute
to the rhetorical construction of disability.
6

denied a voice and millions of persons with chronic pain will remain undiagnosed and
undertreated.
Even more troubling are recent statistics from the International Study of Pain that show
that the risk of suicide for persons with chronic pain is roughly twice as high than for other
people and that 17% of those in chronic pain who are not actively suicidal often wish they were
dead (Foreman, A Nation). These statistics, I argue throughout this dissertation, are in large part
a product of problematic rhetorics of chronic pain. Suicide is not the only deadly consequence of
misunderstanding, silencing, and fearing pain. Disability studies scholar Tobin Siebers also
warns in his essay “In the Name of Pain” that as long as pain is silenced, people will continue to
fear it and conclude that a “painful life is a wrongful life” (186). The ramifications of such fear,
Siebers argues, have resulted and can continue to result in the termination of those lives deemed
by others as a “life not worth living” (184). He points to the euthanasia of Terri Schiavo and the
forced mutilation and sterilization of Ashley X6 as the terrible and frightening consequences that
come from the rhetorical assumption that pain is synonymous with suffering and that those in
pain do not have a life of value. Siebers is one of few disability studies scholars who takes up
pain in his scholarship and by doing so demonstrates its necessity. However, without the support
and understanding of more disability activists, disability scholars, and disability rhetoric
scholars, persons with chronic pain will continue to be problematically defined solely by the
media, the medical community, and framed by pharmaceutical advertisements. Hence, this

6

Ashley X was born with cerebral palsy. In 2006, her parents legally induced a medical state of
permanent pre-pubescence in their daughter at the age of six by surgically removing her breast
buds and uterus and by placing her on high doses of estrogen to stunt her growth. Her appendix
was also removed. Later these procedures became known as the Ashley Treatment. Despite the
controversy and the overturning of the ruling years later, her parents defended their actions in the
name of reducing their daughter’s pain (Siebers 85).
7

dissertation argues that chronic pain should be theorized as a disability. As such, it is the ethical
responsibility of disability rhetoric and the larger disability studies community to account for
persons with chronic pain by making visible the oppressive discourses and distorted
representations of the chronic pain figure in medical and public contexts.
Problematic Rhetorics of Chronic Pain
Sitting in a restaurant was agony if the table was too high, which forced my arms and
shoulders up. So was sitting in the movies, looking up to see the screen. Shifting from
sitting or kneeling on the bed to lying down was excruciating—there is simply no way to
do it with a bad neck. So, new, shocking, and incomprehensible was all this that I felt
utterly alone, convinced that no one had ever felt like this before. But, of course, I was
not alone. America, as I soon discovered, was then—and is still—in the midst of a
chronic pain epidemic.
—Judy Foreman, A Nation in Pain
The fact that fifty million Americans suffer from chronic pain does not comfort me.
Rather, it confounds me. “This is not normal,” I keep thinking. A thought invariably
followed by doubt, “Is this normal?”
—Eula Biss, “The Pain Scale”
Pain is tragic. Pain is suffering. Pain is subjective and deeply personal. A painful life is not
thought of as a human life. Pain is inexpressible. The words for pain—hurt, throbbing, aching,
burning—are inadequate in the face of the feeling. Pain is un-American, not part of the pull
yourselves up by your bootstraps mentality. Pain is temporary. Pain is something that happens to
“others” (usually “exotic” foreigners) over “there” (usually in “third-world” countries). Pain is

8

always unpleasant. To be in pain is to be against God. A painful life is easily terminated. These
are just a few of the commonplace beliefs regarding pain.
And yet despite these commonplaces, many of us know little of the realities of lives in
pain or that chronic pain has reached “epidemic” proportions. Here are the figures: According to
a 2011 report by the Institute of Medicine, 100 million Americans live in chronic pain (Foreman,
A Nation). Of those 100 million, 60 million are partially or totally disabled (Morris). Yet, these
numbers are low estimates because they do not account for adolescents, children, and infants
who also experience chronic pain. Also, the actual number of persons with chronic pain is said to
be difficult to determine because pain is underreported. The stigma brought on by cultural,
religious, and social interpretations of the meaning of pain is most likely the reason pain is
underreported (see Morris; Goldberg). Still, even with a low estimate, the American Academy of
Pain Medicine reports that pain affects more Americans than cancer, diabetes, and heart disease
combined (Mintz) and yet only about one percent of the $30.8 billion [2012] budget for the
National Institutes of Health [NIH] is devoted primarily to pain research (Foreman, A Nation).
Likewise, the fact that medical schools require doctors to have, on average, less than 31-to-41
hours of pain education (veterinary students receive more than twice that much) (Foreman, A
Nation) is evidence of the lack of seriousness with which pain is regarded by the medical
profession.
It is also important to note that chronic pain is not just an American problem. The
most recent worldwide figure puts the chronic pain population at 1.5 billion (Borsook). The
British Pain Society estimates that nearly 10 million citizens of the United Kingdom suffer from
chronic pain and The Canadian Pain Society offers a similar figure. In addition, the International
Association for the Study of Pain [IASP] claims that chronic pain is the number one reason for
9

patients to seek medical attention and that pain relief has become a multi-billion-dollar industry
(Mintz). The cause of such high numbers of persons with chronic pain is in part due to, but not
limited to, longer life-spans, improper surgical post-op treatment, medical professionals’
insufficient knowledge of treatments for chronic pain, health professionals’ lack of empathy for
persons with chronic pain, and federal research underfunding of chronic pain conditions.
With such staggering statistics, it is difficult to comprehend why the problem of
chronic pain has not received more attention from medical professionals, disability advocates,
and the fields of disability studies and disability rhetoric. The fact that chronic pain is what
leading pain scholars refer to as “bad” or “ugly” pain is indicative of its disfavor among scholars,
advocates, and physicians (see especially Cervero; Dahl and Lundgren; Schleifer). Unlike acute
pain, or “good” pain, which is described as temporary, productive, and, at times, life-saving
(since it functions as the body’s alarm system to indicate harm), chronic pain is often described
as meaningless since it is believed to send messages of danger that are not real. Pain researchers
explain that “chronic pain is not protective; its intensity bares no relation to the amount of tissue
damage and may in fact, arise without any damage at all. It is like a broken alarm that rings
continuously, signally only its own brokenness” (Thernstorm 44). As witnessed in this brief
excerpt, the rhetoric surrounding chronic pain is disheartening and might in fact cause persons
with chronic pain and their loved ones additional suffering.
Also, most unfortunate is that the rhetoric surrounding the uselessness and suspicious
nature of chronic pain is placed on pain patients. Such problematic rhetoric (that those with
chronic pain are somehow responsible for their pain) is prevalent not only in the medical
profession but also in sociopolitical, legal, economic, and public media contexts, which results in
stigma and isolation felt by those living with chronic pain (specific cases of problematic rhetorics
10

of chronic pain will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4). This rhetoric of blame echoes past and
present religious beliefs that pain is a punishment for those who have sinned.7 Blame and
suspicion of the chronic pain patient are also heightened by the fact that since most chronic pain
conditions are invisible (they fail biotechnology by not appearing in most imaging testing such as
X-rays, MRIs and Cat Scans) they are easily contested and so are the patients claiming to
experience pain. Chronic pain patients often report feeling stigmatized and ostracized by the very
healthcare professionals they seek treatment from.
Ethnographer Jean E. Jackson, working on a study involving chronic pain patients at the
Commonwealth Pain Center, posits that the stigma is a consequence of the fact that chronic pain
conditions confound biomedicine because pain does not correspond to known physical pathology
and challenges mind-body dualism (332). I would also add that persons with chronic pain cause
uneasiness in others (not just healthcare workers) because they cannot be adequately defined as
either “sick” or “healthy,” but exist somewhere in an in-between state. In addition, most people
understand pain as a symptom that accompanies an illness, but for those with chronic pain the
pain becomes its own disease. The fact that women disproportionately to men seek medical care
for chronic pain also discredits chronic pain conditions such as fibromyalgia, migraines, chronic
fatigue syndrome, gastrointestinal disorders, and complex regional pain syndrome, which are
frequently dismissed as the “hysterical” imaginings of emotional females.8 Another reason for
the poor reputation of the chronic pain patient is that we require a lot of physicians’ time since
7

Disability rhetoric scholars James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson locate the origins of
the rhetoric of blame in the Christian Rhetorical Tradition that demonizes the disabled. They
write, “The religious concept of affliction, casting disability as corporeal testimony of sin and
punishment, was an embodied rhetoric persuading Christians of the power of God and the
doctrine of the church” (“Disability, Rhetoric, and the Body” 15).
8
Most chronic pain conditions are gendered female. Amy Vidali explains in further detail the
medical industry’s phenomenon of the “hysterical female” in her essay “Hysterical Again.”
11

our conditions are not easily treatable. Ultimately, taking all of the above into consideration, it is
no wonder that the chronic pain patient is dismissed by the medical profession, the media, and
even, at times, family members and friends as lazy, deceitful, and drug-seeking.
Perhaps the conflation between the drug addict and persons with chronic pain is one of the
most damaging and distorted problematic rhetorics of pain covered in this dissertation. This is
because many persons with chronic pain believe the rhetoric from the medical profession and
fear that they will become addicts and therefore do not seek opioid pain medication; those that do
have difficulty gaining access to them. Not surprisingly, then, pain researchers estimate that one
third of chronic pain patients who need opioids do not receive them (see especially Foreman, A
Nation). Medical writer and chronic pain “survivor” Judy Foreman notes that The Institute of
Medicine refers to this conflation as an opioid conundrum: “People with chronic pain (often
older people with no history of substance abuse) can’t get the opioids they need and could
probably use responsibly while street abusers, often young people, get them all too easily” (127).
For instance, in order to receive opioid medication for the treatment of chronic pain, many
patients are forced to sign “pain contracts” (further information on pain contracts can be found in
chapter 3). These pain contracts blame persons with chronic pain for their inability to control
their pain while relinquishing doctors’ responsibility if the patient becomes addicted to the
prescribed medication. In addition, the pain contract regulates persons with chronic pain by
restricting them to access only one provider for pain medication prescriptions. Furthermore, each
refill requires a doctor’s appointment, which is costly for those with insurance and impossible to
acquire for those without insurance, thereby cementing the subjugation of persons with chronic
pain and, in particular, those of low socioeconomic status.

12

The problematic rhetorics of chronic pain discussed above are just some of the exigent
reasons why it is necessary for chronic pain syndromes to be considered disabilities and worthy
of study and advocacy by rhetoricians, disability studies scholars, and the disability rights
movement. However, before closing this section, I wish to touch upon two more exigent reasons
why chronic pain syndromes need to be acknowledged as disabilities. Without being recognized
as disabled by the disability rights movement and the disability community, persons with chronic
pain have extreme difficulty being awarded Social Security Disability Benefits and employment
protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). As legal disability scholar
Elizabeth Emmons points out, court decisions often reflect societal beliefs and popular opinions.
Perhaps that explains why most chronic pain syndromes do not appear on the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA) List of Impairments, which assists in determining disability benefits.
Likewise, despite the broadened definition of disability brought forth by the 2005 Americans
with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAA), persons with chronic pain syndromes rarely receive
employment protection and reasonable accommodations because of the distorted representation
of the chronic pain figure and their reputation as financial burdens.9 Furthermore, since chronic
pain has not been considered a disability by disability advocates or scholars, not much thought, if
any, has been given to the kinds of “reasonable” accommodations the ADA might be able to
provide persons with chronic pain so they can maintain or gain employment. Without
accommodation suggestions and requests, it is difficult for judges to conceive of the ways in

9

Being considered a financial burden to society is not a new experience for the disabled.
However, still surprising is the amount of space that national pain organizations spend on
detailing the costliness of chronic pain to the workforce rather than providing information on
chronic pain conditions and advocacy for the very persons they are supposed to represent.
13

which the ADA can protect equal employment opportunities and job security for persons with
chronic pain.
Alternative Rhetorics of Chronic Pain
Theorizing alternative rhetorics of chronic pain is a feminist project, a disability studies
project, a rhetoric and composition project, and most definitely a disability rhetoric project. What
these fields have in common is their commitment to working for social justice by challenging the
inequities found in normalized language practices and by recovering subjugated, marginalized,
and oppressed populations who have been silenced and deemed by dominant society as both
failed rhetors and failed human beings. The work of this dissertation, then, is to combine these
fields and their projects in order to provide a presence for persons with chronic pain in their
scholarship and practices as well as in their social justice work inside and outside of academia.
Perhaps then we can carve out a path to providing symbolic, material, and structural changes in
the way that chronic pain and persons with chronic pain are represented, understood, and treated
by society-at-large. However, this path cannot be carved out without first addressing the
overwhelming scholarship and public opinion that declares that because pain is deeply personal
and subjective, communication with those outside of the experience of pain is impossible10. To
accept this belief as truth, I argue, is to close the door to the possibility that pain is rhetorically
generative, provides insight into the human condition, and has value for persons in pain, the
disability community, and all bodies.

10

Most scholarship on pain historically comes from the field of trauma theory. Leading trauma
theorists such as Elaine Scarry, Cathy Caruth, and Dori Laub contend that the experience of pain
is not representable to others, and even to oneself, because the trauma of pain shatters the human
subject and fractures language.
14

Before continuing further, I want to put to rest any suspicion that what I am suggesting by
advocating that chronic pain be viewed as a valuable experience is that pain is a gift or a
blessing. Acknowledging that a life in pain can also be full of joy and love and community does
not negate the material reality that pain can at times be terrible, feel unbearable, and cause
loneliness and fear. But if that is all we know about pain, the terrible part, as medical,
pharmaceutical, legal, and even public rhetoric suggests, then those with chronic pain will
believe that their lives hold no meaning or value. For this reason alone, the need for alternative
rhetorics of chronic pain is undeniable.
Alternative rhetorics of chronic pain, then, would need to respond to disability rhetoric
scholar Jay Dolmage’s call for a new “futuristic” disability studies that “will not be about the
eradication of disability, but about new social structures and relationships, made possible by new
rhetorics” (2). Such new productive and generative rhetorics of chronic pain have the potential to
add to the future of rhetoric and composition and disability studies by laying the foundations for
a more expansive definition of disability that welcomes persons with chronic pain. In addition,
by claiming a disability identity, persons with chronic pain will benefit from the support that
comes from being a part of a shared community.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2, “Theorizing a Political-Relational-Rhetorical Methodology: Providing a
Presence for Persons with Chronic Pain in Scholarship and Practice,” provides an overview of
the theoretical frameworks that inform this dissertation and describes my political-relationalrhetorical methodology. This methodology puts disability scholar Alison Kafer’s politicalrelational model of disability, which accounts for both the material realities of living with a
disability and the socio-political construction of disability, into conversation with disability
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rhetoric and feminist rhetorical theory. In doing so, it becomes possible to account for persons
with chronic pain in the fields of disability studies, disability rhetoric, and feminist rhetorics by
allowing for the theorization of chronic pain as a disability, establishing the communicability of
pain, and, most importantly, making it possible to imagine the future of disability differently by
honoring and valuing the lives of persons with chronic pain.
In Chapter 3, “Toward a Re-Imagining of Chronic Pain: Disabling Rhetorics of Suffering
and Surveillance,” I analyze, critique, and intervene in problematic rhetorics of chronic pain that
dehumanize and threaten the lives of persons with chronic pain. Specifically, this chapter
investigates and intercedes in the proliferation of two of the most insidious problematic rhetorics
of chronic pain: rhetorics of suffering and rhetorics of surveillance. The former (rhetorics of
suffering) equates living with chronic pain as a “nightmare” and a “curse” and, in so doing,
insists that a life in pain holds no value, while the latter (rhetorics of surveillance) regulates,
punishes, and criminalizes persons with chronic pain for not being able to control their pain. In
order to narrow my range of analysis, I analyze and critique one problematic text for each type of
problematic rhetoric: medical journalist Melanie Thernstrom’s The Pain Chronicles: Cures,
Myths, Mysteries, Diaries, Brain Scans, Healing and the Science of Suffering to illustrate
rhetorics of suffering and the “pain contract” as an example of rhetorics of surveillance.
Following these analyses, I argue that without intervention from disability studies scholars and
disability rhetoricians, persons with chronic pain will continue to be defined solely by dangerous
an oppressive medical and public discourses and as a result will be further marginalized and
stigmatized.
In the fourth chapter, “‘Relaxed, but not lazy’: Rhetorics of Rehabilitation and the Making
of the Chronic Pain Patient,” I build on the previous chapter’s investigation of problematic
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rhetorics of pain by analyzing the rhetorics of normalcy and rehabilitation in a particular site of
medical discourse —the Mayo Clinic’s Comprehensive Pain Rehabilitation Center (PRC) patient
manual. By doing so, I reveal how biomedicine uses the rehabilitation approach to disability and
the “myth of control” (Wendell) to silence and regulate persons with chronic pain whose
“deviant” bodies threaten the health of the nation-state.11 In addition, as a former patient of the
PRC, I engage with my lived experience to show how the program’s practices reinforce and
perpetuate the manual’s problematic rhetorics. I pay particular attention to the manual’s section
on “Forbidden Pain Behaviors,” which disciplines patients with the threat of expulsion from the
center who speak about and use the word pain. The value of this particular chapter is that it
considers the ways medical discourse, as evidenced through the Mayo Clinic’s Comprehensive
Pain Rehabilitation Center patient manual, purposefully denies a language of pain by making
such expression unspeakable.
In Chapter 5, “Changing the Status Quo: Listening to Alternative Rhetorics of Chronic
Pain,” I turn away from those in dominant positions of power and their use of problematic
rhetorics of chronic pain and listen instead to those who live with chronic pain and have different
stories to tell. These stories offer alternative rhetorics of chronic pain that disrupt stigmatizing
representations of chronic pain and persons with chronic pain and instead provide more genuine
and honest interpretations of chronic pain. As a result, these rhetorics reveal how pain is a
valuable, insightful, and a necessary part of the human condition. Next, I explain how alternative
rhetorics of chronic pain challenge normative language practices and allow for greater access to
11

To argue that persons with disabilities are seen as a problem for a modern nation-state that
relies on homogenized standard bodies in order to survive, I will be using Michel Foucault’s
term biopower—a political-judicial-institutional state— that relies on the control of the
normalization of bodies. In addition, I will be forwarding disability studies scholar Lennard
Davis’s own use of this term in Bending Over Backwards.
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and multiple ways of knowing chronic pain and its effects on those living with chronic pain
conditions. To best show how alternative rhetorics of chronic pain do this work, this chapter
analyzes PainExhibit.org, an online chronic pain art exhibit that functions as an alternative and
generative rhetoric of chronic pain.
Chapter 6, “Collective Affinities: Normalcy, Intersectionality, and Multimodality in
Disability-Themed Writing Courses,” is devoted to analyzing my article “Investigating Students’
Reception and Production of Normalizing Discourses in a Disability-Themed Advanced
Composition Course,” published three years ago in Disability Studies Quarterly, and reflects on
the class that informed that article through the lens of this dissertation’s political-relationalrhetorical methodology. The aim of this reflection is to gain insight into my evolving pedagogy
and to consider ways of improving a future iteration of this course based on the new knowledge I
have gained through the researching and writing of this dissertation. Some of the issues I reflect
on in relation to “Investigating” and my “Discourses of Normalcy” class are: subjectivity,
normalization, intersectionality, “white disability studies,” and multimodality.
Lastly, in the “Epilogue” of this dissertation I return to the question posed in the
“Prologue” concerning the communicability of chronic pain and reveal how my own lived
experience with chronic pain enables me to conclude that pain generates rather than destroys
language. In addition, the “Epilogue” recognizes the limitations of my dissertation and points to
further inquiries into the relationship between pain, rhetoric, and disability. These inquiries also
suggest areas of scholarship that still need to be pursued by scholars in the fields of rhetoric and
composition, disability studies, medical rhetorics, and feminist rhetorics in order to continue to
provide a presence for persons with chronic pain and account for chronic pain in our research
and practice.
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CHAPTER II
THEORIZING A POLITICAL-RELATIONAL-RHETORICAL METHODOLOGY:
PROVIDING A PRESENCE FOR PERSONS WITH CHRONIC PAIN
IN SCHOLARSHIP AND PRACTICE
In order to support the arguments of this dissertation—that pain is rhetorical and needs to
be theorized as a disability in disability studies, disability rhetoric, and feminist rhetorics—I will
first outline the theoretical frameworks that inform this project and describe the hybridmethodology I will be using to provide a presence for chronic pain and persons with chronic pain
in the above-mentioned fields. In so doing, I will also enact a core principle of disability studies,
disability rhetoric, and feminist rhetorics—to make transparent the theories that inform my
work—with the aim of being an ethical and responsible scholar.
Disability Studies
Although growing steadily, the interdisciplinary field of disability studies is relatively
new to the academy. Disability studies first appeared in academia, specifically in the social
sciences, as an outgrowth of the 1960s political movement of disability rights activists and
organizations across the world. Both disability studies scholars and activists critique the
commonplace belief that disability is an individual tragedy needing to be overcome. In contrast
with Western medicine’s prevailing medical model of disability that locates disability as an
individual, biological “defect” to be “fixed” or “cured,” disability studies have long adopted a
social model of disability, also known as the British model of disability, coined by sociologist
and disability scholar Michael Oliver. Oliver and fellow British disability sociologists Len
Barton and Colin Barnes use the social model of disability to show that “disability” is a
sociopolitical, historical, and economic category and a form of social oppression that further
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stigmatizes an already marginalized population (Barnes; Barnes et al.; Barton; Barton and
Oliver; Oliver; Thomas). The social model of disability has been taken up and forwarded many
times over by disability scholars and activists since its advent and now is a key element of
disability studies theory. As such, it makes possible important critiques of ableism, the
construction of normalcy, disabling and discriminatory attitudes and practices, inaccessible
buildings, and other social barriers in education, housing, employment, transportation, political
rights, and healthcare.
Primarily written by scholars with lived experiences of disability, scholarship in the field
crosses the disciplines of history (Longmore; Schweik); social sciences (Barnes et al.; Goffman;
Oliver); cultural studies (Mitchell and Snyder; Shakespeare; Siebers); English language and
literature (Davis; McRuer; Stoddard-Holmes); feminist and queer studies (Garland-Thomson;
Kafer; Lindgren); philosophy (Wendell); health and medicine (Barton; Segal); life-writing
(Couser; Jureic; Kleege; Mairs); and rhetoric and composition (Brueggemann; Dolmage; Dunn;
Jung; Kerschbaum; Price; Vidali; Yergeau; Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson). Although disability
studies is an interdisciplinary field, as evidenced by the above, scholars in disability studies are
joined together by their core beliefs.
One crucial belief held by scholars and activists in disability studies is that disability is a
positive identity that forges a thriving, supportive, inclusive community with power and agency
for social change. As a community, disability studies scholars and activists are also united in
their aims to: [1] expose the two-thousand-year history of the exclusion of persons with
disabilities from civic and public life, with particular focus on eugenics, genetic testing,
institutionalization, and the limitations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) legislation; [2]
reclaim the body from the colonization of biomedicine; [3] reassign meaning to the terminology
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used to oppress persons with disabilities (see especially Linton); [4] rewrite commonplace
narratives that represent persons with disabilities as tragic, pitiful figures who need to be rescued
(see especially Couser); and more. I share these core beliefs, which direct and inform the
phenomena I choose to analyze, challenge, and contest in this dissertation: problematic rhetorics
of chronic pain. Unfortunately, scholarship on chronic pain in the field of disability studies is
lacking, due in part to the limitations of the social model of disability, which I describe in more
detail below.
Despite the commonality of beliefs between disability studies scholars across the
disciplines, there exist some tensions in the field, particularly in regards to the social model of
disability. While some scholars and activists maintain strict allegiance to the social model of
disability, including Michael Oliver and many of the British sociologists, other scholars find the
social model limiting because it fails to acknowledge pain, which disability scholar Tobin
Siebers claims is often the cruelest reality of living with a disability:
Many people with disabilities realize that pain is an enemy. It hovers over innumerable
daily actions, whether the disability is painful in itself or only the occasion for pain
because of the difficulty in navigating one’s environment. The great challenge every day
is to manage the body’s pain, to get out of bed in the morning, to overcome the well of
pain that rises in the evening, to meet a hundred daily obstacles that are not merely
inconveniences but occasions for physical suffering. (Disability 72)
Just from this brief quote it is clear why pain and disability are rarely discussed together
in the field of disability studies. Even those scholars who, like Siebers, call for a reimagining of
the social model of disability that “would raise awareness of disabling environments on people’s
lived experience of the body” (25) agree that during the early days of the disability studies
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movement it made strategic sense to distinguish pain from other disabilities for timely political
and social justice aims. For example, in order to argue that disability was a societal creation and
not a tragic medical condition worthy of pity and rehabilitation, it was necessary to divorce pain
and impairment from disability, causing what would become a disability/impairment binary in
the field. More recently, and despite some scholars’ still strict adherence to the social model of
disability, critiques of the social model’s disability/impairment binary (see especially Crow;
Kafer; Shakespeare; Siebers; Wendell) have gained momentum in the last fifteen years.
However, the fact that a new model of disability has failed to take hold is evidence of the power
and endurance of the social model. The rigidity of the social model, I argue, is a primary reason
why chronic pain and persons with chronic pain are not fully accepted into disability studies and
the disability community.
Disability, feminist, and philosophy scholar Susan Wendell’s critique of the social
model of disability perhaps speaks best to this dissertation’s claims that persons with chronic
pain are still stigmatized within disability studies and that chronic pain needs to be theorized as a
disability. Writing from her lived experiences with myalgic encephalomkyelitis/chronic fatigue
immune dysfunction syndrome (ME/CFS), Wendell further delineates the social model’s
impairment/disability binary as a division between those disabilities considered “healthy” and
those considered “unhealthy.” She explains that the “unhealthy” or “bad” disabled are usually
associated with persons who are sick, in chronic pain, diseased, chronically ill, and in need of
medical treatment (i.e., ME/CFDS, MS, fibromyalgia, endometriosis, HIV, AIDS, lupus, Lyme’s
disease), whereas the “healthy” or “good” disabled are associated with persons who have stable
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conditions (i.e., blindness, deafness, paraplegia) and are not in need of medical treatment.12
Wendell explains that the disability rights movement is reluctant to accept persons with
“unhealthy” disabilities into their community because they contradict the movement’s aim to demedicalize disability. Wendell disagrees and adds that all persons with disabilities, even those
considered “healthy,” have recurrent health problems.
What is also exigent about Wendell’s work to this dissertation is that she considers what
is at stake when persons with chronic pain and illness are convinced that they are not deserving
of a disabled identity. Without the option to claim disability, persons with chronic pain feel
greater shame and responsibility for not being able to control their pain and are unable to receive
the material, social, and emotional support that can come from claiming a disability identity.
They are most likely, she writes, to try to “pass” as able-bodied or lose their employment.
Furthermore, they feel further isolation for having illegitimatized illnesses and, as a result, lack
friends and familial support. Wendell believes that by dismantling the disability/impairment
divide, all persons with disabilities would have the freedom to discuss the material effects of
living with a disability. For example, she imagines that many persons with disabilities in the
disability rights movement have pain and fatigue, which they keep secret in order to be
considered “good” activists. Although Wendell is not a rhetoric scholar, it is important to note
that all of the above discussion aligns with the work of this dissertation to not only critique
problematic rhetorics of chronic pain, but to also show the dangerous effects of such rhetorics on
those who live with chronic pain.

12

Wendell’s discussion of the “healthy” and “unhealthy” disabled is reminiscent of the medical
profession’s description of chronic pain as “bad” or “dirty pain” as explained in chapter 1 of this
dissertation.
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Although this would be a good place to move on to the section on disability rhetoric, I
want to first give space to another key concept of disability studies theory: access. To begin, I
want to stress the fact that the concept of access from a disability studies perspective differs
greatly from how it is perceived by an ableist society. Outside of disability studies and the
disability experience, the term access has become a buzz word used by legislatures, institutions
(both medical and educational), politicians, the marketplace, and social media, promising
inclusion and participation of “disadvantaged groups” and other marginalized communities into
mainstream society. As a result, access becomes a term that has been co-opted by bureaucratic
institutions to include some bodies over others while masking discrimination as “natural”
exclusion and further stigmatizing persons with disabilities through surveillance and regulation.
In such a way, access is defined and determined not by those who need it but by those who
already have it. As a consequence, access in an ableist society becomes a privilege rather than a
human right. This conceptualization of access contrasts greatly from how access is defined in
disability studies and by disability advocates.
Access, as understood by the disability studies community, is more than just a question of
inclusion and accommodation, but rather, as Tanya Titchosky describes, “a complex form of
perception that organizes socio-political relations between people in social space” and “an
insight into how disability is perceived by the able-bodied” (9). Most, if not all, disability studies
scholars share Titchosky’s conception of access. Aimi Hamraie, whose work is situated in
architecture and disability, adds: “The very presence of stairs argues for a particular
understanding of citizenship—one defined by the ability to climb steps—that results in an
implicit and potent exclusion of people with mobility or sensory disabilities from the symbolic
and physical aspects of space.” In Crip Theory, Robert McRuer writes, “[A]n accessible society,
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according to the best, critically disabled perspectives, is not simply one with ramps and Braille
signs on ‘public’ buildings, but one in which our ways of relating to, and depending on, each
other have been reconfigured” (1). Hence, these three disability scholars and activists make it
clear that access is more than just a bureaucratic false promise of inclusion. Instead they reveal
that access is a concept that does work.
Doing access from a disability studies perspective means creating spaces where human
difference is not only valued but encouraged. It means questioning assumptions about normalcy
and abled-bodiedness and challenging unquestionable truths such as “you can’t accommodate
everybody” and “it’s always been this way.” Most importantly, access is a concept that enables
and constrains what we think we know about disability and it opens up the possibility of
knowing disability differently—as already belonging to the fabric of social life. The importance
of understanding these conflicting conceptions of access is vital to the arguments of this
dissertation. For example, it makes it possible to explain how persons with chronic pain are
simultaneously promised and denied access in fundamental ways, particularly in relation to
healthcare and other human rights.13
Disability Rhetoric
As noted in chapter 1, my work is situated primarily in the field of disability rhetoric. As
mentioned in that chapter, disability rhetoric scholars integrate disability studies research and
theory into their scholarship and practice. Because they share the core beliefs of disability studies
discussed above, disability rhetoric scholars also function as a voice for marginalized persons
and groups who are stigmatized and oppressed by hegemonic discourses. Disability rhetoricians

13

For further discussion of access as it relates to persons with chronic pain, please see chapter 3,
“Toward a Re-Imagining of Chronic Pain” and chapter 4, “‘Relaxed, but not lazy’”.
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argue that acts of naming, institutions (both educational and medical), media representations of
persons with disabilities, and hegemonic ableism contribute to the oppressive rhetorical
construction of disability (see especially Brueggemann; Dolmage; Wilson and LewieckiWilson). Since language practices are a primary domain of rhetoric, scholarship in disability
rhetoric concentrates on the way bodies are constructed through language and how labels are
used to marginalize persons with disabilities, particularly by scientific discourses that claim to be
“natural” and “objective” (Lewiecki-Wilson and Dolmage). Consequently, disability rhetoricians
aim to reframe disability as positive difference rather than “deviance,” showing that bodily
difference can have rhetorical value.
Other inquiries in disability rhetoric focus on recovery work (see especially Dolmage);
issues of access in higher education (especially in the composition classroom) (Dolmage; Dunn;
Kerschbaum; Price; Jung; Vidali) and the rhetorical construction of particular disabilities such as
deafness (Brueggemann, Lend Me); neuroatypical conditions such as autism and Asperger’s
syndrome (see especially Yergeau); muscular sclerosis (Krummel; Mairs); learning disabilities
(Dunn); functional gastrointestinal disorders (Vidali, “Hysterical Again,” “Out of Control”); and
mental illness (Lewiecki-Wilson; Prendergast; Price). However, missing from this list is chronic
pain. Possible reasons for this absence, as mentioned earlier in this chapter and in chapter one,
include the limitations of the social model of disability, skepticism over chronic pain as a
legitimate disability, and problematic representations of the chronic pain patient.
Another possible reason for the lack of scholarship on chronic pain is the construction of
normalcy. Analyzing and critiquing rhetorics of normalcy is fundamental to the work of
disability rhetoric. Indeed, disability rhetoric scholar Jay Dolmage refers to the norm as the
rhetorical center of disability (Disability 21). Most discussions on rhetorics of normalcy in
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disability rhetoric begin with disability studies scholar Lennard J. Davis’s work on the
construction of normalcy. First theorized in Enforcing Normalcy, Davis explains that the concept
of the norm is a fiction, or rather an ideology, constructed by the most powerful to dominate and
oppress the most vulnerable. Davis traces the roots of the construction of normalcy to the
concept of the bell curve, invented by 19th-century Western European statisticians, that was used
to construct the “average man” and to separate the desirables from the undesirables, the normal
from the abnormal, and the abled from the disabled. Still prevalent today, the bell curve locates
those who fall beneath the curve as deviants. Thus, persons with disabilities, since the advent of
the bell curve, have been and are continued to be viewed as deviants. Davis adds that “under the
rubric of normality, there is an imperative for people to conform, to fit in, to strive to be normal,
to huddle under the main part of the curve” (Bending 105).
What is most interesting about Davis’s last statement is that it shows how the concept of
normalcy does rhetorical work on persons with disabilities. It hints at both the external and
internal pressures that persons with disabilities have to pass as able-bodied and conform to a
normalizing society. The ability to pass as able-bodied in a society in which the norm operates,
no matter how difficult, can externally save some persons with disabilities from further
stigmatization, marginalization, oppression, and economic hardships. But perhaps even more
significant is the ways in which the concept of the norm can work internally on persons with
disabilities to feel shame and blame for not being “normal” and for their inability to control their
disabilities. This discussion is vital to understanding the ways in which the concept of the norm
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is used by the medical establishment and normates14 to discipline and punish persons with
chronic pain.
Disability rhetoric scholars attribute the process of normalization and the policing of
norming to the rise of medicine and science. This rise, explains Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson and
Jay Dolmage in “Refiguring Rhetorica,” “further schematized and multiplied categories of bodily
deviance and deformity” (29), resulting in the medical model of disability, which casts disability
as a personal deficit needing to be cured. In so doing, they explain:
The modern medical paradigm has done more than categorize and control people with
disabilities: It has enforced sterilization, institutionalization, and eradication—a history of
oppression that disability scholars are now recovering and studying. (29)
In conclusion, they argue, “how we see others and ourselves is shaped by the medical-scientific
paradigm, which is in turn shaped by disability and normativity” and “that it is only against an
othered body that the normal body is allowed to perpetuate this deceit” (31).
The importance of the above logic, that in order for the normalizing process to be
enforced there needs to be both a normal and another dichotomy, is crucial to recognizing how
persons with chronic pain are able to be disciplined and punished for not managing to control or
hide their pain through passing. For, as long as there is the belief that normalcy is attainable,
persons with chronic pain will be expected to reach such a state through rehabilitation. As a
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The term normate was coined by feminist disability scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and
is defined as “the constructed identity of those who, by way of the bodily configurations and
cultural capital they assume, can step into a position of authority and wield the power it grants
them” (8).
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result, chronic pain patients are frequently sent to pain clinics where the main goal is not
treatment for pain but rather a return to normalcy through passing (for further discussion see
chapter 4, “‘Relaxed, but not lazy’”). Given all of this context, it is an ethical imperative for
disability rhetoric scholars to critique and intervene in such problematic rhetorics of chronic pain
by redressing the hegemony of the norm. By doing so, the field of disability rhetoric can begin to
provide a presence for persons with chronic pain in their scholarship and practice.
Feminist Rhetorical Studies
Feminist rhetorical studies emerged as a discipline within the field of rhetoric and
composition in the eighties and early nineties amongst much resistance and criticism. Prior to
that time, the dominant, Western-centric history of rhetoric focused on works by ancient
philosophers such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian and then named this one history “the
rhetorical tradition.” Women were missing from this version of rhetorical history. Since they
deviated from the norm—male embodiment—they were cast off from civic and public life and
were dismissed as unfit rhetors15. Likewise, women professors in America were pushed to the
margins, ignored, silenced, or viewed as what feminist rhetorician Gesa Kirsch describes as
“museum pieces, curious objects to be noted but not central actors in shaping academic
institutions.” (5). Considering this history, it is not surprising that much of the early work in
feminist rhetorical studies centers on reframing Western rhetorical history and reclaiming
women rhetors from the margins of that history (see especially Glenn; Jaratt; Logan; Lunsford;
Powell; Royster).
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Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson and Jay Dolmage explain that “rhetorical fitness came to be
described to just a narrow range of (white, male, able) bodies” and that those outside this range
were deemed unfit rhetors (“Refiguring” 27).
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Yet, feminist rhetorical studies refused to remain stagnant. Although recovering women
rhetors and reclaiming rhetorical history continues to be important work in the field, feminist
rhetorical studies is also invested in expanding rhetorical sites of inquiry by including
globalization, transnational rhetorics (Dingo; Hesford; Hesford and Schell), technological
environments (see for example, Blair and Takayoshi; Haas; Hawisher and Selfe), and rhetorics of
science (see for example, Condit; Jack; Jung, “Systems”; Wells) in their scholarship and
practices. In addition, feminist rhetorical scholarship expands the reach of the field of rhetoric
and composition by challenging what counts as rhetoric and questioning the dominance of
traditional, linear, white-male-oriented, alphabetic texts as elitist and normalizing (Dolmage;
Haas; Hawisher; Royster; Selfe; Shipka). Furthermore, feminist rhetorics widens the scope of
rhetoric and composition studies by participating in interdisciplinary scholarship through
gendered analyses of a variety of social, medical, and political texts and discourses (see, for
example, Emmons; Segal; Vidali, “Out of Control”). Guiding all of these inquiries are the
following core commitments of feminist rhetorical research methods and methodologies:
accounting for one’s own subjectivity, destabilizing gendered norms, acknowledging one’s own
embodiment, practicing self-reflexivity, utilizing strategic contemplation16, and engaging in
ethical and responsible action.
I share the above core commitments, which are fundamental to the work of this
dissertation. For instance, like scholars in disability studies, feminist rhetoricians challenge
assumed norms, such as assumptions about who counts as a rhetor and is therefore worthy of
historical study (see especially Logan; Powell; Royster, “Disciplinary”; Royster, Traces).
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Coined by Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa E. Kirsch, strategic contemplation refers to the
research method of “deliberately taking the time, space, and resources to think about, through,
and around our work as an important meditative dimension of scholarly practice” (21).
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Similarly, by challenging the assumed norm in disability studies about what counts as a
disability, my work seeks to recover the experiences of persons with chronic pain as viable and
worthwhile subjects of inquiry. In addition, feminist rhetoricians challenge the norms associated
with what counts as rhetoric by moving beyond male-dominated discourses and texts to include
such genres as letters, diaries, and poetry, as well as calling attention to the importance of
material practices with rhetorical functions that are not text-based, such as needlework samplers
(Goggin), wampum belts (Haas), and quilts (Derksen). Likewise, my dissertation challenges
normative rhetorical practices by investigating alternative rhetorics of chronic pain and analyzing
an online chronic pain art exhibit to allow for greater opportunities of access to pain for those
without the lived experience of pain.
Another core commitment of feminist rhetorical studies that relates to this dissertation is
attending to gender inequality in social, medical, and legal texts and discourses. As discussed
briefly in chapter 1, rhetorics of chronic pain are gendered, and women are disproportionally
diagnosed with chronic pain syndromes than are men while receiving inferior medical care (for
further details, see chapter 3). Perhaps the most crucial commitment of feminist rhetorical
research to the project of this dissertation is the field’s emphasis on accounting for one’s own
subjectivity in research practices (see especially Bizzell; Royster and Kirsch; Schell and
Rawson). Unlike conventional academic research, Patricia Bizzell explains, feminist rhetoricians
challenge the norms of objectivity and detachment by “bringing the person of the research, her
body, and emotions, and dare one say, her soul into the work” (qtd. in Schell and Rawson 4). As
a feminist rhetor and researcher, I understand that my own experiences with chronic pain shape
this dissertation’s inquiries and arguments and direct the texts and discourses I choose to study.
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A Political-Relational-Rhetorical Methodology
In refusing to acknowledge pain, fatigue or depression, our collective affinity to conceive
of, and achieve, a world which does not disable is diminished.
—Liz Crow, “Including All of Our Lives”
Over time, I argue, pain—and whether subjective pain is real pain—came to represent not
just a clinical and scientific problem, but a legal puzzle, a heated cultural concern, an
enduring partisan issue.
—Keith Wailoo, Pain: A Political History
In this section, I develop the political-relational-rhetorical methodology I will use to guide
this dissertation. This methodological approach encompasses the core commitments of disability
studies, disability rhetoric, and feminist rhetorics and, as an effect, allows for the theorization of
pain as a disability, establishes the communicability of pain, and, most importantly, makes it
possible to imagine the future of disability differently by honoring and valuing the lives of
persons with chronic pain and their contributions to the fields chronicled above. A politicalrelational-rhetorical methodology achieves the above aims by combining feminist disability
scholar and activist Alison Kafer’s political-relational model of disability with disability rhetoric
and feminist rhetorical theory. As such, this hybrid methodology makes it possible to conduct the
research of this dissertation while also attending to my scholarly and political commitments. For
the remainder of this chapter, I will make apparent how Kafer’s new model of disability
resonates with my disability-feminist commitments and, in turn, how these commitments extend
Kafer’s model of disability. As a result, it will become clearer how a political-relationalrhetorical methodology best serves the arguments of this dissertation.
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In Feminist, Queer, Crip, Kafer presents an alternative to both the problematic
individual/medical model of disability and the limited social model of disability discussed earlier
in this chapter. Kafer characterizes her political-relational model of disability as a “friendly
departure” from the social model of disability. Although she recognizes that the social model
rightly exposes the social barriers that often lead to disability, she argues that the social model’s
sharp division between disability and impairment fails to recognize that both are social, and that
“simply trying to determine what constitutes impairment makes clear that impairment doesn’t
exist apart from social meanings and understandings” (7). In contrast to the belief shared by the
majority of disability scholars and activists, she resists the argument that impairment is purely
physical, explaining instead that impairment shifts across time and place and is dependent on
economic and geographic contexts. Kafer also points out that the impairment/disability binary
fails to recognize the often disabling effects of the body. For instance, she writes, “social and
structural changes will do little to make one’s joints stop aching or to alleviate back pain. Nor
will changes in architecture and attitude heal diabetes or cancer or fatigue” (7). Kafer’s
scholarship aligns with disability rhetoricians’ critique that the social model of disability fails to
represent the experiences of persons with chronic pain and therefore makes it difficult for this
population to find a presence in the disability community and in the field of disability rhetoric.
However, by collapsing the impairment/disability divide, Kafer’s political-relational model
forges a path to imagine disability differently as an expansive and unfixed category that includes
persons with chronic pain and chronic illness and makes it possible to theorize pain as a
disability. This is just one example of how Kafer’s model of disability serves the disabilityfeminist rhetoric commitments of this dissertation.
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Also, noteworthy to this dissertation is Kafer’s argument that the social model of
disability marginalizes persons with pain, illness, and fatigue for simultaneously desiring
medical intervention and wanting to identify as disabled. A strict social model, Kafer explains,
“casts cure out of our imagined futures; cure becomes the future no self-respecting disability
activist and scholar wants.” As an effect, Kafer writes, “disability rights activists and disability
scholars deny their own feelings of pain and depression for fear of being rejected from the
disability community” (8). What is most important about this statement is that it makes visible
how all persons with disabilities, not just those with chronic pain, are negatively affected by the
failure to account for chronic pain in disability studies and in the disability community. Kafer’s
discussion of the pressure to resist a cure is also reminiscent of Susan Wendell’s description of
the “good” activist earlier in this chapter. However, what is unique about Kafer’s scholarship is
that in addition to critiquing the social model of disability for its limitations, she also addresses
those limitations by theorizing a new model of disability that attends to the social model’s
shortcomings as well as its omissions. In so doing, she accounts for the reasons why persons with
chronic pain are not represented in disability studies and by activists, while also creating an
opening for their presence. The fact that Kafer’s model addresses and critiques the social model
of disability aligns with a core disability-feminist belief that engaging in ethical and responsible
action can lead to social change.
Now it is time to take a closer look at the core tenets of Kafer’s political-relational model
of disability and how they relate to the project of this dissertation. One of these core tenets is that
disability is relational, meaning it is “experienced in and through relationships” and “does not
occur in isolation” (8). Such an understanding speaks to the emotional pain that persons with
chronic pain often experience when their pain is suspect and misunderstood, especially by loved
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ones. The relational part of Kafer’s model also supports this dissertation’s claim that how
persons with chronic pain understand and experience their pain is impacted by their relationships
with their doctors and the medical profession (for further discussion on these relationships please
see chapter 3, “Toward a Re-Imagining of Chronic Pain” and chapter 4, “‘Relaxed, but not
lazy’”). Also, Kafer’s use of the term relational represents family and friends of the disabled
who are also affected by the discrimination and marginalization that accompany disability. This
is an important and radical feature of Kafer’s model, and it reinforces my argument that chronic
pain is not an individual problem to be “overcome” by strength and willpower, as is true of all
disabilities, but a societal problem that needs to be addressed by disrupting the socio-political,
cultural, and economic barriers that keep persons with chronic pain disabled.
Another core tenet of Kafer’s political-relational model is that disability is not a “natural”
condition that can simply be fixed by medical intervention or rehabilitation. According to Kafer,
the assumption that disability is a medical defect rooted in an individual body denies that
disability is political, and, as such, is a product of the power relations and assumptions that are
embedded in the discourses and practices that are used to stigmatize and marginalize the
disabled. It is important to note here that this core tenet of Kafer’s model also aligns with the
kinds of critiques made by scholars in disability and feminist rhetorics. The political framework
of Kafer’s disability model also makes visible the widespread depoliticalization of disability and
its consequences for persons with disabilities. One of these consequences is that medical
approaches to disability are viewed as being “completely objective and devoid of prejudice and
cultural bias” (8). The implications of this consequence can be deadly, especially in terms of
physician-assisted suicide and selective abortions of suspected disabled fetuses. This is
especially salient for persons with chronic pain, since physicians who perform assisted suicides
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and “right to die” advocates often use pain as a way to legitimize their practices (see especially
Siebers, “In the Name”; Wailoo). Another unsettling consequence of the depoliticalization of
disability is that discrimination and prejudice are viewed as acts of individual cruelty rather as
products of structural inequity. Both of these examples demonstrate what is most troubling to
Kafer: that divorcing politics from disability ignores the collective responsibility society has to
affect the ways in which disability is understood and treated now and in the future. Kafer’s
concern is also one that I share.
It has been far too easy to divorce politics from chronic pain. For example, chronic pain
is depicted as an individual problem born from a weakness in character rather than a product of
socio-political practices and policies. As a result, persons with chronic pain are often cast off by
society as drug addicts in need of regulation and surveillance. This can most clearly be seen with
the advent of “pain contracts,” which require persons with chronic pain in need of opioid
medication to relinquish their prescribing doctor from fault if they become dependent on said
medication. The pain contract also limits chronic pain patients’ choice in doctors, since the
contract specifies that patients can only receive pain medications from the physician who first
prescribed the medication. In addition, chronic pain patients are required to attend an office visit
with their doctor each time their prescription needs to be refilled. Lastly, persons with chronic
pain who need opioid medication must appear in person at the pharmacy with a written
prescription and photographic identification in order to obtain their medication. All of these
actions are especially hard for persons who are in daily, constant pain. In addition, these
practices further stigmatize and marginalize persons with chronic pain, especially those with low
social-economic status, and reduces the accessibility of pain medication for those who often need
it the most and who are least likely to be opioid abusers (Foreman, A Nation). It is also important
36

to note here that pain contracts fail to mention the enormous amount of profit that the
pharmaceutical industry gleans from pain medications and the increasing number of pain clinics
that have recently arisen, not to treat pain, but rather to rehabilitate persons with chronic pain
primarily through relinquishing their pain medication. Therefore, as long as politics are divorced
from chronic pain, persons with chronic pain will continue to be blamed for their inability to
manage their pain, and as a result the possibility of social change and a better future for this
population is rendered impossible.
Another core tenet of Kafer’s political-relational model of disability, which contrasts
greatly to the social model, is that “non-disabled” and “disabled” are not discrete or self-evident
categories, but continuously open for debate. Disability rhetoric scholars similarly problematize
fixed categories of disability and expose the ways in which strategic naming is used by dominant
groups to marginalize persons with disabilities. Kafer adds that a political-relational model of
disability is more interested in asking questions rather than answering them and chooses instead
“to explore the creation of such categories and the moments in which they fail to hold” (11). In
doing so, Kafer further explains, it becomes evident that deciding who fits in the “rubric of
disability” is too difficult to determine. In response, Kafer calls instead for a “collective affinity”
in terms of disability, which has the potential to
encompass everyone from people with learning disabilities to those with chronic illness,
from people with mobility impairments to those with HIV/AIDS, from people with
sensory impairments to those with mental illness. People within each category can all be
discussed in terms of disability politics, not because of any essential similarities amongst
them, but because all have been labeled as disabled or sick and have faced discrimination
as a result. (11)
37

I wish to pause here at this passage to emphasize that Kafer’s hope of a collective affinity in
terms of disability is one I will hold onto throughout this dissertation, knowing that it speaks best
to the future I imagine: a future that honors and values the lives of persons with chronic pain and
their contributions to the fields of disability studies, feminist rhetorical studies, disability
rhetoric, and disability activism.
While Kafer’s political-relational model of disability does important work, such as
accounting for persons with chronic pain by dismantling the disability/impairment binary,
establishing a relational and political framework of disability that illustrates how persons with
chronic pain are further disabled and marginalized by the medical profession’s policing policies
and practices, and rendering it possible to imagine a desirable future for the disabled, it is not
explicitly rhetorical. As such, my hybrid methodology extends Kafer’s political-relational model
of disability in important ways. First, it recognizes that disability is rhetorical, meaning it is a
product of language practices and ableist discourses that construct disability as a tragic existence
in need of rescue and cure. Next, it reveals the generative power of rhetoric to transform
commonplace understandings of disability, and in so doing shows disability as positive
difference. Lastly, it offers strategies for intervening in current problematic discourses and
practices that stigmatize disability, therefore making it possible to implement the new, positive
reframing of disability that Kafer’s model seeks to produce.
Disability rhetoricians James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson’s scholarship
“challenge[s] the names, the language, and the frameworks for understanding disability” and
“revise[s] official histories of disability and develop[s] new ones” (Embodied 17). They also
argue that transforming disability “will require transforming economic, social, ethical, and
educational practices, reimagining social spaces, and rethinking ordinary habits” (18). This is
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especially true, they contend, when challenging the “hegemony of scientific discourse.”
Although Wilson and Lewiecki-Wilson are not alone in expressing the need for a rhetorical
framework of disability and a critical alliance between disability studies and disability rhetoric
(see especially Dolmage, Disability) to transform disability, their scholarship aligns most closely
with the goals of this dissertation’s political-relational-rhetorical methodology. For instance,
their insistence on a rhetoric of political engagement to challenge the hegemony of scientific
discourse speaks to the need for this dissertation to critique problematic rhetorics of chronic pain,
such as pain is a medical and individual defect and a weakness of character. Also, Wilson and
Lewiecki-Wilson’s emphasis on how language and naming reinforce problematic ideologies of
disability points to the need to critique and interrupt discourses (especially those found in
medical and legal texts) that normalize and dehumanize persons with chronic pain. However,
none of these interventions are possible without a hybrid methodology that combines Kafer’s
political-relational model of disability with disability rhetoric and feminist rhetorics.
In response, I offer up a political-relational-rhetorical methodology to communicate the
socio-political, cultural, economic, and material realties of living with chronic pain. As such, it
assists in creating a new future for disability: one that values disability as positive difference and
allows for the representation in disability studies and the disability community of persons with
chronic pain and all persons who experience the stigma and oppression of bodily norms. And
yet, although my methodology calls for a more expansive definition of disability that includes
the above populations, it does not attend to the concept of intersectionality, which investigates
the ways in which identity categories (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, class, age) intersect to cause
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multiple forms of oppression.17 Although considerations of intersectionality are instrumental in
confronting social injustices and enacting positive social change, my political-relationalrhetorical methodology does not take up this work in the context of disability studies, since
persons with chronic pain’s claim to a disability identity is still contested. However, my
methodology takes an important first step in attending to the ways in which chronic pain
converges with other marginalized identities and the subsequent effects by arguing that chronic
pain needs to be theorized as a disability. Thus, by theorizing chronic pain as a disability, it then
becomes possible to engage in intersectional analyses that can lead to a richer understanding of
the oppression of persons with chronic pain and how to better address the injustices they face.

17

However, I do discuss intersectionality in relation to my pedagogy in chapter 6, “Collective
Affinities.” Also, in the “Epilogue,” I point out further inquiries into the relationship between
chronic pain, rhetoric, disability, and intersectionality.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARD A RE-IMAGINING OF CHRONIC PAIN: DISABLING
RHETORICS OF SUFFERING AND SURVEILLANCE
People in chronic pain are often simply difficult to be around. They are constantly
distracted, self-centered, often angry, and can find ordinary interpersonal behaviors and
gestures in those they interact with to be dismissive and hateful. Such behaviors can
literally drive people away. Time and time again as I read heart-wrenching accounts of
people suffering from chronic pain, I saw often unconscious gestures of anger and blame
directed at those around them. For healthcare workers and other caretakers and
companions, chronic pain requires deep patience and a constant sense that suffering is the
basis of behavior and attitudes that necessitate that caring patience.
—Ronald Schleifer, Pain and Suffering
Acute pain is good for us. It is a protective component of our sensory repertoire, an alarm
signal that warns of danger and keeps us out of harm. Yet if pain persists, if pain becomes
chronic, if an injury fails to heal quickly, or if pain appears without an apparent cause,
this protective sensation becomes a nightmare, a curse, something that we want to get rid
of by any means possible. The feeling of pain doesn’t change, it remains unpleasant and
emotionally negative, but its significance to our lives undergoes a dramatic switch from
good and protective to awful and nasty.
—Fernando Cervero, Understanding Pain
The above passages are representative of what my dissertation refers to as problematic
rhetorics of chronic pain. It has become commonplace to associate chronic pain with a
“nightmare,” a “curse,” and “a fate worse than death,” as it has become commonplace to depict
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persons with chronic pain as “difficult,” “self-pitying,” and “burdensome.” Disability rhetoric
scholars and activists may find these characterizations of chronic pain eerily familiar to disability
tropes such as disability is “a tragedy in need of overcoming” and “a problem needing to be
eradicated.” For this reason, and those discussed in previous chapters, it is necessary to theorize
chronic pain as a disability and for disability studies scholars and disability rhetoricians to take
up scholarship on chronic pain by critiquing and intervening in these and similarly oppressive
problematic rhetorics of chronic pain. In this context, and in the remainder of this chapter’s
discussion of problematic rhetorics of chronic pain, I define rhetoric as the pervasive use of
language, wherein language induces audiences to accept certain versions of reality, which can
thus be interpreted, contested, and revised (for further discussion of the two types of rhetoric
used in this dissertation, please see chapter 1). Problematic rhetorics of chronic pain are
widespread and indiscriminant, appearing in myriad forms of popular culture as well as in
medical, scientific, legal artifacts, and academic texts.
In response, the work of this chapter is to examine two of the most insidious and damaging
problematic rhetorics of chronic pain—rhetorics of suffering and rhetorics of surveillance—
while also disrupting, and thereby interceding in, their proliferation. Engaging in this work also
aligns with my political-relational-rhetorical methodology which points to the need for disability
rhetoric scholars to expose how language reinforces problematic ideologies of disability by
critiquing and interrupting discourses that normalize and dehumanize persons with chronic pain.
To most effectively do this work, I will narrow my range of analysis and examine one
problematic text for each type of problematic rhetoric that best illustrates the damage that these
rhetorics have on persons living with chronic pain.
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Rhetorics Of Suffering
A modern chronicler of hell might look to lives of chronic pain patient for inspiration.
—Melanie Thernstrom, “Pain, the Disease”
If our vernacular of pain remains locked in malevolence and affliction—pain invades,
wounds, and tyrannizes—is it possible to think our way out of adversarial and frightened
reactions to physical hurt?
—Susannah Mintz, Hurt and Pain
It is impossible to confront chronic pain without also enduring indescribable suffering, or
at least that is what scholarship on pain insists upon. Much of this scholarship appears
sporadically across the disciplines; however, the majority of the work on chronic pain is authored
by psychology, medical, science, history, and trauma studies scholars (see especially Bourke;
Cervero; Melzack and Wall; Scarry; Schleifer). In addition to perpetuating problematic rhetorics
of chronic pain, the discourses used in these texts are also damaging since they promote the
medical model of disability and the hegemony of scientific discourses that disability scholars Jay
Dolmage and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson claim “objectifies the disabled and understands
disability through the categories of abnormality, deviancy, and deficits to be cured” (31), thereby
further stigmatizing persons with chronic pain and those with other forms of disabilities.
Consequently, it is important for all disability scholars to analyze and critique these problematic
texts.
Scholarship on chronic pain has also reached outside the walls of academia. Considering
the growing awareness that chronic pain is a national health concern and the increased media
coverage of prescription opioid abuse, practicing physicians have lent their expertise, and often
their patients’ stories, to explore how chronic pain can lead to a lifetime of suffering (e.g.,
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Fishman and Berger; Groopman; Kleinman). Likewise, medical and science writers (see
especially Thernstrom), often with their own experiences of chronic pain, have turned the page to
uncover the hidden ‘mysteries’ of chronic pain and to contemplate the ‘science of suffering.’
Although a number of these books are doing important work, such as making the problem
of chronic pain more visible and bringing attention to how healthcare professionals are failing
this population, they still participate in what I call problematic rhetorics of suffering. This type of
rhetoric, which equates pain with suffering in much the same way that disability is equated with
tragedy, insists that a life with pain is isolating, full of despair, and identity-destroying. This
conclusion is more easily realized when chronic pain is considered an individual medical defect
and a private and isolating experience rather than a product of political, relational, and rhetorical
discourses and practices. Left unchecked, I argue, the culmination of a rhetoric of suffering is
death. In this chapter, I begin by identifying key tropes of rhetorics of suffering found in one
widely circulating problematic text: medical journalist Melanie Thernstrom’s The Pain
Chronicles: Cures, Myths, Mysteries, Diaries, Brain Scans, Healing and the Science of Suffering.
In addition, I explore the danger that this rhetoric can have on its readers, especially persons with
chronic pain and their loved ones. I then analyze and critique the genre of the “pain contract” to
demonstrate the dangers of a second widespread problematic rhetoric of pain: that of
surveillance.
I have chosen Thernstrom’s critically acclaimed national bestseller as this section’s site
of analysis not only because of its large audience, but also for its considerable use of rhetorics of
suffering as a refrain for understanding the experience of chronic pain. As her subtitle suggests,
Thernstrom’s is a quest narrative that takes her and her readers on a journey through time,
medicine, and magic—stopping along the way to consider Babylonian gods and devils, ancient
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Egyptian prescriptions, spells and enchantments, the great Fall, the discovery of tuberculosis and
later anesthesia, and contemporary pain clinics—all with the hope of demystifying what she
refers to as the “special suffering” of chronic pain. “To be in physical pain,” she explains
is to find yourself in a different realm—a state of being unlike any other, a magic
mountain as far removed from the familiar world as a dreamscape. Usually pain
subsides; one wakes from it as from a nightmare, trying to forget it as quickly as
possible. But what of pain that persists? The longer it endures, the more
excruciating the exile becomes. Will you ever go home? you begin to wonder,
home to your normal body, thoughts, life? (3).
This brief passage already reveals what I consider to be key tropes of rhetorics of
suffering. One such key trope is to use metaphor to shroud chronic pain in mystery and darkness
in order to convey its tendency to confound biomedicine and resist diagnosis. This then makes
chronic pain seem more elusive and frightening, which, in turn, increases levels of pain and
despair and forges a resistance to seeking medical care. Thernstrom’s magic mountain is one
such metaphor.18 The fact that the magic mountain is in a “different realm” also speaks to
another key trope of rhetorics of suffering: that chronic pain leads to isolation and to alienation
from oneself and others. The question, “will you ever go home, home to your normal body,
thoughts, life?” is also a common trope in chronic pain scholarship since it simultaneously
Others persons with chronic pain as abnormal while also implying that chronic pain fractures the
self and leaves in its wake a lesser, “sick” version. For Thernstrom, this sick version is not only a

18

Other metaphors Thernstrom uses for chronic pain are far less pleasant, such as: “the
tormentor,” “the torturer,” “poison, “a chamber of hell,” and “the devil.”
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“shadow of one’s former self,” but a decaying mass of flesh and bone. Thernstrom best
exemplifies this trope in her remarks following a visit to a pain clinic:
What the majority of doctors see in a chronic-pain patient is an overwhelming, offputting ruin: a ruined body and a ruined life. It is the doctor’s job to rescue the crushed
person within—to locate the original source of the pain—the leak, the structural
instability—and begin to rebuild: physically, psychologically, socially. (131)
Thernstrom’s remarks are particularly threatening to persons with chronic pain and to the
possibility of creating greater understanding of chronic pain not only because they are likely to
cause greater hopelessness, but also because they reinforce the stigmatized belief that disability
is a defect (or in this case “a structural instability”) located in an individual needing to be cured
or eliminated.
Also, evident in the above passage is a key disability trope: that persons with chronic pain
are “victims” and “sufferers” in need of rescue. One dangerous effect of this particular rhetoric is
that persons with chronic pain can come to identify themselves as chronic pain sufferers and are
more likely to interpret their pain as a tragedy beyond their control. As a consequence, persons
with chronic pain are more likely to become passive and less willing to question medical
decisions made on their behalf. In addition, persons with chronic pain come to be viewed by
those without the experience of chronic pain as pitiful and helpless. This becomes especially true
when chronic pain is not understood as political, relational, and rhetorical.
To be fair, Thernstrom counts herself amongst these “victims” and “sufferers.” Part of
the journey of the Pain Chronicles is her own. Dispersed throughout the book are excerpts of
Thernstrom’s pain diary in which she recounts her experience with chronic pain and her eventual
diagnoses of spinal stenosis and cervical spondylosis, neither of which can be cured by surgery
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or medical treatments. And yet, Thernstrom also spends much of her personal narrative
disassociating herself from other persons with chronic pain. This is most noticeable during a
physical therapy visit, in which she shares that she is afraid of turning into a “cripple”:
I shrank away from the other patients, afraid to be grouped with the tired, old, sick,
disabled, and sad. Although there was a stray college athlete with a chipped bone, en
route to health, most of the patients looked like inhabitants of the village of the damned. I
didn’t want to be a weak, pain patient. (54)
Earlier in her book, Thernstrom also distinguishes herself from other persons with
chronic pain when she notes that she is not from a third-world country but a “woman in real silk
pajamas lying on a king-sized Tempur-Pedic mattress under a white Shabby Chic comforter in a
room with a decent view. In Manhattan.” (42). Although it would be easy to conclude from these
passages that Thernstrom is classist and stigmatizes persons with disabilities, rather I believe that
these are compelling examples of the very pervasiveness of rhetorics of suffering. Thernstrom
unknowingly has become vulnerable to the very rhetorics of suffering that she puts forth in her
book. As an effect, she fears pain even more and most likely causes herself more pain by
discontinuing physical therapy. This is an example of another dangerous effect of rhetorics of
suffering: that persons with chronic pain might resist treatments that could decrease their pain
levels because of fear and feelings of hopelessness.
Nonetheless, I have no doubt that some of Thernstrom’s readers will be relieved to find
themselves in her story: in the long hours she waits in doctors’ offices, her lover’s lack of
empathy, disbelieving friends and family members, the exhaustion of trying alternative
treatments, and the confusion and fear of not knowing why her body is in so much pain. To be
honest, there was a time in which I too would have experienced similar relief. Like many people
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with chronic pain, it took me years to find a diagnosis. During that time, I tried every wellmeaning suggestion for pain relief including more mainstream alternative therapies such as
acupuncture, acupressure, special diets, and homeopathic remedies, and less mainstream
suggestions such as drinking three scalding glasses of water first thing in the morning, sleeping
on wooden slats with my feet up against a wall, going for colonics three times a week, and
visiting a Shaman to find my spirit animal to return my body to health and wholeness. Finally,
after seventeen doctors (I kept a list), and many “it’s all in your head” diagnoses, several visits to
world re-known pain clinics, an unconventional surgery, physical therapy, and yoga, I improved
significantly, even though my pain will never go away. While this was happening, I experienced
the loss of friends, a job, and even the skepticism of my own loved ones. I tell this story not to
ask for pity or to inspire determination, but rather to show how scared and vulnerable it is to be
in chronic pain. Thernstrom does not exaggerate the desperation that can come with chronic pain,
nor does she exaggerate the awful sensations of that pain, nor the loneliness that can also
accompany living with chronic pain. For these reasons, years ago at my sickest, I would have
been comforted by Thernstrom’s book, by the knowledge that I was not alone in my suffering.
However, her book would never have made me psychologically or spiritually improved, nor
would it have spurred me on to seek additional medical guidance. Rather, it would have left me
stuck in my own misery.
Perhaps this is because, despite the positive temporal quality of The Pain Chronicles and
rhetorics of suffering, they offer no path forward, no possibilities of imagining that persons with
chronic pain can have a desirable future. In fact, the very opposite is occurring. As I mentioned
in the beginning of this section, the culmination of a rhetoric of suffering is death. Pain research
concludes that persons with chronic pain are twice more likely to commit suicide than other
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people and even when persons with chronic pain do not contemplate actual suicide, seventeen
percent have passive thoughts about death (Foreman, A Nation 161). I, by no means, am
implying that Thernstrom and other medical journalists writing similar texts are suggesting that
suicide is preferable to a life with chronic pain; rather, I argue their use of rhetorics of suffering
adds to the discourse already surrounding chronic pain and other disabilities that posit a life in
pain as a life not worth living. This rhetoric is particularly harmful considering disability scholar
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s point that the relief of pain and suffering is often linked to
“legitimized-assisted suicide, mercy killings, and the withholding of nourishment” (779). In
addition, rhetorics of suffering obscure the fact that much of the suffering that accompanies
chronic pain is a result of social, political, relational, and economic factors.
The above arguments are exemplified in a recent and rare article on chronic pain and
disability. In “Recovering a Cripistemology of Pain,” disability scholar Alyson Patsavas recounts
how popular discourses regarding the horrors of living with chronic pain and disability shaped
her experience of pain and nearly resulted in a suicide attempt:
Last night at school I walked across the street to the parking garage and climbed six
floors to the top. I walked to the edge and stood on the railing thinking about how I
would rather not live than be in pain all my life. I don’t know how long I stood there, but
in the moment I fully rationalized dying. Death is full of happiness, exemption from this
suffering. (21)
After many years of living with chronic pain and working in disability studies, Patsavas writes
that she came to realize that dangerous totalizing messages, such as pain is a fate worse than
death, “not only fail to account for the rich, varied, and complex lives that people with chronic
pain lead,” but also “often cause greater suffering” (23). Furthermore, she adds that such
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discourses “frame pain as an isolating, devastating experience crystallized to prevent the
exploration of alternative explanations for why chronic pain might be (or seem to be) unlivable”
(23.) One of these explanations, I argue in the section below, is that persons with chronic pain
are problematically linked to the rise in prescription opioid abuse and as such are often denied
access to much-needed prescription pain medicine. Other explanations are problematic doctorpatient relationships, government under-funding of pain research, gender bias, and a lack of
social support and resources for persons with chronic pain, none of which are adequately
addressed in The Pain Chronicles.
Rhetorics Of Surveillance
A patient will present to a physician difficult-to-diagnose ailments such as severe back
pain or muscular pain that are typically treated with a pain killer. After receiving the
prescription, the patient will repeat the performance for three or four more physicians.
—On “doctor shopping,” qtd. in Wailoo, Pain: A Political History
I do feel, and my other pharmacist who’s with me today feels, like part of this crackdown
is such a big stigma with pain medicines that your general practitioner is not as willing to
write for pain patients who are legitimate.
—Alyson Roby, qtd in Yap, Pharmacy Today
Initially I wanted to begin this section with a detailed discussion of the opioid pain
medication OxyContin and then blame that medication for what I refer to as problematic
rhetorics of surveillance. Such rhetorics, I argue, are a form of what Foucault characterizes as
biopower in which persons in dominant positions of power regulate, punish, and criminalize
persons whose bodies do not conform to nation-states’ ideologies of normalcy, which, in this
instance, are persons with chronic pain (Rabinow 258-59). Most pain scholarship points to
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OxyContin, which, supposedly, when first advertised was resistant to addiction, as causing the
global increase in prescription opioid abuse.19 However, instead of discussing how OxyContin
led to the rise in prescription drug abuse and to the restriction of opioid medications, I want to
take a step back and look at the culture of pain and disability in which OxyContin emerged. Such
an investigation, I hope, will yield a much richer understanding of the causes and dangers of
rhetorics of surveillance to persons with chronic pain. By moving in this direction, I wish to
enact my political-relational-rhetorical methodology, which calls on disability rhetoric scholars
to consider the larger power relations and practices that make possible problematic rhetorics of
chronic pain. Only afterward will I engage in a rhetorical analysis of one specific problematic
text, the pain contract, as an example of how rhetorics of surveillance further marginalize and
stigmatize persons with chronic pain and lead to their under-treatment.20
As the opening passages of this section reveal, and as discussed previously in this
dissertation, persons with chronic pain are suspect: their legitimacy is always up for debate. This
should come as no surprise. Fakery and illegitimacy have long been associated with the disabled.
Disability historian Susan Schweik traces the suspicion of the disabled to the 1880s-1890s
19

In a World of Hurt, New York Times reporter Barry Meier recalls how Purdue Pharma
claimed that because of its time-released mechanism, OxyContin would be less prone to abuse
than fast-acting painkillers like Percocet because those drugs produce the type of quick jolt that
addicts crave” (n.p.). This claim, explains Meier, reassured doctors who usually did not prescribe
opioids to dispense it, leading to the “21st Century painkiller boom.” However, Meier notes, such
a claim was misleading, since “drug addicts and curious teenagers had discovered that
OxyContin’s entire narcotic payload could be released at once by simply crushing or chewing a
tablet” (n.pag). Similarly to Meier, pain researcher Marcia Meldrum in her article “The Ongoing
Opioid Prescription Epidemic” also recounts how “Purdue’s advertised OxyContin as nonaddictive because the drug was released within the body over 12 hours,” even though “recreation
users quickly learned to get high by crushing or dissolving the pills.” Meldrum also informs that
the ready supply of OxyContin led to “an epidemic of drug overdose deaths, which increased
137% from 2000 and 2014” (1365).
20
Thirty percent of persons with chronic pain are said to be undertreated for fears of regulatory
scrutiny (Foreman, A Nation 138).
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American Ugly Laws, which surveilled, regulated, and imprisoned “the imposter beggar” and
“sham cripples” for simulating deformity in order to “steal” money from hard-working
Americans (121-23). This same suspicion operates today in Social Security Disability screenings
in which the disabled are called on to perform21 disability by undergoing periodic physical and
psychiatric evaluations22 in order to maintain their benefits. Similarly, at Americans with
Disabilities Act hearings, disabled employees are often called on to perform disability in order to
prove that their employers neglected to grant them reasonable accommodations in order to carry
out their job responsibilities.23 Considering all of this, it is not surprising that persons with
chronic pain are suspected of “doctor shopping”24 for performing disability in a culture that
demands performance. It is this culture, and not merely a drug, that fosters rhetorics of
surveillance.
Instead of “doctor shopping,” most persons with chronic pain see more than one doctor
because they do not receive adequate healthcare due to doctors’ lack of pain education,
resistance to prescribing opioid medication, and suspicion of persons with chronic pain. As a
result, many persons with chronic pain are passed along from doctor to doctor through the use of

21

To act in ways that make one’s disability noticeable.
Usually these evaluations are general and do not reflect a specific individual’s disability. For
instance, a person receiving benefits for a mental disability might be asked to pick up and carry
weighted objects even though they are not physically disabled; the reverse is also true.
23
Disability performance is a complex issue often taken up in disability studies scholarship (see
especially Brueggemann; Price; Siebers). Most recently in their edited collection Disability and
Passing, Jeffrey A. Brune and Daniel L. Wilson discuss how persons with disabilities are often
called on to draw attention to or exaggerate their disability to get some type of benefit or care
and how such performances reveal “what is at stake when it comes to disability and nondisability
identification” (1).
24
In Pain: A Political History, Keith Wailoo describes what is referred to as “doctor shopping”
as “the process by which patients fraudulently move from physicians to physicians to circumvent
controls on the quantities of pain prescription drugs available to individual consumers” (170).
22
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referrals. By the time that OxyContin gained Federal Drug and Food Administration (FDA)
approval for the treatment of chronic pain in the early 1990s, chronic pain patients were already
culturally and socio-politically constructed as “problem” patients. Often their pain was declared
as “all in their head” and dismissed as “psychogenic, unreal, and imaginary” (Reddy) because it
failed to appear on standard biomedical tests such as Cat-Scans and MRIs (see also Morris;
Wendell). In addition to being thought of as “fakers,” chronic pain patients were also often
described by healthcare professionals as “bothersome,” “angry” and “self-pitying” (Fishman;
Schleifer; Walton).
The above characterizations of the chronic pain patient are particularly aimed at female
patients: more women than men are diagnosed with the majority of chronic pain conditions such
as fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, migraines, and neuropathic
pain (see especially Foreman, A Nation). The fact that these conditions are more prevalent in
females can also explain why chronic pain is not taken seriously and research for chronic pain
conditions is underfunded. This is due to the fact that despite the advancements in medical care,
women are often still regarded as “hysterical,” and “overly emotional” and are therefore easily
dismissed as “frauds.”25 The fact that female patients’ reports of pain are usually met with
sedatives rather than pain medication is indicative of such gender discrimination. Research also
indicates that other minorities, specifically Latinos and African Americans, are more likely than
white males to have their pain dismissed (Wailoo 201). Health disparities in the treatment of
chronic pain is also evidenced by Donald Barr’s work on how race/ethnicity effects pain
25

Examples of this stigmatizing and discriminatory characterization of the female patient can be
found in Judy Segal’s work on the rhetorical history of the migraine patient who is gendered
feminine and described as “neurotic, hysteric, hypochondriac, and a fraud” (Health 45) and in
Amy Vidali’s scholarship on the “gastrointestinal woman” who is “characterized as having
unjustified anxiety and is to blame for her condition” (“Hysterical” 43).
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treatment, which reveals that “there is a clear pattern of blacks receiving an opioid medication
less often than whites, especially for the treatment of back pain and migraine headaches” (189).
Economics, along with gender and race, also reveals similar troubling health disparities. For
example, doctors treating patients in low-income neighborhoods are also less willing to prescribe
pain medication for chronic pain patients, “fearing drug dependency and accusations of fostering
addiction” (Wailoo 200) and pharmacies in low-income, predominately nonwhite neighborhoods
have inadequate amounts of opioids in stock due to the fear of illicit use and theft (Primm et al.).
Undertreatment of pain also occurs in emergency rooms in which women and other minorities
have longer wait times and female patients are more likely to be asked psychosocial questions
and less likely than male patients to have lab tests requested (Foreman, A Nation 69) and
Hispanics are nearly twice as likely to receive no medication for pain during their treatment
(Barr 188).
The general population’s characterization of persons with chronic pain “as people who sit
around watching TV most of time” (Wailoo 179) also adds to the negative depiction and
stigmatization of persons with chronic pain and ultimately to rhetorics of surveillance. In
addition to being constructed as “lazy,” the media offers another problematic image of persons
with chronic pain, that of the drug addict. This representation is fueled by heightened media
coverage of “over-indulgent” celebrities such as Rush Limbaugh, Charlie Sheen, and Eminem
who publicly announced their addictions to the prescription pain-killers Vicodin and OxyContin.
Given this culture of pain, it is no wonder that persons with chronic pain have been
unjustly targeted as being in need of surveillance and punishment, despite the fact that less than
one percent of persons with chronic pain become addicted to pain medication, and the majority
of those that do have previous histories of substance abuse (see especially Foreman, A Nation;
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Wailoo). In fact, pain research indicates that roughly seventy percent of opioids that end up on
the street come from initially legitimate sources,26 not from “doctor shopping27” or “pill mills.”28
I mention these statistics not because I feel the need to defend OxyContin and other opioid
medications for the treatment of chronic pain or to suggest that opioids do not have dangerous
and life-threatening side-effects; rather, my intention is to separate the problem of opioid abuse
from the problem of chronic pain. It is only by understanding this distinction that it becomes
clear how regulatory documents aimed at disciplining persons with chronic pain, such as “pain
contracts,” fail to solve either problem, and, due to the increased surveillance of persons with
chronic pain, actually lead to their undertreatment. This knowledge alone reveals why a
disability rhetorical analysis of problematic rhetorics of chronic pain is valuable.
In brief, pain contracts/agreements are technical documents presented to a patient by a
healthcare professional that detail the prescriber’s expectations of the patient and the conditions
under which the physician will prescribe or terminate opioids. Although these contracts or
agreements are supposedly helpful tools that inform chronic pain patients of the potential
dangers of opioids including addiction and are meant to promote a trusting doctor-patient
relationship, the opposite is often true. Instead, pain contracts/agreements use rhetorics of
surveillance to punish persons with chronic pain for not being able to overcome their pain
without pain medication by regulating and restricting their access to opioid therapy. Pain patient

26

According to a government 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, the majority of
abusers got their pain relievers from a friend or relative for free (Foreman, A Nation 156).
27
The same survey as above reported that only 2.0 percent of abusers got their pain relievers
from more than one doctor (Foreman, A Nation 156).
28
The term “pill mills” usually refers to “shady operations often advertised as pain clinics in
which unscrupulous doctors hand out prescriptions for opioids” (Foreman 135).
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advocacy groups and bioethics scholars not only question the efficacy of the contracts but also
the unethical consequences of such documents. For example, in “Opioid Contracts,” Mark
Collen points out that referring to these documents as contracts or agreements is misleading
because doing so suggests that both parties, doctors and patients, negotiated the terms of the
contract, reached amicable arrangements, and have a shared responsibility in carrying out the
contract’s terms (841-42). Instead, Collen further explains, pain contracts detail guidelines and
rules for a patient to follow in other to maintain their patient status with little or no mention of
the prescribing physician’s responsibilities to the patient. Bioethicist Richard Payne adds that
many of these contract rules, such as “you will be on time for your appointments” and “you will
not call after business hours,” have little to do with communicating the risks of opioid
medications and instead are intended to control patient behavior (6-7). These rules also could
indicate that healthcare professionals already have discriminatory attitudes toward chronic pain
patients even before a person with chronic pain walks into their offices. Other ethical concerns
pointed out by bioethicists regarding pain contracts are that they are paternalistic, unjust, and
impair physician-patient communication (see especially Payne et al.). Of course, bioethicists are
not the first to point out how asymmetrical relations of power between doctors and patients, as
well as the erosion of trust between them, can result in poor treatment outcomes (see especially
Albrecht; Beisecker; Charon; Davis; Heifferon and Brown; Segal, Scott; Wyatt). This is
especially true for persons with chronic pain.
In order to make the above criticisms regarding pain contracts more evident, I will now
move away from a general analysis of pain contracts and turn to examine one specific pain
contract, which I received at a recent visit to a pain clinic. This contract was presented to me
during my second visit to the clinic, even though I was not taking, nor did I mention being
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interested in taking, opioids for pain management. The contract is two double-spaced pages and
titled: “Contract for Controlled Substance Therapy.” It was handed to me on a clipboard along
with insurance forms and a patient questionnaire. Despite the fact that supporters of pain
contracts, particularly the American Medical Association, maintain that one positive outcome of
pain contracts is that they facilitate much needed dialogue between patient and physician
regarding the risks of opioid therapy, not one of the three practitioners I saw at the clinic that day
mentioned the contract. Consequently, I had the impression that instead of facilitating a dialogue
between the doctors and myself regarding opioid therapy, the contract was merely a waiver form
to protect the clinic’s fear of liability. Although studies indicate that there is little risk to doctors
being persecuted for overprescribing pain medication (see especially Collen; Foreman, A
Nation), many doctors still shy away from prescribing opioid medications because of this fear
and because they are genuinely concerned with their patients becoming addicts. It seems then
that physicians, along with their patients, are susceptible to rhetorics of surveillance that
problematically conflate the drug addict with persons with chronic pain.
My pain contract was finally discussed after I informed the third practitioner that I would
not be signing the contract based on ethical reasons and because, as they already knew, I was not
receiving controlled substances from them or any other medical practitioner and I had no history
of substance abuse. Nonetheless, I was implored to sign the contract “for my own good” and
“just in case I decided to take pain medications in the future.” In response, I cancelled my next
appointment and never returned.
Before continuing with this discussion, I want to pause here and acknowledge my own
privilege in order to enact my methodology’s call for self-reflexivity. Unlike many people with
chronic pain, I had the opportunity to leave the pain clinic to find another practitioner due to the
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fact that I was not in desperate pain at the time of my visit. Consequently, I was less vulnerable
and therefore less likely to be coerced into signing the contract. Also, I lived in a relatively large
city with access to several pain clinics and pain specialists29 and was able to save on
transportation costs by driving my own vehicle. In addition, even though medical bills plagued
me in the past, I had relatively good insurance at the time, which allowed me the freedom to see
multiple doctors and choose my own practitioners. I feel that it is important to note this privilege
and by doing so also point out that in addition to decreased access to opioid medication, one of
the consequences of rhetorics of surveillance is unaffordable medical care. Pain contracts make
this especially true since they require office visits for each prescription refill and the additional
costs of “random” drug screenings in the form of urine and blood tests are often not covered by
insurance.
In my pain contract, I was warned about such random drug screenings on the second
page, under “Rules for Controlled Substance Therapy.” Other rules include: “I agree to a pill
count”; “I will be responsible for my own medicine. I will not sell, trade, or share any controlled
substances”; and “I will not get a refill or prescription for controlled substances from any other
provider, urgent care, or emergency room.” These rules are examples of rhetorics of surveillance.
They not only monitor persons with chronic pain, but they also infantilize and criminalize them.
The last rule is particularly problematic considering that a patient may need a controlled
substance for an emergency unrelated to their chronic pain diagnosis yet still be dismissed from
their medical practice for not obeying the contract rules. The consequences of being dismissed
from a medical practice in the middle of opioid therapy are far greater than just not being able to

29

There are approximately only 4 board-certified pain specialists for every 100,000 patients
(Collen 841).
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continue treatment with the prescribing provider. For example, dismissal before being tapered off
opioid medication can lead to experiencing withdrawal symptoms due to physical dependence.
This is very likely, since the shortage of pain specialists and lengthy patient waiting lists result in
a long wait for medication refills. In addition, if opioid treatment is terminated before tapering,
pain levels suddenly increase. The emotional cost of being dismissed is also often great, since
persons with chronic pain already feel ostracized and are blamed for their pain.
In addition to stigmatizing and criminalizing persons with chronic pain and controlling
access to much-needed pain medications, one of the most harmful effects of pain contracts is that
they mask the real systemic issues that are responsible for an increase in addiction to controlled
substances and a problematic culture of pain. Such a culture punishes patients and doctors rather
than scrutinizing the pharmaceutical industry, regulatory agencies such as the FDA and the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) for their part in the rise of opioid prescription abuse (Meier), and
the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) gross underfunding of pain research. Pain contracts also
increase the risk of underdiagnosing and misdiagnosing persons with chronic pain. For example,
by concentrating on periodic drug screenings and enforcing the contract rules, persons with
chronic pain are pigeonholed as drug addicts and less time is spent on determining the reasons
for their constant pain.
OxyContin is still a problem. The fact that OxyContin in addition to Hydrocodone is
responsible for three times as many deaths as heroin a year testifies to that truth (Wailoo 192).
Taking this into consideration with the fact that other treatments might even benefit persons with
chronic pain more than opioid medications, such as acupuncture, meditation, massage therapy,
and yoga, it might seem curious that I spent the majority of this section critiquing pain contracts
and not OxyContin as I originally planned. However, if I blame OxyContin for rhetorics of
59

surveillance and the undertreatment of chronic pain, I would fail to take responsibility for my
work as a disability rhetorician, which is to locate and expose dangerous rhetorics that mark
persons who have been marginalized and subjugated by those in dominant position of power as
abnormal, other, and, even worse, disposable. It is my hope then that this work—my critiquing
and intervening in the rhetorics that cause increased surveillance and harm to persons with
chronic pain—will forge a path for more disability rhetoricians to intervene in similar injustices
aimed at persons with chronic pain and other disabilities.
Before closing this section, I want to make clear that the above critiques of problematic
rhetorics of chronic pain would not have been possible without putting chronic pain and
disability into conversation and using a political-relational-rhetorical methodology to guide these
inquiries. Both make it possible to engage with medicine, to consider its affordances and
limitations to the project of disability studies, while also rejecting the medical model of
disability. This is just one example of the benefits of theorizing chronic pain as a disability and
the advantages of including chronic pain scholarship in the fields of disability studies and
disability rhetoric.
Differently Imagined
Can we, in fact, broaden our conception of what pain means, alter the deeply entrenched
notion of pain as a threat, not to tissue or bone (which of course it usually is) but to
identity.
—Susannah Mintz, Hurt and Pain
I would like to close this chapter with an experiment in imagination. This experiment to
imagine chronic pain differently is spurred on by disability scholars Susannah Mintz, Jay
Dolmage, and Alison Kafer, each of whom asks us to imagine the future of disability differently,
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one in which those with disabilities are valued and living with disability is considered a
meaningful and joyful experience. I believe the same can be said for persons with chronic pain
and living with chronic pain. In fact, I argue that persons with chronic pain are already living
what Alison Patsavas refers to as “rich, varied, and complex lives” (23). However, these lives are
undermined by rhetorics of suffering and rhetorics of surveillance. Therefore, in order to witness
these lives and create possibilities for more of them, I imagine a future in which chronic pain is
not enslaved by dark and menacing metaphors. A future that recognizes that pain is experienced
in and through relationships and that these relationships thrive on interdependence and mutual
respect. A future in which persons with chronic pain are valued for their insights and
contributions rather than pitied and victimized and criminalized and ridiculed. I imagine a future
in which medical schools require more pain education rather than focusing on managing
“burdensome” and “difficult” pain patients. And I imagine a future in which pain is recognized
as a necessary universal human experience, one that unites instead of ostracizes. However, in
order for this all to happen, for this imaginary future to become real, disability rhetoric scholars
and the larger disability community need to intervene and complicate problematic rhetorics of
pain. And then we can start anew.
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CHAPTER IV
‘RELAXED, BUT NOT LAZY’: RHETORICS OF REHABILITATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE CHRONIC PAIN PATIENT
Down the hall, two doors to the left, in the group therapy room, a woman with quivering hands
hides them beneath the table while the man beside her closes his eyes against the piercing
fluorescents overhead, taking advantage of the moment the nurse turns around to write on the
whiteboard. We must be on our best behaviors here when eyes are watching us, at the ready to
spot weakness, pointing at our failed attempts at performing normal. Here is the best research
hospital in the world. Here is where the untreatable come to be saved.
I didn’t have a choice, not really. I suspect that is true for many of the patients who make
the long journey to the Mayo Clinic as a last hope after trying everything else. It’s not just the
distance that makes the journey long; the waiting list for an appointment, even with a referral,
sometimes extends beyond a year. Another option is to arrive at the clinic without an
appointment and stay at one of the many nearby hotels, motels, or boarding houses while
spending each day, sometimes for weeks, sitting in one of the dozens of lobbies waiting for a
cancellation. However, this option is not accessible to many who cannot afford the expense of
staying indefinitely in Rochester, Minnesota, without a promise of an appointment. Since I
couldn’t afford this choice and the severity of my pain made the thought of waiting a year for an
appointment excruciating, I made a deal with the gastroenterology scheduling office to guarantee
an earlier appointment. In only two months, I would be seen by the gastroenterology diagnostic
team and receive the specialized physical therapy my referring doctor recommended, if I also
agreed to spend three weeks living in Rochester in order to attend the Mayo Clinic’s
Comprehensive Pain Rehabilitation Center’s (PRC) adult outpatient day program, which I knew
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nothing of. That was before. Before I ever heard of chronic pain. Before my not-yet-diagnosed
GI disorder was accused of being “all in my head.” Before being told that it was my weakness
and lack of effort that kept me from “managing” my pain. Before becoming a student of rhetoric
and disability studies and realizing that the Mayo Clinic’s Comprehensive Pain Rehabilitation
Center used rehabilitation as just another process of normalization. Before I had the knowledge
to save myself from the trauma that the PRC still inflicts upon me today.
This chapter does the work that I once could not. It exposes the way rhetorics of
rehabilitation employ normalizing discourses and practices to discipline and silence persons with
chronic pain whose “deviant” bodies threaten the health of the nation-state. These rhetorics
reinforce a rehabilitation approach to disability, which focuses on removing the “lack” from the
disabled so that they may return to their assumed, prior normal state and to the able-bodied
workforce (Stiker 122-23). In critiquing these rhetorics of rehabilitation, I also hope to make
visible the often subtle ways they legitimize behavior modification as a method of treatment
rather than attending to patients’ actual medical needs. As such, this chapter contributes to my
dissertation’s larger project by calling on disability scholars and disability rhetoricians to
theorize chronic pain as a disability in order to intervene in the harm that results from rhetorics
of rehabilitation. This work also attends to my political-relational-rhetorical methodology by
making explicit the ways in which rhetorics of rehabilitation function relationally and as a
governmental tool to discipline and control what Foucault refers to as “docile bodies,” or bodies
that in a capitalist society are not deemed “productive” members of the labor force.
In order to most effectively address and redress the dangers of rhetorics of rehabilitation,
this chapter will move from an overview of the rehabilitation approach to disability to analyzing,
critiquing, and intervening in a particular site of rehabilitation discourse—the Mayo Clinic’s
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Comprehensive Pain Rehabilitation Center (PRC) patient manual, paying specific attention to the
section on “Pain Behaviors,” which disciplines patients who speak about and use the word pain
with the threat of expulsion from the center. In so doing, I show how the PRC purposely denies a
language of pain by making such pain unspeakable. In addition, as a former patient of the PRC, I
will engage with my lived experience to show how the program’s practices reinforce and
perpetuate the patient manual’s rhetorics of rehabilitation.
However, before continuing with this analysis, it is first necessary to provide an
introduction to the rehabilitation approach to disability by looking at the cultural, political, and
economic climate in which the approach emerged. Such an exploration reveals how rhetorics of
rehabilitation, such as the “myth of control” and pain behaviors, developed as a way to enforce
the rehabilitation approach to disability. It is only through this exploration that it becomes clear
how rhetorics of rehabilitation are being used today to stigmatize and marginalize persons with
chronic pain.
The Rehabilitation Approach to Disability
Early in the week, we watch a VHS tape of a middle-aged man with a hypothetical back problem
performing ergonomically correct kitchen duties. Then we go to work. We lift and carry pretend
foods from cupboards to the cabinets below: milk cartons and orange juice jugs filled with sand,
peanut butter and jelly jars filled with pebbles, and empty metal soup cans. Being there reminds
me of the house corner in the kindergarten room I used to teach in. I look around for a plastic
sunny-side-up egg frying in a plastic pan, and I imagine children playing with recycled dolls
with bruised faces and tangled hair. The goal, we are told, is to work in the kitchen without
increasing our back pain. It doesn’t seem to matter that only Rhonda has a back problem. We
are all treated the same, so if one of us has a back problem, we all have a back problem.
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Disability scholars point to the First World War and the return of thousands of injured
soldiers “crippled” by the devastating effects of modern warfare, the increase in work accidents,
and the advent of social security as the beginning of the rehabilitation approach to disability
(Healey; Kumar; Schweik; Shakespeare; Stiker). This approach fundamentally changed the ways
in which disability was constructed, and, as an effect, how the disabled were and are treated in
Western society. Prior to the First World War, at best, the disabled were treated as aberrations in
need of a cure; when a cure was not possible, they were sequestered away from “normal” society
and placed into asylums, prisons, almshouses, and custodial care; at worst, they were subject to
elimination by eugenicists.
The present day goal of rehabilitation differs greatly from the above, although a close
examination of the approach reveals that stigmatizing attitudes toward the disabled have changed
little (see especially Kumar; Schweik; Shakespeare). Instead of excluding the disabled from
society because they fail to be cured, the aim of rehabilitation is to eliminate disability through
transformation by “restoring the patient’s former appearance or function usually by emphasizing
ways of thinking and behaving which are consistent with ‘normality’” (403 qtd in Kumar) so that
they may be returned to “or replaced into a habitat, a home, a habitus from which the subject has
been dislodged” (Schweik 230). Such an aim only became possible with the advancements of
technology brought by the war, particularly the replacement of body parts with prostheses. As an
effect, all persons with physical disabilities, and not just the war-injured, became candidates for
rehabilitation and as such were freed from the asylum, separated from the mentally disabled, and
placed into rehabilitation centers, another form of institutionalization, where they were trained to
return to work.
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I want to pause here for a moment to speculate what this history reveals about the concept
of rehabilitation and, by doing so, join its critics. For example, although rehabilitation seems to
concern itself with medical interventions to approve the functioning of the disabled, such as the
fitting of a prosthetic limb and subsequent physical therapy, disability studies scholars instead
contend that rehabilitation is primarily a social concept enforced through normalizing discourses
that demand overcoming and passing, sometimes even at the expense of more pain, greater
discomfort, and loss of function (Hammel). Disability historian Susan Schweik adds that instead
of being motivated by charitable benevolence and the spirit of inclusion, rehabilitation was
fueled by the fear of more disabled beggars lining the streets with their unsightliness, thus
emphasizing the financial and social burden of dependency, rather than on improving the lives of
persons with disabilities. Schweik also informs that the rehabilitation approach to disability
claims that disability is an attitude that can be changed, making disability seem “optional as well
as reversible” (238). Ashwin Kumar explains that the rehabilitation approach reinforces the
medical model of disability and “focuses on disability as an individual problem which requires
individual change” (402). The rehabilitation approach to disability thus denies that disability is
also a product of socio-political, relational, and economic forces.
What is most revealing about the rehabilitation approach is its insistence that disability is
an attitude that can be changed through individual will. The aim of rehabilitation, then, is not to
actually eliminate the medical and social problems that cause disability, but rather to give the
appearance of normality through disciplinary power, which Foucault defines as the methods used
by the nation-state to “control the operations of the body” (180). Kumar adds that this
disciplinary power is not very different from the normalizing power used in the penitentiary
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system designed to “reform” criminals and that in both contexts rehabilitation is assured of
maintaining its power “to define, target, and marginalize” (402).
Given the above, perhaps it would not be a reach to say that rehabilitation centers are
institutions of incarceration. In their edited collection, Disability Incarcerated, disability scholars
Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman, and Allison C. Carey seem to make this argument as they
claim the term “institutional archipelago” to account for the diverse sites of incarceration and
segregation (such as group homes, sheltered workshops, and day programs) that “all trace back
to undifferentiated confinement and its ongoing reform” (14). These diverse sites of
institutionalization, the editors explain, “loosely share a structure of political relationality: under
the right conditions imposed from the above, degenerated, disabled, criminalistic, or uncivilized
peoples can be brought up to normative standards” (6). This belief, as is true of all rehabilitation
approaches to disability, is enforced through rhetorics of rehabilitation.
The above quote also speaks to the necessity of building a coalition among scholaractivists who care about chronic pain, disability, and other forms of difference, since all share
similar marginalization and discrimination in regards to rehabilitation. It is also important to note
here, before moving on to an overview of the Mayo Clinic’s Comprehensive Pain Rehabilitation
Center (PRC) and their use of rhetorics of rehabilitation, that despite its supposed improvement
on other forms of treating the disabled, the goal of rehabilitation to eradicate disability is
disturbingly similar to that of the eugenics movement. It is only the means that differ. These
means are most aptly expressed by Henri-Jacques Stiker:
Rehabilitation marks the appearance of a culture that attempts to complete the act of
identification, of making identical. This act will cause the disabled to disappear and with
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them all that is lacking in order to assimilate them, drown them, dissolve them whole in
the greater social order. (xii)
The Mayo Clinic’s Comprehensive Pain Rehabilitation Center (PRC): An Overview
What strikes me the most about Kim is her vulnerability. She is so incredibly hopeful and scared
at the same time. I know I feel that way, as do many of the others, but she shows her desperation
so openly. At one point she asks me if the program is working. No one is in the lunchroom but
me, Kim, and her family. She is asking only me, and I want to be truthful. It is quiet and my
hesitation hangs in the stale air. I want to tell her no, that it isn’t helping, that the program is
letting me down, and that the only reason I am still here is because I have nowhere left to go. But
I don’t want to tell her that. Instead I tell myself that maybe the program will work for her, that I
am sure her pain will get better, that she will be rehabilitated and her husband and children can
have her back the way she used to be: healthy and normal.
The PRC is a unique chronic pain rehabilitation center. Although it treats common
chronic pain conditions that are similar to those treated at other pain centers (e.g., fibromyalgia,
chronic back pain, chronic fatigue syndrome, complex regional pain syndrome, migraines, and
neuropathic pain), most of its patients have already tried numerous medical interventions and
alternative treatments for chronic pain by the time they reach the PRC and consider the program
their last chance for relief. This knowledge, which I will continue to use in this chapter to
supplement, or rather interrupt the “expert” knowledge of the PRC’s medical discourse, is a
product of my lived experience as a former PRC patient.
Unlike at other pain clinics, the majority of PRC patients come “from across the United
States and the world” (“Comprehensive”), often leaving their homes, families, and workplaces to
participate in the 7:30AM to 4:30PM, Monday through Friday, three-week adult day-patient
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program with the promise of “returning to a healthier lifestyle” (“Comprehensive”). As such, the
PRC operates similarly to earlier rehabilitation centers that separated patients from their lifeworlds and “healthy” society until they were rehabilitated and returned to a “normal” state. Even
though normalcy is a social construct and is therefore unattainable (see especially Davis; Linton),
the PRC capitalizes on what Henri-Jacques Stiker refers to as the disabled’s desire to be “like
everybody else” and their willingness to be “integrated into the norm” (143). It is for this reason,
along with the hope and longing that the reputation of the Mayo Clinic inspires and subsequent
family and friends’ expectations, that some patients, like myself, remain in the PRC despite its
use of rhetorics of rehabilitation to intimidate and shame patients into compliance.
Perhaps an even greater reason for enduring the program’s rhetorics of rehabilitation is
the financial hardship that many patients experience in order to attend the PRC and the emotional
need for that hardship to be of value. For example, in order to participate in the program,
prospective patients must have the means to pay for travel to Minnesota, three-weeks of lodging
costs, and program fees not covered by insurance. For those without insurance a recent call to the
Mayo Clinic’s Estimating Services indicates that the approximate cost of the program is $32,000
to $46,000. Although the cost of the program for those with Medicare is reduced to $7,000 to
$9,000 dollars, patients with this type of insurance will not know until after the services are
rendered how much is actually covered. Even those who have the privilege of affording greater
coverage, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, still have to pay out of pocket expenses for uncovered
fees. For instance, although I had Blue Cross PPO, the insurance company found occupational
therapy unnecessary, and since it is not possible to opt out of any part of the program, I had to
cover the $2,000 cost of this service. As for lodging, this is also a considerable expense,
especially since there are only a limited number of non-profit and charitable housing
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opportunities, and most are restricted to persons with specific health care needs such as
transplants and cancer treatments. Given all of this information, it is not surprising that PRC
patients are invested in making the program work for them despite the PRC’s use of disciplinary
power to control patient-behaviors through rhetorics of rehabilitation. Examples of these
rhetorics are found throughout the patient manual given to patients on the first day of the
program.
The PRC’s Patient Manual and Rhetorics of Rehabilitation
I spend the majority of my days over a long oval table, listening to the staff talk about how we
shouldn’t talk about pain. Instead there are scheduled topics to discuss during group therapy,
such as: time management, assertiveness training, and sleep hygiene. Through these scheduled
discussions, I learn that the ideal chronic pain patient should be assertive, but not aggressive;
active, but not overly so; relaxed, but not lazy; time-managed, but not inflexible; and successful,
without being overly ambitious.
PRC patients are instructed to have their patient manual with them at all times. Patients
are also encouraged to read the manual as soon as possible and to complete the reading by
midweek. The sheer volume of the information in the manual is overwhelming and seems to
suggest that persons with chronic pain need more education on their own bodies and behaviors in
order to be properly rehabilitated. The patient manual is a thick, three-ring binder and contains
approximately two hundred pages of information on the PRC and its goals, including
descriptions of the different types of therapies provided (occupational, physical, and group),
examples of behavioral modification techniques, educational materials on chronic pain, self-help
worksheets, and medical forms. The information is separated by twenty-seven tabs with headings
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such as: Coping Techniques, Problem Solving, Anger, Chemical Dependency, Assertiveness,
and Time Management.
The Mayo Clinic publishes the manual and holds the copyright. As an effect, the manual
reads as if it has one author: the prestigious Mayo Clinic. As such, it is difficult to challenge the
material presented in the manual because of the ethos and authority of its author. This authority
is even more pronounced by the use of second-person narration. The pronoun “you” appears
throughout the manual, which has the rhetorical effect of segregating the clinic’s patients from
the program staff and thereby heightening the power differentiation between the two. This power
differentiation is evident in the very beginning of the patient manual on the “Daily Schedule”
page that states: “As part of the program’s rehabilitation focus, we expect you to attend every
scheduled activity in spite of your level of pain.” This sentence is revealing not only because it
makes evident the unequal power distribution between the staff and its patients, but also because
it reveals that the PRC believes that persons with chronic pain need disciplining even before they
begin the program. Also, the repeated use of the second person pronoun makes it clear that the
program reinforces the rehabilitation approach to disability, which locates disability in the
individual and as a consequence attributes reduction in pain to an individual patient’s willingness
to be rehabilitated rather than according to the dictates of the PRC program and its staff.
The following passage in the “Personal Responsibility” section of the patient manual
emphasizes this point:
The path to health includes being able to have your emotional needs met without
remaining ill. The first step down this path may involve a change in perspective
that will lead to accepting responsibility. (n.p.)
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The patient manual’s emphasis on individual will and personal responsibility also echoes
Susan Schweik’s earlier criticism of the rehabilitation approach to disability, which claims that
disability is an attitudinal problem that is “optional as well as reversible” (238). The PRC’s belief
that chronic pain is a temporary state that depends on individual effort and on a change of
attitude is a powerful rhetoric of rehabilitation found throughout the patient manual. This
rhetoric, that persons with chronic pain are responsible for their own recovery, seems to stem
from the PRC’s belief that persons with chronic pain have chosen to remain in pain. Although
the manual does affirm that chronic pain conditions are “real,” it also suggests that persons with
chronic pain are still somehow at fault for having these conditions. This is made clear by the
manual’s stigmatizing discourse about persons with chronic pain, which is reminiscent of the
negative depictions of the chronic pain patient analyzed in previous chapters. For example,
consider the following passage on “secondary gain” from the “Workplace Issues” section of the
manual, which characterizes persons with chronic pain as exaggerators who use their pain as an
excuse for not being “productive” members of the nation-state:
When a person is living with chronic pain, there may be occasions when symptoms can
be used to avoid the unpleasantries of the workplace. This is called “secondary gain.”
However, secondary gains do not lead to rehabilitation; rather they often contribute to a
pain problem . . . . While these secondary gains may seem like benefits, in the long run
they become problem behaviors that can lead to deconditioning, anxiety, and prolonged
preoccupation with your pain problem. Furthermore, avoiding the workplace makes it
more and more difficult to fulfill workplace duties and responsibilities, which increases
stress, which in turn slows down the rehabilitation process. (n.p.)
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This passage is significant not only because it makes visible the stigmatizing and
discriminatory attitude that the PRC has toward persons with chronic pain, but also because it
serves as another example of how the program uses rhetorics of rehabilitation, such as disability
is “optional and reversible,” to enforce the rehabilitation approach’s main objective: to return
“docile” bodies to the labor force. In fact, the passage even accuses persons with chronic pain of
deliberately choosing to leave the workforce instead of acknowledging that many workplaces are
inaccessible to persons with chronic pain and other disabilities.
Also, in order to convince persons with chronic pain that they are responsible for their
pain problems and are not justified in leaving the workforce, the manual informs patients that
they do not have a disability, and they should not take advantage of benefits or compensation.
This is made evident in the “Pain Problems and Disability: Common Misconceptions” section of
the manual that states it is a “misconception” that “a person living with chronic pain or illness is
disabled and is therefore entitled to compensation,” while claiming instead that “injury/illness
does not mean that one’s ability to work stops. The goal is to rehabilitate and get back one’s
ability to work. Compensation may help with the rehabilitation process, but it is not a ‘retirement
payment’” (12). Even though I agree that returning to work, if possible, could be beneficial to
PRC patients, I find the above discourse problematic and stigmatizing because it assumes that
persons with chronic pain want to leave work and remain unemployed. Also, placing the
responsibility on patients to reduce their pain and not on the program and outside forces ignores
the political, relational, economic, and social factors that have made chronic pain an “epidemic”
and a “burden.” In addition, maintaining the belief that patients can be rehabilitated through
individual will falsely suggests that persons with chronic pain have the psychological ability to
control their own bodies through the power of their minds. This belief is another powerful and
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dangerous rhetoric of rehabilitation found throughout the PRC manual and enforced by the
program’s practices. I refer to this rhetoric of rehabilitation as the “myth of control.”
In The Rejected Body, Susan Wendell introduces the “myth of control,” which she
describes as the commonplace belief that the mind controls the body and that persons with
chronic pain and chronic illness consequently have control over their pain and poor health. The
“myth of control,” Wendell informs, is perpetuated by the medical community as an explanation
for why persons with chronic pain and illness fail to be diagnosed and cured. As Wendell
explains:
First, [the myth of control] contributes to the illusion that scientific medicine knows
everything it needs to know to cure us (provided that we cooperate fully) because there is
no physical problem for which it cannot provide a diagnosis. Second, it transfers
responsibility for controlling their bodies to the minds of those patients who cannot be
cured; the problem is not that the medicine cannot control their bodies, it is that their
minds are working against them. (94)
Consequently, “the myth of control” “is useful in maintaining medical omnipotence.” In
addition, the thought that “‘she could be cured if only she wanted to get better’ is comforting to
both healers and those who want to believe in their power” (Wendell 95). In this way, the PRC
uses the myth of control to maintain its own ethos and power while simultaneously instructing
patients that changing their minds can change their bodies. This rhetoric is most evident in the
patient manual’s explanation of the “Cycle of Control.”
The “Cycle of Control” is a series of worksheets located in the “Chronic Pain” section of
the manual and attempts to explain to PRC patients how managing their emotions can control
their pain. The first “Cycle of Control” worksheet lists a series of questions that asks patients to
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identify how their emotions keep them from “controlling” their pain. Following this worksheet
are several pages of visual representations of the “Cycle of Control,” each with a circle in the
middle of the page with the words “Pain in Control.” On the outside of the circle are clockwise
arrows showing the direction of the cycle. Also, along the outside of the circle appear the
following words and phrases: “Focus on the Pain,” “Sense of Loss of Control,” “Increased
Anger,” “Withdrawal/Withhold,” “Sadness,” and “Decreased Self-Esteem.” These words and
phrases serve as headings that are used to prompt patients into thinking how they might control
their “Cycle of Pain” and to show patients how the failure to control their emotions leads to more
pain and greater despair.
The first page of the cycle is already filled out with suggestions from the program written
underneath each heading on what steps patients might take in order to improve coping and take
control of their emotions, such as: “avoid pain behaviors, especially isolation,” “improve selftalk and communication skills,” and “use anger management strategies.” The second page is left
blank, except for the headings, in order for patients to consider and write down the steps they
will take to better manage their emotions in the future. Patients are then expected to share their
results with the whole group and as a response the group leader praises those patients who
“correctly” identify the steps they will need to take to control their emotions, while instructing
those who failed to do so to try harder. At the end of group therapy, patients fill out the last
worksheet of the cycle, which contains only a circle in the middle of the page with the word,
“You in Control.”
Before continuing with this analysis, I want to take a moment to make clear that I realize
that emotional health does have bearing on physical well-being. I also know that emotions can
affect the experience of pain. And yet, I still find the PRC’s use of the “myth of control”
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problematic and potentially dangerous. I find it problematic to promise patients that their pain
can be controlled through a change in emotions considering that one of the symptoms of chronic
pain is that it is sporadic and uncontrollable. I also find it problematic that the “Cycle of Pain”
worksheets are built on the assumption that chronic pain is the result of uncontrollable emotions
rather than a disease of the body. This assumption aligns with another version of the “myth of
control,” which Wendell explains as
the belief that if you take proper care of your body, you will stay well and fit until you
die. This has the ugly implication that if you are ill or disabled, you must have failed to
take care of yourself. Another is that people ‘make themselves ill’ or disabled by
mismanaging their lives, their psyches, or their spirits in some way. (103)
The PRC’s use of this version of the myth of control is evident in the “Cycle of Control”
worksheets and is a powerful rhetoric of rehabilitation used throughout the patient manual.
Consider, for example, the PRC’s explanation of their “Approach,” which once again
implies that persons with chronic pain have mismanaged their lives and their health and need to
make behavioral and emotional changes to control their pain:
Managing chronic pain is a process rather than an act—a process in which you
will make choices and changes that will affect your lifestyle. These changes
will help you stop or decrease behaviors that cause problems in your life and help
you focus on appropriate, wellness-oriented behaviors. (n.p.)
What is most dangerous about the passage above and the PRC’s overall use of the “myth of
control” as a rhetoric of rehabilitation is that it hinges on the self-disgust and shame that many
persons with chronic pain already experience through marginalization and stigmatization while
amplifying that experience. Also, since controlling chronic pain is not possible, I argue that the
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PRC’s use of the “myth of control” is not intended to improve the pain of their patients, but
rather to teach them to pass as able-bodied. This is done most effectively through the program’s
emphasis on pain behaviors, which I examine in the next section.
Forbidden Pain Behaviors
As soon as I see the list, I know I am in trouble. I am guilty of doing every item on the list, except
limping. Crying is my greatest weakness; I spent most of the last three years crying, and I
consider the action involuntarily. I also do most of my crying in bed, and I wonder if I’ll be in
twice the amount of trouble for doing two pain behaviors at once. And when I continue to think
about it, I realize I sometimes do three or four pain behaviors at the same time. When I cry (2) in
my bed (4), sometimes I also put my hand on my stomach when I have spasms, which I learn is a
protective posture (5) and I’m sure I must be grimacing (3) as well. My only hope is that perhaps
doing them out of order isn’t as big of a deal.
Bad Back Bob is a big man, about 6’4 and bulky, and when he falls onto the wooden floor the
second time around, his body makes a loud thud. We all turn away from Bob’s embarrassment,
from his cry of pain. Finally, Aaron helps Bad Back Bob up, Bob leans on him hard, his weight
heavily spilling onto Aaron’s shoulder. But when he stands up, he isn’t given his cane back.
“Limping and using protective posture,” Aaron tells him, “are pain behaviors.”
Even now, eleven years after my time at the PRC, when I put my hands on my belly to
calm the pain that moves inside of it, I still feel guilt and shame at my attempts to soothe myself.
As soon as I notice that I am engaging in this “protective posture,” I quickly drop my
hands to my sides. Using “protective posture” was just one of the pain behaviors listed in the
PRC manual, which are described as:
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[A]ny action or response that lets others know or reminds you, that you are experiencing
pain. Pain behaviors are used as a way to try to escape pain or to obtain care and support
from others. Pain behaviors usually lose their usefulness with time, but some people
continue to engage in these behaviors as habit. Often pain behaviors become a social
problem and isolate you from friends and family. Your healthcare team can help you
identify and address any pain behaviors you may have. (n.p.)
I can still hear the staff, whom we had come to call The Pain Police, telling me that I touched my
belly because I wanted to draw attention to myself, to seek pity.
I was not the only one in my group who apparently used protective postures. A fellow
patient was reprimanded during “individual time” for putting her legs up against a wall, a
common resting pose in yoga, to take the pressure off her back. Another patient with migraines
was instructed to remove her baseball cap in group therapy since it only served to bring attention
to herself rather than shield her from the bright lights overheard. Even assistive devices,
particularly canes and braces, were considered using protective posture and were taken away
from patients when the staff deemed them unnecessary. Leaning against the wall for support was
also forbidden. As an effect, we were always on high alert, feeling unsafe in a supposedly safe
environment. Using pain behaviors was taken very seriously, and those who continued to use
them disappeared. We only knew of their dismissal from the program when they went missing
from morning meeting the next day. The staff never talked about their absence and their loss was
heavy and quiet.
We guessed that patient dismissals were decided by the program’s psychiatrist, Dr.
Matthews, who every Tuesday and Thursday of the program had us form a line outside of his
office door to await judgment. We waited tensely, never knowing the order in which we would
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be called and weary of being chastised for accidently leaning against the hallway walls. Some of
us held hands. When a name was called, each patient walked into the office alone and came to
stand in front of Dr. Matthews and the program team seated in a small conference style room that
reminded me of being in the courtroom of my Social Security Disability hearing. At this
meeting, Dr. Matthews summarized the patient’s progress or lack thereof based on her ability to
taper off pain medication and reduce or eliminate pain behaviors. Afterward, each member of the
program team had the opportunity to ask the patient specific questions and to comment on any
problematic or redemptive qualities that she had exhibited. We did not talk as we waited, in part
because the fear made us quiet, and in part because talking about pain was a pain behavior.
I share these stories not to seek attention or pity, as the PRC would contend, but rather to
provide another example of the ways in which the PRC uses rhetorics of rehabilitation, in this
case in the form of pain behaviors, to enforce the rehabilitation approach to disability that
demands normalization as a necessary step toward inclusion. Since a cure for chronic pain is
impossible and treatments for chronic pain such as occupational therapy and physical therapy are
time-consuming and unpredictable, having patients eliminate pain behaviors, which I argue is a
form of what the field of disability studies refers to as “passing” or “the way that people conceal
social markers of impairment to avoid the stigma and pass as normal” (Brune and Wilson), is the
only way for the PRC to ensure the illusion that their patients returned to normalcy.
The need for PRC patients to identify and eliminate pain behaviors is also emphasized
repeatedly in the patient manual, starting with the “Pain Behavior” list and the “Daily Pain
Record” forms. The “Daily Pain Record” forms are completed and turned in at check-in each
morning of the program. The forms contain a checklist of what the program has identified as the
most common types of pain behaviors—talking about pain; limping; crying; grimacing; moving
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slowly; rubbing affected area; using protective posture (brace, cane, splint); lying down;
withdrawing from people; and avoiding activity—and ask patients to identify how often they
engage in these behaviors. These forms are then given to the program team and are used to
evaluate patient improvement and compliance. Pain behaviors also appear in the “Goal Setting”
section of the manual and are further described as “actions or words that communicate to people
that you have chronic pain.” Apparently, then, the PRC believes that having chronic pain and
appearing to have chronic pain need to be kept hidden. Patients are then instructed to choose
reducing pain behaviors as one of their program goals.
Pain behaviors also appear in the “Difficult Day” and “Group Therapy” sections of the
manual; patients are told to “avoid talking” about pain and symptoms. Talking about pain is also
condemned in the “Relationships” section of the patient manual, which explains that “people
communicate through actions as well as their words,” which apparently results in the loss of
relationships and “sexual intimacy.” This rhetoric of rehabilitation, that talking about pain makes
pain worse and destroys relationships, is the most damaging of the PRC’s forbidden pain
behaviors because it denies a language of pain by making such pain unspeakable. Consequently,
persons with chronic pain are further stigmatized, marginalized, and eliminated by being forced
into silence. This forced silence is also indicative of how Western medicine fails to address pain
effectively, and, as a result, is responsible for the commonplace belief that pain “destroys”
language and is uncommunicable. It is also important to emphasize here that it is not chronic
pain that fails language, but rather the medical establishment that disallows persons with chronic
pain access to language.
I remember the rise and fall of voices. The after-hours when the program doors closed for the
nights and the weekends. When we gathered in each other’s motels, hotels, and boarding homes
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in far-away Rochester, Minnesota, to talk about how we could not talk about pain. And in that
talking, we came to know each other’s stories, where and when the pain began and who was
there or not there to support us in the moments when we needed support the most. We talked
about the hurting, the throbbing, the stabbing, the pins and needles, and then the pain of the
waking up of joints and muscles and bones. I remember how the words kept coming and coming,
and how in them we found another way to be in pain, another way to speak.
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CHAPTER V
CHANGING THE STATUS QUO: LISTENING TO ALTERNATIVE
RHETORICS OF CHRONIC PAIN
I explore what it means to speak with cracked voices, to use words, language, and rhetoric, in
cries and rants, teases and taunts, that refuse to accept the status quo.
—David L. Wallace, Compelled to Write
Much of what we know of chronic pain comes from those in dominant positions of
power—medical experts, the pharmaceutical industry, popular media outlets, and legislative
bodies. Despite critiquing and disrupting these institutions’ voices, I have still allowed them to
dominate this dissertation, and all they have spoken of is the drug addict, isolation and despair,
suicide, and illegitimacy and fakery. Thus, all they have given to us is what this dissertation has
referred to as problematic rhetorics of chronic pain. In this chapter, I heed David L. Wallace’s
above call and listen instead to the “cracked voices,” the “cries and rants,” and the “teases and
taunts” of those who live with chronic pain and have different stories to tell (3).
These stories offer alternative rhetorics30 of chronic pain that provide more genuine and
honest interpretations of chronic pain that include both the often terrible material realities of
30

The two major works that I will draw on for explanations of alternative rhetoric are David
Wallace’s Compelled to Write and editors’ Laura Gray-Rosendale and Sibylle Gruber’s
Alternative Rhetorics. Wallace uses the singular form “alternatve rhetoric” in his book, while
Gray-Rosendale and Gruber use the plural form “alternative rhetorics” when referring to a
singular instance of a type of alternative rhetoric. For example, in their book they refer to one
activist website as a site of alternative rhetorics and multiple activist websites as alternative
rhetorics, while Wallace would refer to the former as an alternative rhetoric and the latter as
alternative rhetorics. Gray-Rosendale and Gruber explain that they choose to use the plural form
in order to “emphasize multiplicity and fragmentation within and between different rhetorics and
different traditions” (5). Although I understand their reasoning, I also find it confusing.
Therefore, unless I am referring to Gray-Rosendale and Gruber’s work, I will be using the
singular form of alternative rhetoric for the purposes of this chapter. However, I will use the
plural form when referring to multiple examples of alternative rhetorics of chronic pain.
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living with chronic pain and the transformative power that a life in pain affords. In so doing,
these rhetorics also speak to this dissertation’s political-relational-rhetorical methodology, which
calls for [1] troubling the hegemony of biomedicine and its medical model of disability that
defines chronic pain as an individual defect unaffected by political, societal, economic, and
relational factors; [2] disrupting stigmatizing representations of persons with chronic pain; [3]
challenging the prevailing belief that chronic pain is uncommunicable and inaccessible to those
without the lived experience of chronic pain; and [4] problematizing the supposed invisibility of
chronic pain. To best show how alternative rhetorics of chronic pain do this work, this chapter
analyzes a particular site of alternative rhetoric—PainExhibit.org—an online chronic pain art
exhibit. However, before moving on with this analysis, I first wish to provide a brief theoretical
overview of alternative rhetoric and its capacity to enact positive social change.
Alternative Rhetoric
Most discussions of alternative rhetoric occur amongst scholars in the field of rhetoric
and composition studies who challenge the Greco-Roman classical rhetorical tradition that is
authored largely by white, middle-to-upper-class men in prominent positions of power (see, for
example, Dolmage; Glenn; Gray-Rosendale and Gruber; Powell et al.; Schroeder et al.; Wallace).
Those engaged in alternative rhetoric—feminist rhetoricians, rhetoricians of color, disability
rhetoricians—speak from a place of marginalization and stigmatization. They offer alternative
histories of rhetoric and rhetorical thought by recovering and expanding the rhetorical canon. By
doing this work, these scholars “give voice to those whose discursive acts went unrecognized by
Western culture” and were instead “marginalized, ghettoized, neglected, or overlooked within
our historical context as well as other historical contexts for particular cultural, social, and
political reasons” (Gray-Rosendale and Gruber 2). Also, alternative rhetoric scholars have and
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continue to pave new rhetorical landscapes by including rhetorics of race, gender, sexuality,
disability, and identity formation in their research and teaching. In addition to redefining who
counts as a “rhetor,” alternative rhetoric scholars also question what counts as “rhetoric” by
challenging the hegemony of male-dominated, alphabetic, print-based, linear, so-called objective
discourse (Bizzell; Dolmage; Haas; Powell, “Listening”; Schroeder, et al.; Shipka).
Alternative rhetoricians focus instead on material, visual, digital, and multimodal
rhetorics as legitimate and rigorous intellectual rhetorical practices that increase opportunities for
inclusivity and accessibility. For example, in “Listening to Ghosts,” Malea Powell speaks of the
necessity of challenging dominant discourse (or Euro-colonialist discourse) with “other ways of
knowing, other ways of being and becoming that frequently go unheard of and unsaid in
scholarly work” (12). She advocates for alternative discourses that “tell a story that mixes worlds
and ways, one that listens and speaks” (12), and then does so in her hybrid essay that defies
linearity and weaves together storytelling, scholarly discourse, poetry, journal entries, and other
remembrances. Maureen Daly Goggin similarly “pushes at the boundaries of what counts as
rhetorical practice and who counts in its production” in her work on the rhetorical practice of
needlepoint sampler-making (310). In “Wampum as Hypertext,” Angela M. Haas challenges
hegemonic understandings of digital rhetoric, calls for revisions of how we understand digital
rhetoric and digital literacy, and proposes “digital and visual rhetoric sovereignty” by
recognizing that American Indians have composed and used wampum belts, which Haas
describes as “a living rhetoric,” to “record hundreds of years of alliances within tribes, between
tribes, and between the tribal governments and colonial government” (78). The work of
alternative rhetoric scholars is also felt in the composition classroom through the integration of
alternative discourses within traditional academic discourses. According to the editors of ALT
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DIS, these new discourses “accomplish intellectual work while combining traditional academic
discourse traits with traits from other discourse communities” and “invoke a counter-cultural
image that bespeaks the political resistance to hegemonic discourse that these new forms
express.” (Schroeder, Fox, and Bizzell ix).
Perhaps the greatest effect that alternative rhetoric has on the field of rhetoric and
composition and the public sphere is its capacity to change the status quo. As David L. Wallace
argues in Compelled to Write, alternative rhetoric helps “to sort out both the ways that some
groups have been systematically marginalized by dominant discourse practices that pretend
neutrality and the means those who have been so marginalized have used to challenge the
discourses of power” (4). He also adds that the “lion’s share of the work of alternative rhetoric
will, for the seeable future, revolve around exposing the inequities in our society, and the means
by which traditional approaches to language and rhetoric support those inequities” (24) and,
conversely, demonstrate how nontraditional approaches enact alternative ways of being and
knowing. In this chapter, I intend to contribute to and honor the aforementioned commitments of
alternative rhetoricians by showing how an oppressed group creates an online art exhibit that
provides an alternative rhetoric of chronic pain. As an effect, PainExhibit.org enacts positive
social change for persons with chronic pain, the field of rhetoric and composition, and the
disability community by offering counter-narratives to problematic rhetorics of chronic pain that
redefine what it means to live with chronic pain and other disabilities.
The most insidious rhetoric that PainEhibit.org seeks to challenge and redress is the
theoretical and commonplace belief that pain is inexpressible and resistant to language. This
rhetoric comes largely from the field of trauma studies (see especially Caruth; Felman; LaCapra;
Laub; Scarry), which theorizes that the experience of pain is not representable to others, and
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even to oneself, because the trauma of pain shatters the human subject and fractures language.
Most known for this theory is Elaine Scarry, whose seminal work, The Body in Pain, argues that
pain “evaporates from the mind because it is not available to sensory confirmation.” She also
insists that pain “comes unshareably into our midst as at once which cannot be denied and that
which cannot be confirmed” (4). However, despite the pervasiveness of Scarry’s work, it has not
gone unchallenged. Scarry’s most persistent detractors are disability life-writing scholars. For
example, in Illness as Narrative Ann Jurecic points to the abundance of literature about pain as
testimony to argue that that pain is not resistant to language. She explains that what makes pain
difficult to communicate is the challenge of making “readers receptive to stories of pain” and the
“restrictive biomedical language for pain” (51). Martha Stoddard Holmes also questions
Scarry’s conclusions about pain in her essay “Thinking Through Pain,” in which she speaks of
her own encounters with pain as a “site not of language erosion but generation” (133). Holmes
recounts how writing in her Moleskine notebook “anchored her to the waking world” as she
endured six months of chemotherapy, characterizing it as a time in which she wrote the most in
her adult life. In contrast, she describes how her experience of acute surgical pain, whose visit
she slept through, was “muted by the sense of a clear trajectory to the day when pain would be
gone and forgotten” (127). That language came more readily to her with chronic pain than with
acute pain suggests that we reread Scarry’s work as a treatise about acute pain, rather than
chronic pain. Holmes also urges her readers to “look at a wider range of relationships between
pain and language” (133).
As if in response to Holmes’s call, Susannah Mintz takes up this work in Hurt and Pain
by “capturing the fullness of pain’s iterations” and “broadening our study of pain as a matter of
language ingenuity,” which she does in her investigation of pain across literary genres (5).
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Mintz’s work is also important to this dissertation not only because it argues that “pain can be
uttered,” but also because it tells us what is at stake when we believe that pain is unspeakable,
such as “perpetuating the loneliness and fear that pain can inspire” and “reinforcing the idea that
pain forestalls our forward motion; that it is an interruption or aberration of our regular life” (9).
Instead she urges us into becoming writers and readers of pain expressed in alternative forms,
allowing us to
witness pain in very different guises; as generative, for example, rather than
overpowering; as the foundation of lyric and storytelling, the occasion for touch and
intersubjective understanding, the very substance as our status as moral but no less
resilient beings. (9)
PainExhibit.org, I argue, is one of these alternative forms. In the section below, I show how
PainExhibit.org challenges the commonplace belief that pain is uncommunicable and
inaccessible to those living outside the experience of chronic pain and instead offers multiple
ways of knowing chronic pain and its effects on those living with chronic pain conditions. In
addition, I also describe how the multimodality of PainExhibit.org complicates trauma theorists’
argument that pain is resistant to language, given the understanding that language is not limited
to linguistic forms of expression (see especially Haas; Kress; Powell et al; Shipka; Rice;
Yancey).
PainExhibit.org—An Introduction
PainExhibit.org is an online visual arts exhibit that features art by persons living with
chronic pain. The exhibit’s mission, which can be found on the site’s homepage, is to “educate
healthcare professionals and the public about chronic pain through art” and “to give voice to the
many who suffer in silence.” Founded by Mark Collen, who— after “herniating his disk in his
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lower back resulting in chronic nerve pain” struggled “to find quality pain management” and to
communicate the severity of his pain to his physicians—“made art of his pain.” Collen concludes
in the history section of the exhibit’s site that “art was far more effective at communicating pain
than words, and resulted in the receiving of better quality healthcare.”
Upon realizing the power of art to communicate pain, Collen began PainExhibit.org by
inviting artists “from around the globe” to “express some facet of their pain experience,” and
then assembled a collection of their artwork online. Rhetorically, PainExhibit.org creates a
community for stigmatized and marginalized persons with chronic pain and brings its artists’
struggles with chronic pain into the public sphere and collective consciousness. This community
also extends to exhibit visitors with chronic pain who may find comfort and support in seeing
their own similar private experiences with chronic pain reflected back to them. In addition, given
that the exhibit is virtual, this community fosters inclusivity by making it possible for persons
with chronic pain and other disabilities who are often ostracized by traditional art exhibit spaces
to “attend” the exhibit. By creating this community, PainExhibit.org offers an alternative rhetoric
of chronic pain—one of belonging—that troubles problematic rhetorics that insist chronic pain is
an isolating, individual, and alienating experience and speaks to this dissertation’s politicalrelational-rhetorical methodology, which argues that chronic pain is experienced in and through
relationships.
Selections featured in the exhibit include art images of paintings, photography, sculpture,
mixed-media, and found art. A few pieces also incorporate alphabetic text, seemingly used for
emphasis and to depict thoughts. The multiple modes (image, text, color) and materials (paint,
canvas, clay, glass) used in the artwork afford the artists with more means to render their pain
and their audience with greater opportunities to access the lived experience of pain being
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conveyed.31 Access to the artists’ works and their pain experiences is also increased given the
fact that the exhibit’s website offers multiple points of entry into the eleven art galleries resulting
in visitors having more agency over how they wish to experience the exhibit.32 Such agency
would not be possible for readers of a traditional, linear, print-based text on chronic pain. Thus,
PainExhibit.org enacts an alternative rhetoric of chronic pain not only through its messages but
also through its hybrid form.
One multimodal composition that exemplifies this enactment is Judy Cowan’s “Pieces of
Me.” The art image contains an exaggerated form of a head, arms, and torso of a human figure
painted in black. Inside the figure are scattered puzzle pieces of photographs painted, cut out, and
glued onto its surface. The images on the puzzle pieces seem to act as symbols that capture the
artist’s lived experiences of chronic pain: broken hearts, the word Love torn apart, the blue
waves of an ocean, black crosses, and a teddy bear wearing a pink ribbon. Cowan’s choice to
include the image of the teddy bear in her artwork serves as a critique of the tendency to
infantilize women with chronic pain considering the fact that teddy bears and other stuffed
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Although multimodality as it is theorized and practiced in writing studies is beyond the scope
of this chapter, it is worth noting that multimodal rhetoric scholars advocate for the use of
multiple modes in the composition process in order to increase accessibility (Arola and Wysocki;
Butler; Shipka; Yancy). For example, in “Where Access Meets Modality,” Janine Butler writes:
“I connect multimodality to accessibility to reflect the potential for communicating through
multiple modes to engage more senses. When we express meaning in more than one mode—
when we go beyond the spoken work in isolation, for instance—we increase the number of ways
that others might access our message” (n.p.).
32 However, it is important to note that despite these increased opportunities for access, persons
who do not have the means to afford personal internet service will still have limited access to the
exhibit. Also, the exhibit is not universally designed. For example, although there are artist
statements describing the artists’ interpretation of their images, there are no text captions to
describe the artwork to those visitors with visual impairments. Also, missing from the exhibit are
trigger warnings that indicate that an image could evoke trauma. Although, the ability to
communicate pain effectively is still challenging, Collen has made an important start.
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animals are often given as “get well” tokens to sick women, especially during hospital stays. The
pink ribbon wrapped around the teddy bear is indicative of how the color pink permeates sick
women’s hospital rooms and bedrooms because of its associations with femininity (see
especially Ehrenreich). On the outside of the figure are discriminatory remarks that are all too
familiar to persons with chronic pain, such as “it’s all in your head,” “oh, but you look so good,”
and “you’re just being lazy.” Cowan’s positioning of these problematic rhetorics outside of the
black figure speaks back to the demand that persons with chronic pain internalize and individual
their pain. In addition, the space outside of the body can be imagined as a shared public space in
which these dismissive comments circulate socially, thereby drawing attention to how chronic
pain and other forms of disabilities need to be theorized as political-relational-rhetorical. Also,
the hybrid form of the composition allows for multiple opportunities to access her experiences
with chronic pain. As a result, Cowan offers an alternative rhetoric of pain that validates and
values the lives of persons with chronic pain and demonstrates the communicability of chronic
pain by acknowledging the material realities of living with chronic pain and by disrupting
attempts by commonplace rhetorics to devalue a life in pain.33
As a person with chronic pain, I know I am more able to connect with and understand
Cowan’s and the other artists’ experiences with chronic pain through their art images than those
visitors coming to the exhibit without this shared experience of pain. I know I am more likely to
understand the symbols Cowan uses to express her struggles with chronic pain than those
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It is important to note that this line of inquiry intersects with work being done in visual and
digital rhetorics (i.e., Buehl; Frost and Haas; Graham; Teston). Although investigating these
connections is beyond the scope of this dissertation’s methodology, future iterations of my
methodology will be more heavily influenced by visual cultural rhetorics invested in
embodiment and social justice.
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without the shared experience of undergoing numerous hospital stays in rooms filled with teddy
bears, pink balloons, and pink flowers. Like Cowan, I have also felt the loss of faith and the
losing of love, and the betrayal of voices shouting that my pain is not real. We both know deeply
the marginalization and stigmatization that comes from being othered by problematic rhetorics of
chronic pain. For these reasons, Cowan’s artwork speaks to me because it speaks to my own pain
as well. I know this sense of solidarity is not available to those visiting PainExhibit.org without
the lived experience of chronic pain, and that, as an effect, the pain communicated to these
visitors by “Pieces of Me” and the other art images might not be the same as that which is
communicated to me. However, the pain that is communicated to those visitors who do not share
the artist’s lived experience can still be one that opens a space for questioning, thus leading to
possibilities for different kinds of connection and relations. These possibilities then offer
different, and no less important, understandings of pain. Also, there is value in becoming aware
of the pain of others, of being able to cultivate empathy for those who struggle in ways we
cannot truly know. And it is this empathy, this willingness to imagine other people’s pain, which
draws us all together.
The Galleries
The art images featured in PainExhibit.org’s eleven galleries include approximately
twelve images in each gallery. When selected, the images are enlarged and accompanied by the
artist’s name, the title of the artwork, a list of the materials used in the creation of the artwork,
and an artist statement.34 The titles of the galleries—“Portraits of Pain,” “Pain Visualized,” “But
34

The artist statements are a few sentences-to-two paragraphs in length. They read as though
they are journal entries produced by a writing prompt. Each statement tends to have similar
components: a description of the pain condition, an explanation of the artwork, what the artwork
is meant to convey, and the impact of pain on the artists’ lives. It is important to stress that the
artist statements do not appear simultaneously with the artwork in the gallery; rather, they only
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you Look so Normal,” “Healthcare,” “Escape from Pain”—in and of themselves are noteworthy
since they reflect the artists’ awareness of problematic rhetorics of chronic pain, such as: since
pain is invisible, it must not be real, and therefore persons with chronic pain are illegitimate.
These titles also suggest that visitors of the exhibit might experience a disconnect between
reading about the exhibit and actually viewing the collection. This disconnect is the result of the
congenial tone used in describing the exhibit and the artists’ expressed desire to help “educate
healthcare providers” about chronic pain without giving an indication of the darkness, anger, and
despair evoked by the images, especially those directed at the medical industry, the healthcare
professionals “treating” them, and the pharmaceutical industry.
The artists’ distrust and frustration are felt most in the “Healthcare” gallery where pills,
multicolored and in various sizes and shapes, are set loose: crashing down fences, scattering on
plates for an evening meal, and stacking high on a wall in Dilaudid pill bottles (a commonly
prescribed narcotic pain killer) where a shiny stethoscope hangs. Other striking images include a
tower-high cylindrical image visualizer plastered with X-rays and a pill bottle whose label has
been replaced with a hundred-dollar bill. These images not only express the artists’ frustration

come to the screen after a visitor clicks on the art image. As a result, the artist statements seem
secondary in importance to the art image on display and give the impression that they were
written after the artwork was already composed. In fact, given that as part of the submission
process artists have to explain “how each piece of art relates to you and your chronic pain,” I
would argue that most, if not all, of the artist statements were written for the submission process
rather for the artists’ themselves or visitors to the exhibit. I make this important distinction in
order to explain why my analysis of PainExhibit.org as an alternative rhetoric of pain focuses
solely on the artwork displayed and not the artist statements. Also, the fact that the artist
statements are not integral to experiencing the artwork might also explain why many of them not
only undermine the complexity and nuances afforded by the art images, but also re-inscribe some
of the problematic rhetorics of pain discussed in previous chapters (e.g., pain is uncommunicable
and not survivable) and, in so doing, become an example of the pervasiveness of these rhetorics.
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and disillusionment with biomedicine; they also serve as an alternative rhetoric of chronic pain
by providing a counter-narrative to the self-indulgent, doctor-shopping, and drug-seeking chronic
pain patient by revealing how medical professionals overprescribe medications and undertreat
their patients and how the pharmaceutical industry profits from patients’ pain. Thus, we see in
this example how PainExhibit.org aligns with the commitments of alternative rhetoric to make
apparent how those in dominant positions of power oppress marginalized populations and how
such populations challenge discourses of power and, in so doing, begin to upset the status quo.
As an effect, the artists become active agents in their healthcare management rather than passive
victims of a hegemonic medical system. In turn, exhibit visitors are invited to question the
“authority” that the medical and pharmaceutical industries seemingly have over their bodies. In
such a way, PainExhibit.org also participates in what Susannah Mintz describes as the larger
project of disability studies, which is to provide a counter-discourse to commonplace narratives
of disability by finding “a way of articulating the body that challenges the authority of medical
narrative and allows the individual to emerge as a self-authored, rather than a chart-noted, being”
(6).
In addition to revealing how the medical industry fails to effectively and ethically treat
persons with chronic pain, the artwork in the Healthcare gallery also troubles the medical model
of disability, which locates disability in the individual rather than acknowledging that disability
is created by political, societal, economic, and relational factors. For example, the proliferation
of medications in these art images illustrates the great cost of pain management, the stethoscope
hanging on the wall with the Dilaudid pill bottles points to the fraught and suspicious
relationship between pain specialists and their patients, and the image visualizer plastered with
X-rays points to the great amount of time and energy that persons with pain must undergo in
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order to receive treatment. Lastly, these criticisms of the medical model of disability speak to the
necessity of a political-relational-rhetorical model of disability that accounts for the above
material realities of living with disability and chronic pain.
Before moving on to the next section and continuing my analysis of the
PainExhibit.com’s artwork, I first wish to revisit an argument I presented in chapter 1 of this
dissertation. In that argument, I made a distinction between two types of rhetorics: problematic
rhetorics of pain and the new, generative rhetorics of chronic pain,35 and I now realize that the
distinction between the two is no longer necessary. I wrote that the former (problematic rhetorics
of chronic pain) defines rhetoric as the persuasive use of language, wherein language induces
audiences to accept certain versions of reality, which can thus be interpreted, contested, and
revised, while the latter (the new, generative rhetorics of chronic pain) defines rhetoric as the
study of how embodiment produces knowledge, identity, and ways of being-in-the-world. Now I
have come to understand that for persons with chronic pain and other “marginalized, ghettoized,
neglected or overlooked” populations, the act of critiquing problematic rhetorics is also an act of
survival. Thus, the art images in the “Healthcare” gallery, as is true of all the art images in the
exhibit, simultaneously critique problematic rhetorics of chronic pain and invent a new
generative and productive rhetoric of chronic pain that honors and values their lives. Hence, the
artists’ critique of problematic rhetorics of chronic pain is also what allows them to survive.

35

The new, generative rhetoric of pain is also what I refer to as alternative rhetorics of chronic
pain in this chapter.
94

The Visibility of Chronic Pain
The issue of knowledge location is central to the struggles of people experiencing pain.
The physical location of pain within bodies’ tissues is ambivalent, its materiality
questioned by practitioners who point to the lack of organic traces of chronic pain.
—Petra Kuppers, The Scar of Visibility
As discussed in previous chapters of this dissertation, many chronic pain conditions are
considered invisible because they do not appear in most imaging testing studies, such as X-rays,
Cat Scans, and MRIs (Foreman, A Nation; Wendell). As Petra Kuppers notes above, the fact that
chronic pain conditions cannot be detected in biomedical tests leads to medical professionals’
skepticism about the chronic pain patient and to their questioning of the validity of their patients’
symptoms. This skepticism is also felt by family and friends of persons with chronic pain who,
after time, start to question why their loved ones’ pain does not improve in spite of countless
doctors’ appointments, medications, and a lack of physical evidence to support reports of
suffering (Foreman, A Nation; Morris). As a person with chronic pain, I have often wished and
prayed for a broken bone, a fracture, swelling, bruising, scarring, even a tumor, anything that
would make my pain visible, and, therefore, believable and treatable. The supposed lack of
visibility of most chronic pain conditions is also what leads to chronic pain being labeled as
“bad” and “dirty” pain (Cervero; Schleifer), since unlike acute pain it is said to reveal no
indication of danger or a threat and instead leads to what pain scholar Ronald Schleifer describes
as “the destruction of a person’s sense of her life as a whole” (8).
Schleifer’s words serve as an example of how the belief that chronic pain is invisible
leads to problematic rhetorics of chronic pain. His use of such rhetorics also points to the need
for alternative rhetorics of chronic pain that are more nuanced and generative. Such a rhetoric
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can only come from refusing to accept the commonplace belief that chronic pain is invisible and
by interrogating who decides and what defines the invisibility of chronic pain. This can be done
by questioning the authority and objectivity of the “evidence” most used to discount the chronic
pain patient—the medical photograph.
The ethos of the medical photograph is a topic of conversation amongst disability studies
scholars and medical rhetoricians (i.e., Buckland; Garland-Thomson; Hall; Helle; Hevey;
Siebers). For example, in “Zip Zip My Brain Harts,” Alice Hall asks us to consider what it means
“to name, diagnose, and make disability visible on a literal level” (266). She argues that medical
portraiture is “based on a momentary fantasy of transparency” in which
X-rays turn the body inside out, not only in the sense that technology allows doctors to
make the hidden interior visible, but also in that they suggest that an external viewer can
“read” or “decode” an individual’s interior state from a single image. (267)
By questioning the ability of the medical photograph to name and diagnose, Hall complicates the
one-dimensional view of the body and the authority of biomedicine, reminding us that “the X-ray
cannot be seen as culturally neutral or simply as a technical-medical image” (267). Hall also
argues that the medical photograph “captures views of a body at a particular moment and does
not take into account the complex layering of cultural associations, power relations, and wider,
intersecting histories of oppression that construct and complicate the way that we see” (268).
Hall’s work challenges the invisibility of “invisible” disabilities, such as chronic pain conditions,
by showing the limits of medical knowledge as well as the limits of the photographic image.
Additionally, Hall’s work speaks to the need for alternative rhetorics of disability to reveal how
those in dominant positions of power construct restrictive identities of the disabled and how the
disabled resist such identity constructions.
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In Disability Aesthetics, Tobin Siebers also questions the ethos and objectivity of the
medical photograph by explaining that
the medical photograph is its own aesthetic genre, an aesthetic genre determined not to be
seen as one: it obeys a number of aesthetic rules, such as the use of full body profiles,
changing postures, and serial shots of the same subject, comparative anatomy between
subjects, and close-ups, but its primary aesthetic imperative is the pretense of objectivity
for the purpose of medical understanding and diagnosis. (45)
In addition to questioning the credibility of the medical photograph, Siebers also points out what
is at stake when the medical photograph is taken as truth when he writes that “there is no better
example with which to think of human disqualification than the medical photograph” (45). He
explains that the medical photograph “may enfreak any deviation from the baseline, however
slight,” considering that “the baseline in medicine is perfect health” (45). He concludes that the
danger of the medical photograph is its power to “represent a person as a medical oddity,” and,
in so doing, “disqualify the medical subject as inferior” (46). Rather than give the medical
photograph the power to define normalcy, Siebers instead turns to modern art for more realistic
and complex representations of disability. By challenging the ethics and omnipotence of the
medical photograph, both Hall and Siebers ask us to consider how other ways of seeing make
disability visible.
Consider, then, a pair of a woman’s feet. Side-by-side images of a pair of clay papermache woman’s feet jut out from a pinkish-red spray painted cardboard box resembling a slab of
heavy brick. The toes and tops of the feet are painted the same pinkish-red color as the cardboard
box. Thick shards of glass gather at the middle of the woman’s feet and then cascade over the
brick creating a waterfall of ice. In the second image, the back of the woman’s feet are inflamed
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red, small rocks are embedded in the skin, and more glass shards pierce the tender flesh before
falling to the floor in a heap. Consider then a charred and cracked hand lit up with bright redorange flames. Wisps of smoke surround the decaying hand in a landscape of darkness. The
damaged hand rests atop an artist’s notebook with a pencil-drawing of a healthy hand. Consider
then a woman’s back. The gentle curving interlocking vertebrae of her spine is replaced by
jagged heavy metal black and red anvils that crumble at the base of her back. Beside her is a tall
ladder. Across each rung of the ladder is the word Pain written in red ink.
Pain is visible in each of the PainExhibit.org’s art images described above. In Deborah
Ann’s “Pain Without Words,” the pinkish-red areas of the feet indicate the rawness, sensitivity,
and burning sensation that are often symptoms of chronic pain conditions. The shards of glass
that fall over the feet and the small rocks embedded in the soles represent chronic pain’s
contradictory sensations of sharpness and numbness. In “Suffering for Art,” Tanya Paterson’s
digital manipulated photograph of the charred and cracked hand bursting in flames makes it
almost possible to feel the scorching heat of the fire burning up the flesh. The juxtaposition of
the decaying hand atop the artist’s notebook with the drawing of the healthy hand is a
visualization of the trauma that many persons with chronic pain feel when disembodied from
what they believe to be their former “healthier” selves (see especially Wendell). In KJ William’s
“My Reality,” the ink drawing of the woman’s back makes visible an injured spine that has
seemingly undergone numerous surgeries to repair pierced nerves or dislocated discs. The heavy
metal anvils along her spine show the pressure, muscle spasms, and stiffness that many persons
with chronic pain feel with incurable and unexplainable back pain. The ladder with the rungs of
pain climbing upward into the sky can be seen as a variation of the pain scale found in most
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medical professionals’ offices that attempts to quantify the often subjective experience of chronic
pain from 0-to-10, and fails to do so.
Unlike the medical photograph with its limits, dehumanizing mechanisms, and
questionable ethics, the art images above invite us to consider and witness other ways of seeing
that make disability visible. Rhetorically, they trouble the unknowability of chronic pain and
offer an alternative rhetoric of chronic pain to the one presented to us in the static, onedimensional, snapshot of an X-ray of a body part at a particular moment. Instead of attesting to
chronic pain’s invisibility, the art images, like pain, breathe and pulse with life. They reveal the
artists’ humanity—their vulnerabilities, struggles, determination, and perhaps even their hope,
which is often the result of channeling difficult emotions and experiences into art. These images
do not portray the “destruction of a person’s sense of life as a whole” nor other such problematic
rhetorics of pain; rather, they are testaments to the resilience of the human spirit.
It is also important to note that the alternative rhetoric of chronic pain that these art
images express neither deny the hardships and other terrible realities of living with chronic pain,
nor do they put their audiences at ease and placate them with rhetorics of overcoming. What they
offer are nuanced and generative rhetorics of chronic pain that produce new insights and
knowledges about the richness and vastness of the embodied lives of persons living with chronic
pain, while opening up moments of difference and new alignments of power. In creating these
works of art, the artists also resist the medicalization of their bodies and, as an effect, challenge
the restrictive and stigmatizing identities forced upon them by the medical industry and others in
dominant positions of power. Consequently, these artists empower not only themselves, but also
the viewers of their work who also live with chronic pain by reclaiming their voices, their bodies,
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their minds, their feelings, and their sensations from objectification and victimization to
transformation and healing.
Cracked Voices and Narrative Medicine
In the opening of this chapter, I vowed to listen to the “cracked voices,” the “cries and
rants,” and the “teases and taunts” of those who live with chronic pain and have different stories
to tell, and move away from the voices of those in dominate positions of power who have
occupied this dissertation for far too long (Wallace 3). Thankfully, I began to do this listening as
I viewed the galleries at PainExhibit.org. Such listening can lead to positive social change for the
disability community, persons with chronic pain and other disabilities, and even practitioners of
medicine.
The practice of medicine, “despite such technical progress,” argues physician and
narrative medicine specialist Rita Charon, is populated by “doctors that often lack the
capabilities to recognize the plights of their patients, to extend empathy, and to join honestly and
courageously with patients in their struggles toward recovery, with chronic illness, or in facing
death” (24). Charon argues that narrative medicine, which she describes as “medicine practiced
within the narrative competence to recognize, absorb, interpret and be moved by stories of
illness,” will “lead to more humane, more ethical, and perhaps even more effective care” (8). I
wish to propose that as an alternative rhetoric of chronic pain, PainExhibit.org is also a site of
narrative medicine with the potential to positively change the way medical professionals treat
chronic pain and the persons who live with these conditions. Such a proposal aligns with the
mission of PainExhibit.org, which is to “educate healthcare providers” about chronic pain, and
with founder Mark Collen’s own personal experience of receiving improved medical treatment
as a result of using his art to communicate his pain to his physician. The stories of resilience,
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suffering, desperation, and hope that the artists offer in PainExhibit.org can have an
extraordinary impact on the future of pain medicine that too often overprescribes opioids and
nerve blocks rather than encouraging patients to share their experiences of living with daily,
unrelenting pain.
In “When the Photograph Speaks,” Anita Helle notes that contemporary narrative
pedagogy in medicine has expanded to include visual media by realizing its importance to “our
evolving understanding of the sick” (297). This fact points to the possibility that the art images
featured at PainExhibit.org will be received and accepted as legitimate forms of medical
knowledge production and lead to the increased communicability and visibility of chronic pain
amongst healthcare professionals. As a consequence, problematic rhetorics of chronic pain will
lose the power they once had to marginalize and stigmatize persons with chronic pain and new
productive rhetorics of pain will continue to emerge. In addition to being of vital importance to
the improved healthcare treatment of persons with chronic pain, narrative medicine also is said to
have healing powers for those patients who tell their stories. Charon explains that the
proliferation of illness narratives, or pathographies, “demonstrate[s] how critical is the telling of
the pain and suffering, enabling patients to give voice to what they endure and to frame the
illness so as to escape dominion over it” (86). While reading Charon’s words, I am reminded of
the ways in which the PainExhibit.org’s artists expose themselves, open up to their pain, and
then release their hurt, and of the alternative rhetorician’s responsibility to listen.
This responsibility to listen, especially to those voices that are appropriated by persons in
dominant positions of power claiming subject-positions that are not their own, is powerfully
expressed in Jacqueline Jones Royster’s “When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own” and
Krista Ratcliffe’s “Rhetorical Listening.” Both feminist rhetoricians urge scholars in the field of
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rhetoric and composition to incorporate listening as invention into their research and pedagogies
as a transformative process that can lead to deeper understanding of cross-cultural differences.
Ratcliffe offers that “perhaps through listening we can avail ourselves with more possibilities for
inventing arguments that bring differences together, for hearing differences as harmony or even
as discordant notes, (in which case, at least, differences are discernable)” (203). Royster
similarly urges us “all to be awake, awake and listening” (40). In addition, she asks us to take
care in our listening, especially when “strangers outside of our communities” speak for us. She
cautions us to recognize that although these strangers offer “interpretive views,” these views still
“tend to have considerable consequences in the lives of the targeted group, people in this case
whose own voices and perspectives remain still largely under considered and uncredited” (32).
When I listen to Royster’s warnings, I am reminded of how the voices of persons with
chronic pain are appropriated by institutions of power—medical experts, the pharmaceutical
industry, popular news outlets, and legislative bodies that claim to speak for and know of the
embodied lives of persons with chronic pain. For example, they claim to know that laziness is
what keeps persons with chronic pain unemployed and in search of Social Security Disability
benefits, they claim to know that since chronic pain “indicates no harm” that it must be
meaningless, they claim to know that “a life in pain is not a life worth living.”36 But then I stop
and listen.
Royster is still speaking. She is speaking about Audre Lorde’s wisdom and how it has
encouraged her to come to voice:

36

This quote is from Tobin Sieber’s article “In the Name of Pain.” In that article he explains that
the able-bodied consider that a “life in pain is a life not worth living,” (184) and how this belief
is used as a reason for ending the lives of persons with disabilities.
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Lorde teaches me that, despite whatever frustration and vulnerability I might feel, despite
my fear that no one is listening to me or is curious enough to try to understand my voice,
it is still better to speak. (36)
By listening to Royster’s words I am reminded of PainExhibit.org’s artists and the bravery that
resides in each of their art images. I listen to Royster explain that stories act as “vital layers of a
transformative process,” and I hear her call for those whose voices have been displaced and
erased by “authorities” to join their stories with hers:
My sense of things is that individual stories place one against another build credibility
and offer, as in this case, a litany of evidence from which a call for transformation in
theory and practice might rightfully begin. My intent is to suggest that my stories in the
company of others demand thoughtful response. (35)
I realize then that Royster is calling for alternative rhetoricians to rewrite the stories and
reinscribe the voices that were taken without permission. In response, I offer up the stories
hanging up in the galleries of PainExhibit.org and, when I listen close enough, I can almost hear
those other voices disappear.
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CHAPTER VI
COLLECTIVE AFFINITIES: NORMALCY, INTERSECTIONALITY, AND
MULTIMODALITY IN DISABILITY-THEMED WRITING COURSES
Three years have passed since I published the article, “Investigating Students’ Reception
and Production of Normalizing Discourses in a Disability-Themed Advanced Composition
Course,” in a special issue of Disability Studies Quarterly that welcomed contributions from
disability studies scholars who integrated disability studies into their pedagogies. In those three
years, I have finished all but this chapter of my dissertation, relocated twice, slowly embraced
my disability identity, and become a mother. I mention all of this to account for the changes in
my subjectivities, embodiment, knowledges, and beliefs that now inform my work as a teacherscholar, and I realize that I am no longer the same woman who wrote that article.
Exposure in these last three years to the core commitments of the fields in which my
work resides—disability rhetoric, disability studies, and feminist rhetorics—has pressed upon me
the ethical imperative to acknowledge one’s own positionality in relation to one’s research and
teaching (Kerschbaum; Kirsch and Royster; Oliver; Price; Wallace). This awareness has also
allowed me to recognize that all of the students who enter my classroom are unique and diverse
because they are shaped by the multitudes and limitations of their embodied experiences.
Although, at the time of developing the course, I had made a commitment to practice an
inclusive and accessible pedagogy, I failed to recognize the diversity of all my students, seeing
instead their similarities: they were mostly white and came from rural and working-class
backgrounds. Now I realize I made assumptions about their capabilities, strengths, and
weaknesses based on rigid identity categories and, by doing so, limited their potential to develop
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and contribute to the course.37 In effect, I normalized my students in a class devoted to disrupting
normalizing discourses.
Although it is disheartening to realize how some of the pedagogical choices I made when
teaching the course and writing “Investigating” were problematic, I welcome this opportunity of
looking back so that I can move forward. In this penultimate chapter of my dissertation, it seems
apt to be doing this work. In “Investigating,” I came to a conclusion regarding pedagogy that I
believe still has value. I wrote that “pedagogy is not a static category to be fit into, but rather a
philosophy that emerges from our subject positions, identity formations, and our ways of beingin-the-world” (Selznick). Given the fact that three years has passed since I wrote “Investigating”
and taught my “Discourses of Normalcy” advanced composition course, and that my ways-ofbeing-in-the-world have changed, I can expect to continue to have new insights similar to those I
describe above. This chapter, then, is devoted to analyzing “Investigating Students’ Reception
and Production of Normalizing Discourses in a Disability-Themed Advanced Composition
Course” and the class that informed that article through the lens of this dissertation’s politicalrelational-rhetorical methodology, both to improve the course I created three years ago and to
gain insight into my evolving pedagogy and teacherly identity.
Desiring Normalcy
I always wanted to be normal, so much so that I began “Investigating” with this
declaration and designed a disability-themed composition course that asked students to question
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In Toward a New Rhetoric of Difference, Stephanie Kerschbaum warns of this tendency
among writing teachers to fix students in static identity categories. Instead, she explains the
necessity of how “recognizing the contingency of identity and remaining vigilant toward our
own orientations to difference is important for us as teachers because our vantage points lead us
to see our students in particular ways—some of which can be harmful and damaging” (9).
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what it means to be “normal” and to consider how the concept of normalcy threatens the lives of
persons deemed “abnormal.” The impetus for developing a course on the “Discourses of
Normalcy” emerged from my reading disability scholar Lennard J. Davis’s Enforcing Normalcy,
which revealed the social construction of the norm. From Davis, I came to understand that
normalcy is a fiction, or rather an ideology, constructed by those in dominant positions of power
to suppress difference. As an effect, the concept of the norm separates the desirables from the
undesirables, the normal from the abnormal, and the abled from the disabled. In “Investigating,”
I concluded that despite reading and doing work in disability rhetoric, “I still carried around a
normal measuring stick,” knowing that “the most powerful narratives are the hardest to resist.” I
also wrote that one of the reasons I decided to teach a course that looked at the terrible material
consequences of discourses of normalcy on marginalized populations was because I did not want
my students “to wait until they are my age to realize that being normal is a façade and that trying
to fit in with the norm suppresses our unique identities.” Put more simply, I did not want my
students to become me. Now as I revisit the article, I am relieved to realize that in doing the
work of this dissertation—analyzing, critiquing, and disrupting dangerous problematic rhetorics
of normalcy—my desire for normalcy has lessened, and I am coming closer to accepting myself
as I am. This is what I want for my students. And yet, by making the above claim, I do not wish
to negate how powerful and insidious is the ideology of the norm; rather, I realize from my
research that being aware of such an oppressive ideology can reduce the power it has over our
lives. This is also what I want for my students.
In addition to the above realizations, I also know now that normalcy is a concept more
complicated than I had once thought and presented in my teaching. My dissertation’s
methodology has shown me that normalcy is not only a rhetorical, social, and cultural construct
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but also influenced by political, socioeconomic, and relational factors. As such, any explorations
of normalcy must include discussions of how power dynamics, class structures, institutions,
legislative bodies, relationships, and the politics of identity contribute to the norming process.
Without this more nuanced understanding of normalcy, I did not give my students the knowledge
necessary to interrupt and disrupt normalizing rhetorics, which was one of the core aims of the
course. For example, although as a class we spent much time considering how language and
rhetoric shapes the norms associated with disability and other stigmatized populations and how
such rhetoric affects the ways these populations are represented and treated, we did not discuss
how institutions (educational, medical, rehabilitative) that are meant to support persons with
disabilities participate in the norming process, and, as a result, to the systemic oppression of the
disabled (see especially Ben-Moshe, et al.; Kafer). In addition, class readings and discussions
paid little attention to how the eugenics movement, right-to-die legislation, and debates over
selective abortions for fear of birthing disabled children are also products of rhetorics of
normalcy. Conversely, we did not address how the norms associated with poverty, such as
poverty is the result of laziness, are used to deflect from real social inequities such as the
inaccessibility of quality healthcare to low-income populations.
Although it would be difficult to cover this much content in a single semester, and
perhaps suggesting that I should would be setting myself up for disappointment, I want instead to
focus on how realizing that normalcy is influenced by political, socioeconomic, and relational
factors, in addition to being socially and culturally constructed, changes my orientation to
normalcy and affects how I will teach future iterations of this course, and how other disability
rhetoric scholars might also think through the complexities associated with teaching a course on
rhetorics of normalcy. For instance, knowing that disability cannot be divorced from politics, as
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is also true of gender, race, class, and sexuality, makes it possible for a future discourses of
normalcy course to address Alison Kafer’s call to understand disability differently by “making
room for more activist responses” and “seeing disability as a potential site for collective
imagining” (9). One way I can implement Kafer’s call in a future iteration of a discourses of
normalcy course is by incorporating an activist unit into the course syllabus. In addition to
continuing to assign an academic paper that asks students to analyze, critique, and disrupt
discourses of normalcy as they relate to disability and other marginalized identities (which is a
form of activism), I might also task my students to work in groups to develop a public writing
project or create and implement a proposal that does activist work by addressing a social justice
issue related to their lives on campus, such as the inaccessibility of dormitory life and the
gendered stereotypes used in marketing advertisements posted around campus. Another possible
project for this unit could ask students to investigate a local or online activist group that
problematizes normalizing stereotypes and have students participate in these groups by using
writing to further the aims of these organizations. Incorporating these types of assignments into a
future syllabus, I believe, will not only show students how discourses of normalcy are contingent
on political factors, but also encourage students to realize their agency as social actors to enact
change.
Similarly, coming to understand that disability and other marginalized identities are
relational because they are “experienced in and through relationships” (Kafer 8) has profound
implications for how I would teach a disability-themed advanced composition course in the
future. This is especially true since it has caused me to reconsider some of the conclusions I
made in “Investigating” in regards to student work. For example, in “Investigating,” I spoke of a
student who “ends up reifying the narrative of overcoming and inspiration” in her life-writing
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paper, in which she wrote that her blind uncle “made the people around him, especially me learn
to appreciate and simplify life at times.” I had concluded in the article that this student reinscribed normalizing discourses in her writing by situating her uncle as the “moral compass for
which she judges herself and others” and, in so doing, “reduced his life.” However, now that I
am aware that disability is relational, I realize that I was not in the position to make such
conclusions, considering that the student understood disability through her relationship with her
uncle—a relationship that I was not privy to. Without knowing more about my student’s
relationship with her uncle, I made a generalization about my student’s perception of disability
based on my research and experience at the time that may have been inaccurate and unfair. In
retrospect, it would have been best to talk to my student about my concerns and also ask her to
spend more time in the revision of her life-writing paper developing her relationship with her
uncle. As an effect, her readers would have more insight into how she came to understand
disability through that relationship. As the above example indicates, by understanding that
disability is relational, I now realize that when analyzing student responses to normalizing
discourses, I need to pay more attention to the contexts in which they are written.
Understanding that normalcy and disability are relational has also given me insight into a
troublesome interaction that took place during a group discussion during my normalcy class. In
“Investigating,” I spoke of how a student exhibited a “forcibly negative reaction” at another
student’s disclosure that she had A.D.H.D and took medications for her symptoms. The student
with the negative response explained that his younger brother with A.D.H.D was “ruined” for
years from taking similar medications. Although I tried to “mitigate the conversation by making
it less personal,” both students left class that day frustrated, and the student with A.D.H.D told
me later that her classmate’s reaction was the reason why she usually did not self-disclose her
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disability. I concluded in “Investigating” that I felt terribly that “I failed to protect her from
normalizing discourses and I wonder what I could have done differently.” I realize now that I
need to reconsider my perception of the situation. Now that I know that normalcy is relational
and that disability is experienced in and through relationships, it is clear to me that my first
mistake was in thinking that their discussion was not personal. In fact, both students had very
personal relationships to A.D.H.D, and it would have been impossible for them to ignore their
subjectivities in such a discussion. Perhaps instead of trying to mitigate the conversation, it
would have been more valuable to both students and the class if I allowed them to continue their
discussion but then shifted their attention to the ways in which our relationships shape our
perceptions of normalcy and disability. By doing so, my focus would move away from trying to
shield my student from normalizing discourses (which would not be possible no matter how
much I wanted to) and move more productively to enabling her to better understand them.
As I hope the above discussion demonstrates, my dissertation’s political-relationalrhetorical methodology has allowed me to develop a more complex understanding of normalcy
and of my own desire to be normal. By incorporating this understanding into my teaching
practice, I can with more confidence create a future discourses of normalcy course that better
equips students with the knowledge and awareness they need to analyze, critique, and disrupt
oppressive and discriminating normalizing rhetorics not only in their compositions, but also in
their own lives. This is what I want for my students.
Intersectionality and “White Disability Studies”
One of the issues I grappled with during the planning of my “Discourses of Normalcy”
course was whether I should develop an advanced composition class that focused exclusively on
disability studies content, or whether I should broaden the scope of the class to look at issues of
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normalcy as they related to race, gender, sexuality, class, and other minority identities. When I
reflected on this decision in “Investigating,” I came to the realization that I chose to look at
issues related to other minority identities including disability because I was unsure if seemingly
nondisabled students would be receptive to an entire semester of disability studies content and
would rather take a course that considered multiple identity categories. Therefore, I decided that
I would use disability studies theory as the foundation for the course and then apply that theory
to disability and then to the other marginalized identities mentioned above.
The decision worked out well. However, I was wrong about my assumption regarding
student resistance to disability studies content. Most of my students had never taken a class that
addressed disability and remarked in reading responses that they appreciated being introduced to
the field. The normalcy theme also energized my students, and subsequent class discussions were
animated and compelling. Hence, in “Investigating,” I wrote that “the course theme was
effective” and that after being exposed to critical disability studies earlier in the semester my
students were “more open and willing to discuss other social justice issues relating to race,
sexuality, religion and class” (Selznick). Yet, despite these successes, when I look back at the
question I posed—whether to focus the course on disability or also include other minority
identities—through the lens of my political-relational-rhetorical methodology, I realize I was
operating on a fallacy that all minority identities are discrete categories of difference rather than
understanding them relationally as also intersecting identities. Given this new lens, I realize that
it is impossible, and perhaps even unethical, to develop a course on disability that does not also
attend to race, gender, sexuality, class, and other minority identities. In addition, by not
recognizing these identity categories as also intersecting identities, I foreclosed consideration of
what Akemi Nishida describes in “Understanding Political Development through an
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Intersectional Framework” as the “ways in which various social injustices intertwine and
interactively affect our daily lives.” Thus, I find myself looking at how the concept of
intersectionality, which disability studies scholar Stephanie Kerschbaum describes as “a rich
consideration of how different factors shape identity and identifications” (64), might address my
concerns and offer my students a deeper understanding of how rhetorics of normalcy oppress
stigmatized and marginalized populations. In order to this work, it seems necessary to review
some of the scholarship on intersectionality, apply that scholarship to a reflection of
“Investigating,” and then consider how intersectionality can invigorate a future iteration of a
disability-themed composition course.
Developed by critical race feminist scholars, the concept of intersectionality is described
as a way of understanding “the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social
relations and subject formations” (McCall 1771). By understanding these relationships, it
becomes possible to analyze the experiences of people who are located at the interstices of
multiple differences and to better address the social injustices they face. For example, in
“Mapping the Margins,” Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw advocates for intersectionality as a “way
of framing the various interactions of race and gender in the context of violence against women
of color” by considering that
many of the experiences that Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional
boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood,
and that the intersection of racism and sexism factor into Black women’s lives in ways
that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those
experiences. (1244)

112

As an example of the above, Crenshaw illustrates how an intersectional analysis is crucial to
understanding the plights of battered women, which she explains is the result of “when systems
of race, gender, and class domination converge” (1246). Without such an analysis, Crenshaw
concludes, “intervention strategies based solely on the experiences of women who do not share
the same class or race backgrounds will be little help to women who because of race and class
face difference obstacles” (1246).
Disability scholars Nirmala Erevelles and Andrea Minear similarly describe how an
intersectional analysis is essential to understanding the “historical context and structural
conditions within which the identity categories of race and disability intersect”38 (357). They pay
particular attention to ways in which these categories have intersected in the U.S. education
system to cause multiple forms of oppression. For example, in “Unspeakable Offenses,” they
describe how the association of race and disability led to
a large number of students of color (particularly African American and Latino males)
being subjected to segregation in so-called special educational-classrooms through
sorting practices such as tracking and/or through labels such as mild retardation and/or
emotional disturbances. (357)
As an effect of putting disability and race into conversation with one another, Erevelles and
Minear also make it more possible to recognize when such convergences happen in the future
and to develop more effective ways to intercede in them.
The work of the above scholars has shown me that presenting race, sexuality, disability,
class, and gender as separate entities and not also as intersecting identities limited my students’
38

It is important to mention that Erevelles and Minear are cautious of critical race feminist
theory’s characterizations of intersectionality that do not account for disability in their analyses
and/or understand disability as a biological condition rather than a social construction. (356-59)
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understanding of how the ideology of the norm is used to silence, punish, and eradicate
difference. For example, when I look back at my students’ Normal Commonplace Books39, I
notice how an understanding of intersectionality could have enriched their analyses.
This is particularly clear in the instance of my student who produced a Pinterest board for
his commonplace book, which I discussed in “Investigating,” by using a mix of images and texts
to disrupt the norm that “real men” do not need to be stereotypically masculine—muscular,
strong, and athletic, without including a single image of a man of color. The fact that I never
noticed that all of his images were of white men until now is rather shocking to me since I teach
a course on normalcy! With this new awareness, I now think of how much more insight my
student could have gained about masculine normativity had he also considered race in his
analysis. Similarly, as I look back at the Art as Representation papers that my students produced,
in which they were asked to analyze a piece of “art” that used normalizing stereotypes, I realize
that students who chose to analyze disabled characters in film did not also take into account how
race, class, gender, and sexuality also affected the characters’ experiences of disability. For
instance, in her paper on Avatar, a student produced an astute analysis of how the main
character’s disability, portrayed as a defect in need of an eradication, motivates him to endanger
his life at the promise of a new functioning leg; however, she did not also consider how his
desire for a cure might have been impacted by the hyper-masculinized norms of the military and
the character’s fear of losing his career and military status. These examples not only show me
how an intersecting analysis could have meaningfully impacted my students’ understanding of
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Throughout the semester, students were asked to take notice of some of the societal
commonplace assumptions in regards to normalcy, stigma, and stereotypes and arrange them in a
“book.” This was a semester-long project and the students used various material and digital
technologies to create the books.
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normalcy, but also how such an analysis could have enhanced their ability to disrupt normalizing
rhetorics and imagine different futures for stigmatized populations.
The above explorations of the concept of intersectionality have also made me aware of
the fact that, as Chris Bell warns, my advanced composition disability-themed course was
actually a white disability studies-themed course. In “Introducing White Disability Studies,” Bell
writes that the field of disability studies is not inclusive since it fails to “engage issues of race
and ethnicity in a substantive capacity, thereby entrenching whiteness as a constitutive
underpinning” and focuses only on the “work of white individuals and is itself largely produced
by a corps of white scholars and activists” (275). After providing compelling examples of how
the above is true, Bell writes that if “Disability Studies as a field had taken a reflexive look at
itself at some point, particularly with regard to its failings in examining issues of race and
ethnicity, there might not be such a glaring dearth of disability-related scholarship by and about
disabled people of color” (278). When I take a reflexive look at my own teaching of disability
studies, I notice that although I talk about race and ethnicity in my normalcy course, in particular
in regards to white privilege, I did not consider these identity categories in the context of
disability. Also to my dismay, when I review my “Discourses of Normalcy” course syllabus, I
notice that every critical disability studies reading and disability life-writing excerpt I assigned
was written by a white author. As a consequence of not bringing the scholarship and stories of
disabled persons of color into the classroom, I participated in the silencing of marginalized
voices. In retrospect, I can easily see how I could have incorporated these voices into the course
and how the course would have been more valuable because of that inclusivity. For example, my
students were particularly engaged with the disability studies use of the concept of “passing,”
which I introduced through white disability studies scholar Brenda Jo Brueggmann’s “Lend Me
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Your Ear,” who discusses passing in reference to her deafness. Although I would not strike the
reading from the course since Brueggmann does such interesting work incorporating her personal
experiences with critical scholarship, I could have also assigned black disability scholar Dea H.
Boster’s “I Made Up My Mind to Act Both Deaf and Dumb,” which tells of how slaves
“pass[ed]” as disabled in order to gain agency over their masters. By including Boster’s essay in
the course readings, we could have discussed how race and disability intersect and gained a
much richer understanding of the complexities of “passing.” In addition, I could also have
assigned Nirmala Erevelles’s “Disability in the New World Order,” in which she discusses the
intersections of Third World feminism(s) and disability, and, as a result, we could have moved
our examination of normalcy outside of the U.S. and into the context of globalization and
transnationalism.
Lastly, I realize from this discussion of intersectionality that bringing the concept into a
future normalcy course can also enable students to explore their own subjectivities, embodied
experiences, and the ways in which they self-identify and identify with others. In doing so, they
will better understand themselves in relation to normalcy and be more aware of their own use of
normalizing discourses. In “Investigating,” I thought it was my responsibility to intercede in their
uses of these discourses rather than discovering ways in which students might realize for
themselves when they reified in their writing the same normalizing rhetorics that they critiqued
in class. Now, through this analysis, I can see how making intersectionality a part of the content
of the course can assist students in acts of self-discovery. Such acts, in turn, can allow them to
notice when they use normalizing rhetorics and choose for themselves how to respond.
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Reconsidering Access and Multimodality
In these last three years, since developing and teaching “Discourses of Normalcy” and
writing “Investigating,” my work in disability studies has allowed me to recognize that access
means creating spaces where human difference is not only valued but encouraged. This
realization is crucial to reimagining a course on normalcy that celebrates difference. In
particular, disability scholar Tanya Titchkosky’s scholarship on disability and access has shown
me that access is an act of perception, “a form of oriented social action that organizes the sociopolitical relations between bodies and social space” (3). Questions of access, she writes, reveal
which bodies belong and which need to fight for legitimization. Under this framework, then,
access has become a privilege rather than a basic human right. By looking at access as a
questioning orientation rather than reducing access to accommodation or simply viewing access
as inclusion, I am more able to develop a pedagogy that honors the strengths and contributions of
all bodies.
Prior to reading disability studies scholarship on access, when I designed and taught
“Discourses of Normalcy, my understanding of the concept of access was limited to discussions
of the ways in which students could make their compositions more accessible to diverse
audiences. Although having students consider the accessibility of production, delivery, and
reception of their texts is fundamental to their work as compositionists, it would have been best
to first consider whether the design and approach of the course were accessible to my students so
that they would be more able to do such important work. Also, a more nuanced understanding of
how access is political, relational, and rhetorical could have enriched my students’ awareness of
the subtle ways in which norming operates by masking discriminatory practices as natural
exclusions under the guise of “unreasonable” accommodations. In addition to being valuable to
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students, a more in-depth understanding of access would have allowed me to witness the fact that
I was norming my students by not practicing an “ethic of accessibility.” For the remainder of this
section then, I will use Cynthia L. Selfe and Franny Howes’s conceptualization of an “ethic of
accessibility,” described below, as a heuristic for understanding how I practiced an accessible
pedagogy during the development and teaching of “Discourses of Normalcy” as discussed in
“Investigating,” and how I might improve upon this pedagogy in all future composition
courses40.
In the multi-authored webtext, “Multimodality in Motion,” Selfe and Howes ask
composition teachers to practice an “ethic of accessibility.” Such an ethic, they explain,
includes teaching students “how to create texts that allow the broadest possible range of people
to make meaning in ways that work best for them,” in addition to “expanding our understanding
of the physical and material conditions needed for learners” and acknowledging “the responsible
and respective attention we need to pay to the differences people bring to the educational spaces
of composition programs, classes, and assignments” (qtd in Yergeau). After rereading
“Investigating,” it is clear to me that I only considered access in relation to the first part of Selfe
and Howes’s explanation of an “ethic of accessibility” since I only spoke of accessibility in
terms of developing texts for multiple audiences, especially in relation to disabled users. As I
said earlier, although considering the accessibility of texts is crucial to developing usable and
effective compositions, ensuring that the course was accessible to my students needed to be my
first priority. I realize now that I could have made my class more accessible by inviting students
to join me in developing course projects; selecting course “readings” (including digital texts,
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My decision to italicize “all” reflects my belief that enacting an accessibly pedagogy should
not be restricted to disability-themed composition courses.
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print texts, and multimodal compositions); and designing assessment criteria. In addition to
ensuring that all materials and assignments were accessible, students would also have had the
opportunity to become more active participants in their own knowledge-making. Furthermore, by
involving my students in creating accessible pedagogy, I would be heeding Margaret Price’s call
in “Multimodality in Motion” that we composition teachers build academic infrastructures
through participatory design that are accessible to all bodyminds41. Without paying attention to
access in this way, Price warns that infrastructures will “continue to be designed for normate42
bodyminds, and non-normate bodyminds (those that are gendered, classed, raced, disabled in
particular ways) will disappear” (qtd in Yergeau). This is an important consideration in a class on
normalcy.
My review of “Investigating” has also revealed that I believed I was addressing issues of
access by simply assigning multimodal projects. I explained this belief by concluding in
“Investigating” that “multimodal assignments unlike strict, linear, rule-based writing
assignments allowed students to access more aspects of themselves and their abilities in the
composing and delivery process” and that “the audience of multimodal compositions have
greater opportunities at accessing these compositions.” Although I still agree with these
conclusions, and a plethora of scholarship supports my belief that many multimodal projects are
more accessible than traditional print-based papers (see especially Ball; Dolmage; Shipka; Selfe;
Yancey), I also know now that I need to be more careful when equating multimodal projects with
access since many of these projects still remain inaccessible to a variety of users. For example, in
41

Margaret Price uses the term bodyminds, which is a term sometimes used in trauma theory and
psychotherapy, to “emphasize that although ‘body’ and ‘mind’ usually occupy separate
conceptual and linguistic territories, they are deeply intertwined” (qtd in Yergeau).
42
Normate is a term coined by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson that represents a “mutually
constituting” figure existing opposite the disabled figure.
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“Multimodality in Motion,” Stephanie Kerschbaum explains that “many multimodal texts are not
commensurable across modes” and that “this lack of commensurability means that for many
multimodal texts, if someone cannot access one or more of the modes, the entire text is
inaccessible” (qtd in Yergeau). Kerschbaum’s warnings have me reconsidering the accessibility
of some of my “Discourses of Normalcy” students’ multimodal projects, which I assumed were
accessible because of their use of multiple modes.
I am thinking specifically of a major course project in which students had to create a
multimodal remix of their print-based, traditional life-writing narratives that described their
personal experiences with normalization. Although many of the projects were insightful and
inventive, I realize now that most of them privileged some modes over others and, as a result,
were not accessible to many audiences. For instance, many of my students who composed videos
for the life-writing multimodal remix projects used auditory modes (narration, music, dialogue)
and visuals, but did not include closed-captioning, rendering their projects inaccessible to deaf
and hard-of-hearing audiences. Another student produced an interesting and provocative sound
essay that depicted her experiences with eating disorders and disrupted gender norming.
Although the student used a variety of auditory modes, she never turned in a script for those who
could not access sound. Also, I recognize now that when students were using Pinterest boards for
their Normal Commonplace Books, neither my students nor I conducted any research beforehand
on Pinterest’s compatibility with screen readers. In addition, in many class discussions I spoke of
access as a retrofit43, rather than considering from the onset how to develop and construct a
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In “Mapping Composition: Inviting Disability in the Front Door,” Jay Dolmage explains that
“to retrofit is to add a component or accessory to something that has already been manufactured
or built. This retrofit does not necessarily make the product function, does not necessarily fix a
faulty product, but it acts as a sort of correction” (20).
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multimodal project for a variety of users. Although I do not expect future students to produce
fully accessible projects in a one semester course, especially since my own skills are limited in
this area, I do believe that integrating the concept of access in the course content would have at
least pressed upon my students and myself the urgency to de-normalize composition by
discussing and implementing, as best as possible, universal design principles. By doing so, I
would have come closer to practicing an “ethic of accessibility.”
In addition to assigning multimodal projects following readings on and discussions of
access and its relationship to normativity, I now realize that another way I can practice an “ethic
of accessibility” in all of my future composition courses is by making access a part of our
everyday classroom experiences. For example, students can routinely analyze the accessibility of
digital spaces, texts, and other materials that they encounter through their research practices and
strategize how to improve the accessibility of these resources to make them more useful to a
wider range of persons with differing needs. In addition, students can analyze the accessibility of
spaces around campus and in their communities and incorporate their findings into a multimodal
project of their own choosing. Also, by assigning more group assignments and projects, I can
help students become more aware of the different insights and perspectives that each group
member brings to the table and of each other’s access needs.
Lastly, before closing this section, I want to address the final part of Selfe and Howes’s
“ethic of accessibility,” which stresses the importance of paying “responsible and respective
attention to the differences people bring to the educational spaces of composition programs,
classes, and assignments.” Although I would have said at the time I developed my normalcy
course and wrote “Investigating” that I practiced an accessible and inclusive pedagogy by doing
the above, I know now that I would have been mistaken. It is only through this reflection on the
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concept of access seen through the lens of my dissertation’s political-relational-rhetorical
methodology that I have come to understand that all students who enter my classroom are unique
and diverse because they carry with them their own truths and beliefs, vulnerabilities and
strengths, and ways of knowing and expression. I also know now that by fixing rigid identities on
my students and by not acknowledging the intersections of their identities, the class I designed
worked for some bodies and not others. Thus, I normed my students and, in doing so, restricted
their access to class materials, class content, richer understandings of discourses of normalcy,
and, most importantly, to realizing their full potential as thinkers and writers.
Looking Forward
Instead of ending this chapter with the narrative of all the “mistakes” I made in
developing my “Discourses of Normalcy” course and in “Investigating,” which I am dangerously
close to doing, I want to instead close this chapter by looking forward. And yet, it is important to
note that in looking forward I do not mean to reify the normative rhetoric of improvement that is
so often expected from teachers in pedagogical reflections. Rather I wish to look forward in a
way that honors the important work of teaching my discourses of normalcy class and writing
“Investigating,” while also accounting for the new knowledge and awareness I have gained by
looking back. In order to make this possible, I am letting go of the normalizing rhetorics that tell
teachers to “fix” the errors of the past in order to move forward. Instead I look forward to
developing and teaching a future iteration of my normalcy class that is not motivated by regret,
but rather invigorated by my dissertation’s methodology, evolving subjectivities, and political
commitments. I look forward to witnessing my students become more empowered by a course
that theorizes and practices intersectionality and how the collective affinities that come from
intersectionality can challenge stringent and fixed categories of difference that contribute to the
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power of discourses of normalcy. I look forward to the multitude and diversity of voices that will
echo through the walls of my classroom and spill out into the hallways and beyond.
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EPILOGUE
For twenty years, I have filled notebook, upon notebook, upon notebook—perhaps
hundreds—with my pain. It began after my first emergency room visit when the sharp spasms in
my belly caused me to collapse on the floor of my tiny dorm room. Since then I’ve come to the
page when I have nowhere else to go. I used to buy fancy journals, the kind that you can still find
on the shelves of Barnes and Nobles and independent stationary stores, with gilded pages and
striking Asian-inspired designs on the covers: long-stemmed crimson flowers, burnt orange
sunsets, intricately-painted mandalas, all accompanied with Chinese proverbs encouraging me to
find courage and faith in myself and in the world around me. Next I turned to classical literature
and sought out journals whose covers carried the words of William Blake, Emily Dickinson, and
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, with the hope that their oft-quoted passages would ease some of my
pain. Then I tried Italian leather-wrapped journals, some with and some without lines. But I often
found it difficult to allow myself to write of such ugliness in places meant for beauty.
Later I read Natalie Goldberg’s Writing Down the Bones, in which she urged me to write
instead in spiral notebooks with unadorned or whimsical covers to give myself the freedom and
permission to write imperfectly, ignore the censor, and let go of the fear that often comes from
writing about the self. Sometimes I wrote to G-d and prayed for him to take the pain away.
Sometimes I wrote about the things I missed about myself and my life before chronic pain,
especially the curiosity and spontaneity. Other times I wrote about the pain itself—how it moved
inside of me in fits and starts, stiffened my muscles and weakened my limbs, burned and cooled
my skin—as I tried to make sense of its messages. And I think now of all those notebooks: piled
high in my basement, stacked away in cardboard boxes, leaning on one another on my
bookshelves, and how I can’t get rid of them. I take them with me each time I move to a new
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home, even though the words inside are illegible, slanted so heavily that they run into each other,
rushed in swirls and loops, and left with uncrossed Ts and sentences with missing words. The
result of sleepiness, an opioid-addled brain, and the achiness of my hands. I take them with me
because more than any treatment, medicine, or specialist, these notebooks have kept me alive.
And I remember that day at the Disability Studies Conference, when the patient-advocate at my
Q&A asked me if pain destroys language and of how silly it was that I had to search for an
answer.
And yet I am grateful for her question, for it has allowed me to understand the necessity
of arguing that chronic pain is communicable to persons without the lived experience of chronic
pain. It has also made me realize that if we were to continue to invest in the theoretical and
commonplace belief that pain is unknowable, we would lose the valuable insights into the human
condition that a life in pain affords. Additionally, by employing this dissertation’s politicalrelational-rhetorical methodology to reveal the ways in which pain is communicable, I have
made it possible to provide a presence for persons with chronic pain in the fields of rhetoric and
composition, feminist rhetorics, disability studies, and disability rhetoric, in which this
dissertation resides. By beginning this work, I hope that persons with chronic pain are more able
to claim a disability identity, and, as a result, have increased access to the resources and benefits
that make living with chronic pain more manageable, while also experiencing the solidarity that
comes from being a part of a community that has a shared understanding of oppression and
marginalization. Pursuing the question of the communicability of chronic pain has also led me to
discover how normalizing rhetorics are used to punish and silence persons with chronic pain for
supposedly threatening the health of the nation-state and how to intercede in their proliferation.
Perhaps most importantly, exploring the relationship between language and pain has made it
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possible to witness alternative and generative rhetorics of chronic pain that account for and honor
both the loss and the wisdom that comes from living with chronic pain.
However, as is true of all explorations, my study has yielded almost as many questions as
answers. Although attending to these questions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I want to
take the time to identify what some of these questions are and briefly consider how they open up
future inquiries into the study of chronic pain, rhetoric, and disability for myself and other
teacher-scholars invested in this work. The majority of these questions relate to the concept of
crip, intersectionality, alternative rhetorics of chronic pain, and access as it relates to chronic
pain.
The first time I encountered the term “crip” was that same day when the patient-advocate
asked me about the communicability of chronic pain. It was at that Indian restaurant after I
explained how chronic pain made it difficult to make and keep friends since no one could
understand how I could appear perfectly healthy one day and then claim I needed to stay home
the next because of pain and fatigue. In response, the women around the table had told me that I
needed “crip” friends. When I wrote of this conversation in this dissertation’s prologue, I marked
it as the moment that I felt part of and let into a community that shared similar struggles and
understood the pain of alienation. Throughout the rest of the conference, I heard the term crip
evoked in numerous presentations and pop up in casual conversations between conference
attendees. And yet, I still did not quite understand what the concept meant.
From what I gathered at the conference, crip seemed to suggest an identity that somehow
merged queerness with disability, while simultaneously resisting identity categories. Also, crip
seemed to be just another word for disability, yet it problematized some of the aims of the
disability movement. I could not make sense of its contradictions. However, since my
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dissertation argues that chronic pain is a disability and needs to be theorized as such in the fields
of disability rhetoric and disability studies, it made the most sense to use disability theory as the
theoretical framework for the dissertation and not engage with the concept of crip. But now that I
have made these arguments, I find myself coming back to crip and embracing its contradictions,
especially because it reminds me of how chronic pain defies easy explanations.
Specifically, I wonder how crip theory, which Robert McRuer defines as “the study of
how bodies and disabilities have been conceived of and materialized in multiple cultural
locations, and how they might be understood and imagined as forms of resistance to cultural
homogenization” (33), might lead to a greater and more nuanced understanding of chronic pain,
and of how persons with chronic pain problematize culturally imposed binaries such as
healthy/sick and abled/disabled. In addition, I also wonder if the term crip, which crip theorist
Carrie Sandahl refers to as “fluid and ever-changing,” rather than the term disability, which is
more fixed and restrictive, might better represent the shifting and fluctuating nature of chronic
pain conditions. If so, might persons with chronic pain benefit from claiming a crip identity,
rather than, or in addition to, a disability identity since crip theory includes illness and
impairments that are not usually recognized as disabilities (see especially Kafer; McRuer;
Sandahl)? Conversely, how might taking up chronic pain in their scholarship further the aims of
those working in crip studies? Likewise, how might the inclusion of persons with chronic pain in
the crip community empower crip movements? Another line of inquiry that might be of interest
to teacher-scholars concerned with chronic pain and disability is an exploration of “crip time.”
Specifically, would crip time, which Alison Kafer describes as “flex time not just expanded but
exploded . . . [which] requires reimagining our notions of what can and should happen in time, or
recognizing how expectations of ‘how long things take’ are based on very particular minds and
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bodies” (27), be useful in challenging stigmatizing representations of persons with chronic pain
as lazy and deceitful? As all of the above suggests, a consideration of the concept of crip offers
rich and robust avenues for future study into the relationship between chronic pain and disability.
Now that I have considered future inquiries into how the collapsing of identity categories
can potentially benefit persons with chronic pain, it seems prudent to also consider possible
inquiries into how recognizing and maintaining identity categories can lead to a more nuanced
understanding of chronic pain. In order to do this work, I turn to the concept of intersectionality,
which has been used in critical feminist race studies and disability studies to analyze how the
intersections of multiple identity categories can lead to increased experiences of oppression for
minority groups. Although I attended to intersectionality in my dissertation in relation to my
pedagogy (see chapter 6 “Collective Affinities”), I limited my engagement with the concept
knowing that I needed to first theorize chronic pain as a disability in order for persons with
chronic pain to claim a disability identity. Now that this work has begun, it becomes possible to
explore the ways in which chronic pain intersects with and is affected by race, ethnicity, gender,
sexuality, class, and other identity categories. This exploration seems particularly necessary
considering that pain research indicates that “a disproportionate number of persons with chronic
pain come from traditionally disempowered groups” (Graham) and “chronic pain greatly
exasperates already existing inequality in our society” (Bourke 300).
Future research on intersectionality and chronic pain might look at the demographics of
the chronic pain population and analyze how cultural rhetorics influence why certain minority
groups are more likely than others to report high levels of pain.44 Other explorations into race,

44

In a recent National Institute of Health’s (NIH) study on chronic pain, women, older
individuals, and non-Hispanics were more likely than Asians to report pain. In “I Don’t Feel
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ethnicity, and chronic pain might consider why minority groups receive less pain management
treatment than white pain patients and are less likely to get their prescriptions for pain
medication filled at pharmacies (Foreman, Why; Graham; Wailoo). A specific inquiry might
address how racial stereotypes and colonizing rhetorics are being used to justify giving black
pain patients less pain medicine than white males. Additionally, future research on
intersectionality and chronic pain could examine the intersections between gender and chronic
pain, which seems especially important given that recent statistics indicate that a much larger
number of women are diagnosed with chronic pain conditions than men.45 Disability
rhetoricians and feminist rhetoricians might wish specifically to study how the rhetoric of the
“hysterical female” (see especially Segal; Vidali) leads to the feminization of chronic pain,
skepticism over chronic pain as a legitimate disease, and the under-treatment of persons with
chronic pain. Also, those interested in doing work on intersectionality and chronic pain might
wish to pursue the connection between chronic pain and low-income populations, especially in
regards to access and healthcare and the policing of opioid medications. Clearly, as with crip, the

Your Pain,” Ruth Graham reports that among pain patients, blacks and Hispanics are likelier to
report their pain as severe.
45

According to a recent article in the New York Times, women are twice as likely to have
multiple sclerosis, two to three times more likely to develop rheumatoid arthritis and four times
more likely to have chronic fatigue syndrome than men. As a whole, autoimmune diseases,
which often include debilitating pain, strike women three times more frequently than men
(Edwards). Similarly, in “Why Women are Living in the Discomfort Zone,” Judy Forman
informs that “women are both more likely to get chronic painful conditions that can afflict either
sex and to report greater pain than men with the same condition, according to studies over the
past 15 years” (n.pag.).
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concept of intersectionality has much to offer future scholarship on chronic pain, disability
rhetoric, disability studies, and feminist rhetorics.
I wish to turn now to speculate on how future work on alternative rhetorics of chronic
pain might further emphasize the communicability of chronic pain. In an earlier version of
chapter 1 of this dissertation, I discussed how I would be exploring several alternative rhetorics
of chronic pain that would offer productive and generative rhetorics of chronic pain that need not
be restricted to linguistic forms of expression. I also wrote that these alternative rhetorics would
offer persons without the lived experience of chronic pain multiple ways to access and
experience chronic pain. As a result, these alternative rhetorics of chronic pain would challenge
the prevailing belief that pain is uncommunicable, while also complicating what counts as
language. Due to the time and space constraints of a dissertation, I was only able to analyze one
example of this type of alternative rhetoric of chronic pain: a non-profit visual art exhibit on
chronic pain titled PainExhibit.org. Thus, I am left wondering how other forms of alternative
rhetorics of chronic pain might offer different engagements with chronic pain and also provide
unique insights into the lives of persons with chronic pain.
One possible line of inquiry might be to consider how disability performance art
challenges the invisibility of chronic pain, considering that “performance is a conscious
placement of one’s body into the visible, tangible scene of a show” (Kuppers 2). Doing so could
complicate the belief that chronic pain is unknowable. Also, it would be interesting to analyze
how the aims of disability performances, which Petra Kuppers describes as “creating unexpected
encounters, fleeting moments, and puzzles and unanswerable questions” (1), mirror the
experience of living with chronic pain. Another alternative rhetoric of pain worth future study is
autobiographic disability comics, especially for multimodal rhetoric scholars. A specific inquiry
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could explore how autobiographical disability comics capture the trauma of living with chronic
pain by utilizing visual, gestural, spatial, audio, and multimodal modes (see especially Jacobs
and Dolmage). In addition, disability-life writing, including memoir, the lyric essay, and
disability blogs, might offer multiple inquiries into the communicability of chronic pain and
provide realistic and genuine representations of living with chronic pain. Lastly, I propose that
studying crip poetry, which Jim Ferris explains as poetry that “centers the experience of disabled
people [and] shows disabled people taking control of the gaze and articulating the terms under
which we were viewed,” might be useful in challenging rhetorics of suffering that view chronic
pain as tragic and shameful, while also complicating normative expectations of form and
language.
Contemplating how alternative rhetorics of chronic pain offer more access to
understanding lived experiences of chronic pain has been an important part of the work of this
dissertation. In addition, exploring access as a concept and a practice has allowed me to identify
the reasons why persons with chronic pain are often denied access to quality medical care and
other much-needed services. This exploration had led me to the conclusion that access should be
considered a fundamental human right and not a matter of privilege. I also studied access from a
disability studies perspective, and in doing so I was able to reimagine how to develop a more
inclusive pedagogy that supports the needs of all students. However, now that I have come to the
conclusion of this dissertation, I am surprised to realize that I did not consider issues of access in
the context of chronic pain.
One line of inquiry I wish to explore in the future, then, is how to develop an accessible
pedagogy in the composition classroom that would speak to the needs of students with chronic
pain. One question that comes to my mind readily is how I can make the physical environment of
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the classroom more accessible for students with differing chronic pain conditions. Attending to
this question is especially necessary considering that many college disability services offices do
not consider students with chronic pain disabled and therefore do not offer them
accommodations. Given that chronic pain conditions can fluctuate in severity almost daily, other
inquiries might explore how stringent attendance policies, mandatory face-to-face teacherstudent conferences, and the demands of group projects might make it difficult for students with
chronic pain to be successful in their courses. Consequently, what changes to class policies might
need to be made in order to accommodate students with chronic pain?
Perhaps students could Skype or Zoom into class on high intensity pain and fatigue days?
Maybe instead of meeting in person with their professors for conferences, students with chronic
pain can arrange Google Chats as an accommodation? Similarly, might it be possible for students
with chronic pain to use Google Hangout in order to “attend” peer-group meetings? And most
importantly, how can all of this be done while still practicing universal design for all students?
Although these questions are important, I realize that they are focused more on accommodation
than access. Thus, maybe future research into making composition classes more accessible to
persons with chronic pain and all students should instead, or in addition to, concentrate on
thinking of access more conceptually. For example, an avenue for future work might focus on
how to change perceptions of “participation” and “time,” instead of thinking of access in terms
of a retrofit.
This inquiry could also expand to include other spaces of academia and consider faculty
in addition to students. Specifically, one future study might look at access issues as they relate to
chronic pain in what Margaret Price calls the “kairotic spaces” of academia. Price defines
kairotic spaces as the “less formal, often unnoticed, areas of academe where knowledge is
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produced and power is exchanged” (Mad 60). She identifies one of these spaces as the academic
conference. I know personally the difficulties of participating in academic conferences when
access for persons with chronic pain is not a consideration. Although I value and look forward to
academic conferences to share work and hear the work of my colleagues, I am often in so much
pain the last day of the conference because of all the sitting, navigating the long hallways at
conference centers, and too short in-between session times that I almost regret attending the
conference at its close or have to leave early, and yet I am expected to participate in them in
order to be successful in my profession.
Price explains that kairotic spaces tend to be understudied because they go unnoticed by
those who “move through them with relative ease” (“Multimodality”). I am interested in Price’s
work on the inaccessibility of kairotic spaces not only because it considers access issues beyond
the classroom, but also because it points to an even larger concern: that the expectations of our
profession are predicated on the assumption that all of us have normative bodyminds. Perhaps,
then, the best way to make the work of our profession accessible to persons with chronic pain
and other disabilities is to recognize our diversity as a community of teacher-scholars and to
approach our work relationally through collaborations. These kinds of investigations into access
and chronic pain are worth advocating for and can lead to much-needed change in our
classrooms, profession, and other areas of academic life.
***
Tonight, as is true of all nights, before I go to bed I will lie down with one heating pad on
my belly and another one on my back, and I will write in my notebook. However, I no longer
feel the loneliness of my pain and get lost in my suffering. This dissertation has changed my
pain, as it has changed me. I used to believe that I would never get better, but perhaps I didn’t
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understand what better meant. I realize now that my pain is not useless or invaluable and that
neither am I. Rather, I have come to accept that pain is a part of my life and although it stays
with me this night and all nights, I can use it to channel change by continuing to do the important
work that this dissertation has begun.
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